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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WANDA EILEEN BARZEE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20060627-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant, WANDA EILEEN BARZEE ("Ms. Barzee"), appeals the trial court's 
June 21, 2006 Ruling on Motion to Compel Medication. R530-568 (Addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(h), as this is an 
interlocutory appeal involving first degree felony charges. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in granting the State's motion to compel 
medication? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a question of first impression in Utah. The 
parties stipulated below that the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence: 
(1) the State has an important interest in restoring Ms. Barzee to competency; 
(2) involuntary medication will significantly further the State's interest such that 
it will have (a) a substantial likelihood of rendering Ms. Barzee competent, and; 
(b) a substantial unlikelihood of causing side effects that will significantly 
interfere with Ms. Barzee's ability to assist counsel in her defense; 
(3) involuntary medication is necessary to further the State's interest; and 
(4) medication is medically appropriate for Ms. Barzee. 
Sell v. United States1 (Addendum B); R579:6. Some federal courts considering this issue 
have determined that "[wjhether the Government's asserted interest is important is a legal 
question that is subject to de novo review.... [and the trial court's] findings with respect 
to the other Sell factors are factual in nature and are therefore subject to review for clear 
error." United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157 (2nd Cir. 2004); accord, United States v. 
Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005). 
Because this is a matter of first impression, the appropriate standard of review of 
the mixed questions of law and fact involved has not been formally established in Utah. 
However, this Court's recent decision in State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, weighs in favor of a 
correctness standard, wherein no deference should be given to the trial court's decision.2 
]539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct 2174, 156 L. Ed. 2d 297 (2003). 
2This case involves fundamental liberty interests expressly recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court in Sell, and "mixed questions where uniform application" is 
thus "of high importance" as is "establishing consistent statewide standards". State v. 
Levin, 2006 UT 50, f23. Facts relevant to the underlying inquiry, even if complex, will 
be "reflected in a cold record." Id. at ^40. Even if the facts relevant under the Sell 
analysis may or may not be complex or disputed or significantly impacted by witness 
credibility, the need for uniformity on the question of forced medication and the 
fundamental liberty interests involved weighs against a deferential standard of review. Id. 
2 
However, Ms. Barzee will assume that the highly deferential clear error standard applies. 
Under this standard, Ms. Barzee must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial 
court's factual findings then demonstrate, in light of that evidence, why those findings are 
clearly erroneous. Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 1123, 1140 (Utah 2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 18, 2003, Ms. Barzee, along with the co-defendant, Brian David 
Mitchell, was charged with two counts each of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated 
Sexual Assault, and one count of Aggravated Kidnaping, all first degree felonies; and one 
count of Attempted Aggravated Kidnaping, a second degree felony, or in the alternative 
Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Kidnaping, a second degree felony. Rl-21. On 
March 27, 2003, the State filed a Petition to Inquire into Competency of Defendant which 
the court granted after Ms. Barzee's counsel stipulated to the same. R41-8, 70-78. 
After two independent evaluators found Ms. Barzee incompetent, she requested 
a hearing. R98-9. Although the trial court initially ordered the hearing closed to the 
public, it later reversed that decision after much protest from various media interveners. 
See, e.g., R98-9, 102-135; 138-218, 227-252,283-86. As a result, Ms. Barzee waived her 
right to a competency hearing while proffering her belief that she is competent. R253-56. 
at \A2. The decision will "define the boundaries" of the compelling liberty interests at 
stake. Id. at [^44. Further, there is a "strong interest in promoting clarity and consistency 
in our state's jurisprudence" on the question of forced medication, which "will benefit the 
accused by offering predictable constitutional protections", and benefit the state by 
providing uniform standards. Id. at f41. 
3 
On February 4, 2004, the trial court entered its findings and conclusions that Ms. 
Barzee was not competent to proceed. R293-307. A subsequent competency hearing was 
conducted on August 10, 2004 (R363-65; R577), and on February 4, 2005, the trial court 
entered its findings and conclusions that Ms. Barzee was still not competent. R367-75. 
On February 7, 2005, the Utah Attorney General's Office filed a motion for a 
medication hearing. R380. In the meantime in September 2005, the trial court conducted 
another competency hearing and concluded Ms. Barzee was still not competent. R425-
26; R578. On October 14, 2005, the State filed a Motion for Medication Hearing and for 
Forced Medication (R428-30), and the Attorney General's Office withdrew its motion, 
deferring litigation of the matter to the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. R433-34. 
A hearing on the State's motion was conducted on February 16, 2006. R474-75; 
R579. After simultaneous briefing by the parties (R477-501; R502-29), the trial court 
granted the State's motion to compel medication on June 21, 2006. R530-68. Ms. 
Barzee, through her attorneys, petitioned this Court for review of the trial court's 
interlocutory order, which petition this Court granted on September 20, 2006. R572-73. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 18, 2003, Ms. Barzee was charged for her alleged role in the 
kidnaping of Elizabeth Smart. Rl-21. On April 9, 2003, the parties stipulated and the 
trial court granted a petition to inquire into Ms. Barzee's competency. R70-72. Both 
evaluators assigned to assess competency, while reaching different diagnoses, agreed 
4 
Ms. Barzee is delusional and not competent to proceed. R336-37. In its February 4, 
2004 findings, conclusions and order, the trial court found that while Ms. Barzee was 
able to consult with counsel, she lacked "the capacity to engage in a reasoned choice of 
legal strategies and options [and] suffers an inability to participate in the proceedings 
against her with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, due to a severely 
compromised or impaired ability to reason about, consider and rationally weigh 
alternatives available for her defense" (R288, 293-307). 
Ms. Barzee was transported to the Utah State Hospital ("USH") pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §77-15-6. R293-98. At a review hearing on August 10,2004, the State 
acknowledged its burden of showing a substantial likelihood of Ms. Barzee being 
restored to competency in the foreseeable future (R363-65; R577:5), and Dr. Gerald 
Berge, a psychologist in the forensic unit of USH was the only witness. R577:12. 
Dr. Gerald Berge 
Dr. Berge could not conclude that Ms. Barzee was substantially likely to become 
competent in the foreseeable future because it is impossible to quantify the likelihood of 
restoration in her case. R577:45-6, 60, 69, 72, 83. He concurred with Dr. Kovnick's 
previous diagnosis of shared psychotic delusional disorder,3 but would change it to 
3
"A delusion is a false fixed belief that is maintained in spite of evidence to the 
contrary." R577:17. DSM-IV, the "accepted" and authoritative "diagnostic manual for 
psychiatric disorders"(R577:15), defines a shared psychotic disorder as follows: "A 
delusion develops in an individual in the context of a close relationship with another 
person . . . who has an already established delusion." R577:18. Delusional disorder "is 
5 
delusional disorder if Ms. Barzee's delusions did not subside after being separated from 
the dominant partner, the co-defendant in this case. R577:19-20, 52. Dr. Berge found 
Ms. Barzee had made some improvement particularly from what Dr. Cohn reported, 
which report he believed to be inaccurate.4 However, there was no improvement in her 
mental illness and delusional thinking; Ms. Barzee was simply being "more flexible in her 
attitude toward her defense team" (R577:73, 82). As to whether she had actually 
progressed, Dr. Berge conceded, "It depends on how you measure that." R577:81. 
Dr. Berge testified that Ms. Barzee's delusions "arose in the context of her 
relationship with her husband", were "continuing in spite of separation" and had not 
decreased in intensity or degree. R577:19, 21. There were no unusual changes reported 
during her treatment, nor had there been any changes manifest in either the depth or 
structure of her delusions. R577:25, 33, 72-3. 
distinguished from schizophrenia by a more adaptive level of functioning" (R577:26), and 
is not characterized by bizarre delusions, but rather is characterized by delusions that 
could not occur in reality. R577:26-7. 
Dr. Raphael Morris explained that a bizarre delusion is one that would be 
physically impossible to realize, such as twisting yourself into your own pocket or 
Martians coming down and placing a computer chip in your floor. On the other hand, 
receiving messages to pray from a television program is not a bizarre delusion according 
to psychiatric diagnostic principles. R579:105-06. 
4While finding no improvement in her delusions, Dr. Berge found Ms. Barzee less 
impaired than what Dr. Kovnick and Dr. Cohn reported, although he believed Dr. Cohn 
was mistaken from the outset in her interpretation of Ms. Barzee's symptoms and her 
diagnosis. R577:40-l, 61, 66. For example, Dr. Berge disagreed with Dr. Cohn's 
conclusion that Ms. Barzee was having hallucinations, opining that was a 
misinterpretation of the data obtained from Ms. Barzee's self-reporting. R577:62, 66. 
6 
If Ms. Barzee's delusions continued or if it turned out the co-defendant was not 
delusional, Dr. Berge would change the diagnosis simply to delusional disorder, R577: 
25, 47, 55. Persons with delusional disorder are "quite resistant to change" and because 
of its rarity there is a lack of data specific to patients suffering from it. R577:41, 44, 59-
60. Further, Dr. Berge testified that the substantial length of Ms. Barzee's illness5 is a 
negative factor weighing against the likelihood of competency restoration. R577:46-7, 
59, 69. Moreover, Ms. Barzee's USH treatment team was unable to predict with medical 
certainty how Ms. Barzee would respond to medication. R577:48. 
As with previous and subsequent examiners, and consistent with delusional 
disorder {see, fii. 3, supra), Dr. Berge concluded that Ms. Barzee can comprehend and 
appreciate the charges, she has the capacity to disclose pertinent facts, she understands 
the potential penalties, she can exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior, and she has a 
good relationship with her attorneys. R577:36-7, 39-40. 
However, because of her delusional thinking, Ms. Barzee is significantly 
impaired in her ability to engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options and 
she suffers at least mild impairment in her ability to testify relevantly. R577:37, 39. Dr. 
Berge explained that Ms. Barzee's delusions create "an unpredictable element of how she 
wi l l . . . make choices and reach decisions based upon her delusions." R577:37-8. She 
5Dr. Berge concurred with both Drs. Cohn and Kovnick that Ms. Barzee was 
mentally ill perhaps 20 years prior to her admission to USH. R577:61. 
7 
"has a mental disorder that keeps her from making judgments about the existence of a 
mental disorder." R577:49. Dr. Berge could not say there was a "substantial probability" 
Ms. Barzee would become competent in the foreseeable future. R577:45-6. 
At the conclusion of the August 10, 2006 hearing, and notwithstanding Dr. 
Berge's testimony that Ms. Barzee' competency impairing delusional thinking had not 
improved (R577:19, 21, 25, 33, 37-9, 46-7, 49, 59, 72-3, 81-2), the trial court found that 
while she remained incompetent to proceed, "With respect to the criteria referring to the 
Defendant's ability to engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options, although 
the impairment is represented to be severe, there has been significant improvement in this 
area by the Defendant since she has been in the Utah State Hospital"; and there is a 
substantial probability she may become competent in the foreseeable future. R367-79; 
577:92. Ms. Barzee's counsel objected to these findings on the ground they were not 
supported by the evidence. R577:87-90. 
Dr. Eric Nielsen 
In November 2004, USH lawyers began making preparations and filing 
paperwork to force medicate Ms. Barzee under the standards set forth in Sell v. United 
States, supra. R578:24. Dr. Eric Nielsen, a clinical social worker under contract with 
USH, was then assigned to evaluate Ms. Barzee and found she had made no progress 
toward competency. R578:8, 24. On September 16, 2005, the court found Ms. Barzee 
still incompetent based upon Dr. Nielsen's report. R425-26; R578:5, 8, 17. 
8 
Like Dr. Berge, Dr. Nielsen concluded that Ms. Barzee's delusions impair her 
ability to "make a rational decision about the management of her case" and her ability to 
testify relevantly, but she likes her attorneys. R578:14. Dr. Nielsen explained that Ms. 
Barzee has "cognitive awareness" of her case, but "she is fairly rigid in her delusional 
beliefs and quick to deflect any kind of information that would be contrary to her 
perception of the world" and "absorbs herself in the delusion." R578:15-16. Her 
delusions continue to impair her ability to recognize she has a mental illness. R578:16, 
23. Since her separation from the co-defendant, Ms. Barzee experienced a "shift in her 
thinking" in that she has left him behind, but remains as delusional as ever. R578-10-11. 
Contrary to Dr. Berge's, Dr. Cohn's, and Dr. Kovnick's diagnoses, Dr. Nielsen 
diagnosed Ms. Barzee with psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified ("NOS"), finding 
her behavior was not "clearly identifiable" as either delusional disorder or schizophrenia. 
R578:10-12, 19-20. Dr. Nielsen conceded that all of the previous and current diagnoses 
are psychotic disorders with the common feature of Ms. Barzee's inability to judge reality 
and there is "no question that Ms. Barzee has delusions." R578:105 18. Schizophrenia 
and psychotic disorder NOS are more restorable and likely to respond to medication than 
delusional disorder. R578:18. Ms. Barzee's continued lack of insight into her mental 
illness6 is a delusional symptom of her disorder. R578:23. 
Dr. Nielsen estimated that persons suffering from psychotic disorder NOS have a 
6The technical term for this lack of insight is anosygnosia. 
9 
50-80 percent chance of being restored to competency (R578:12-13), but medication 
"doesn't work as a rule" for delusional disorder. R578:13. Thus, Dr. Nielsen believed 
there was a "better than 50 percent probability that [medication] would make a difference 
and would cause some change in [Ms. Barzee's] behavior." R578:17. Dr. Nielsen 
testified, "Whether that ultimately led to a complete restoration, I can't say. But I think it 
would make a difference." R578:17. Dr. Nielsen conceded that while responsiveness to 
medication depends upon facts specific to the patient, he did not consider those pertinent 
aspects in forming his conclusions in her specific case. R578:21-2. 
After finding Ms. Barzee incompetent a third time, the trial court found it lacked 
sufficient information to conclude whether Ms. Barzee had made any progress toward 
competency. R578:37,45. On October 14, 2005, the State filed a motion requesting an 
order forcing Ms. Barzee to be medicated against her will. R428-430. An evidentiary 
hearing on the motion was held on February 16, 2006. R474-75; R579. 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL MEDICATION 
Dr. Kreg Jeppson7 
Dr. Jeppson, who testified for the State, was a forensic psychiatrist who went 
straight from his four-year residency after medical school to USH where he was employed 
for six years exclusively in the forensic unit as a practitioner and "curbside" consultant. 
R579:8-10. Because Dr. Jeppson was the only physician who treated female patients, he 
7Unfortunately, Dr. Jeppson passed away from cancer subsequent to the hearing. 
10 
was Ms. Barzee's attending physician "by default" for about two years prior to the 
evidentiary hearing, excluding two and half months when he was on medical leave. 
R579:11,14. He met with her "weekly to monthly," often for "just a few minutes here 
and there" (R579:17), and observed no progress towards competency. R579:14. 
Dr. Jeppson consulted with his colleagues about forcefully medicating Ms. 
Barzee under Sell in anticipation of an evidentiary hearing, and apologized, "I am not 
what you would deem an expert witness. I am a clinician." R579: 31. His testimony 
was based on the 200 patients he treated during his tenure at USH, about 180 (or 90 
percent) of which were restored to competency; but only a rare few of Dr. Jeppson's 
patients suffered from delusional disorder. R579:9, 13, 31-2. 
Dr. Jeppson initially diagnosed Ms. Barzee with delusional disorder. R579:12. 
About the same time the State filed its motion to force medication, Dr. Jeppson changed 
to the "working diagnosis" of psychotic disorder NOS. R579:12, 33, 38, 39-41. He 
admitted the latter is a catch-all used if one lacks sufficient information to make a more 
accurate diagnosis. R579:36.8 About 15-20 percent of his patients were diagnosed with 
8Dr. Jeppson read from the DSM-IV, "Psychotic disorder not otherwise specified . 
. . includes psychotic symptomatology, i.e., delusions, hallucinations, disorganized 
speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, about which there is inadequate 
information to make a specific diagnosis, or about which there is contradictory 
information, or disorders with psychotic symptoms that do not meet the criteria for any 
specific psychotic disorder." R579:37. Of these symptoms, Dr. Jeppson identified only 
delusions (grandiose and persecutory type, with grandiose being most prominent), as 
being exhibited by Ms. Barzee. R579:15, 41-2. 
11 
psychotic disorder NOS. R579:13,44. 
Dr. Jeppson changed the diagnosis because Ms. Barzee's symptoms "became 
more apparent, where she was quoted as saying that she was told to watch movies by God 
so that she could get answers to prayers through movies." Id. Dr. Jeppson characterized 
this behavior as "referential thinking"9 "out of the range" of delusional disorder, although 
he acknowledged that "[Ms. Barzee] brought that up a long time ago" (R579:12,22) and 
those symptoms were part of her history before her admission to USH, known at the time 
of her initial diagnosis, and prominently associated with her delusions. R579:41. 
Dr. Jeppson described Ms. Barzee's symptoms as delusions of grandiose and 
persecutory types, with the most prominent being grandiose, and said she had made no 
progress since her admission to USH. R579:14-15, 41-2. He found that Ms. Barzee is 
not a danger to herself or others and she exhibits anosygnosia, i.e. she does not consider 
herself mentally ill. R579:16-17, 27. Dr. Jeppson did not believe there is any likelihood 
of restoring Ms. Barzee to competency without antipsychotic medication. R579:28. 
Though diagnostic criteria are derived from the DSM-IV manual, Dr. Jeppson 
did not believe himself "tied to that book," which he did not "pack around" and "[hadn't] 
read recently." R579:35, 54. He just helps patients "get better" (R579:35, 54). 
9Dr. Jeppson testified, "The main reason I changed [the diagnosis] was when [Ms. 
Barzee] was making these comments about getting answers to prayer through movies, 
from God. That's referential thinking, is my understanding, that's really not part of 
delusional disorder; if it is, it is certainly a small part." R579:33. 
12 
Dr. Jeppson's proposed treatment regimen included administration of anti-
psychotic medication that would "hopefully" help restore Ms. Barzee to competency. 
R579:18-20. He would "try one of the newer drugs" and "see if she could respond to it", 
which "will likely render her competent if she if given adequate trials . . . over the course 
of eight months to a year" (R579:14, 30), but "we will have to see if she responds or not." 
R579:45. He did not believe forced medication would impair Ms. Barzee's ability to 
consult with her attorneys and thought her gender and positive symptoms (delusions as 
opposed to flat affect or withdrawal) pointed to a better prognosis. R579:23. 
Dr. Jeppson admitted that antipsychotic medication "would not eliminate [Ms. 
Barzee's] mental illness. It would hopefully diminish the strength or maybe the intensity 
of the delusion to where she would become more flexible to work on other avenues that 
thus far she hasn't, and hopefully, she would be restored to competency. And it would 
probably be [his] practice to try one, two or three drugs, and then, if that didn't work, to 
combine a couple of them." R579:18-19. Antipsychotic medications would "hopefully" 
reduce her focus on her perceived "religious role" such that "hopefully" "she would talk 
less and less about those kinds of things, and maybe she would just start talking about 
treatment or other things." R579:22. He later explained, "What we are practicing here is 
an N of 1. We have to see if she responds or not." R579:45. 
Dr. Jeppson understood that delusional disorder is more refractive to 
antipsychotic medication than schizophrenia but did not know if it is the most refractory 
13 
of all disorders. R579: 42-43. Reiterating his lack of expertise, Dr. Jeppson did not 
believe grandiose-type are most refractive. R579:43. Contrary to Dr. Berge and Dr. 
Nielsen, Dr. Jeppson concluded that the duration of untreated psychosis ("DUP") is not a 
significant factor in predicting the effectiveness of medication, although he admitted it 
was "definitely a factor.... I would have to read on that." R579:44-6. 
Dr. Jeppson acknowledged likely side effects, including "quite a bit of fatigue" 
or sedation, constipation, dry mouth, orthostatic hypotension, and possibly metabolic 
syndrome, weight gain, high cholesterol, diabetes, dizziness, strokes, and tardive 
dyskinesia characterized by abnormal ticks or similar involuntary muscle movement. 
R579: 20, 46-8. However, Ms. Barzee would be monitored; and while some side effects 
could be permanent, many are "transient and time limited" or otherwise uncommon, 
although risks increased with exposure to the drug. R579:21, 46-8. 
Additional side effects include traumatization, depression and suicidal ideation, 
which Ms. Barzee may experience if the medication works because it could devastate her 
sense of identity, which is currently and intimately intertwined with her delusions, and 
thereby could "certainly . . . change" her personality. R579:55-6. Dr. Jeppson minimized 
these potential side effects as "not common" but "possible." R579:55-6. 
Dr. Jeppson concluded that administration of medication is in Ms. Barzee's best 
medical interest and "in the best interest of the court to move her towards competency." 
R579:26, 28, 30. He did not believe any side effects would impair her ability to consult 
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with her lawyers or to engage in a reasoned choice of legal options, and medication might 
diminish her delusions so she will not talk about them so often, although she will continue 
to have them. R579:22-4, 50-1. While less intrusive means of treatment offered by USH 
are ineffectual and have been exhausted, his proposed treatment plan is substantially 
likely (75 percent chance) to render Ms. Barzee to competent based upon general 
statistics comprised of patients suffering from various disorders. R579:26-7, 30, 49-51. 
Dr. Paul D. Whitehead 
Dr. Whitehead, who also testified for the State, subspecializes in forensic 
psychiatry and has worked at USH for five and a half years, serving as the clinical 
director during 2004-2005. R579:57. He has seen 150-200 patients and been the 
attending physician for about 100 patients, 15 of which were diagnosed with psychotic 
disorder NOS and restored to competency. R579:58-9, 63. Dr. Whitehead testified that 
delusional disorder is "very rare" and he has seen only four or five cases. R579:81. He 
has never acted as a peer reviewer for any scientific journals or drug studies. R579:201. 
Dr. Whitehead's only contact with Ms. Barzee was one occasion for less than 
two hours in November 2004 to determine if Ms. Barzee met the Sell criteria. R579:59-
60, 76, 82.10 Otherwise, he has occasionally consulted with Dr. Jeppson about the case 
10Dr. Whitehead explained, "I was asked by Dr. Jeppson to see Ms. Barzee for a 
consult in November of 2004, and I sat down with both her, Dr. Jeppson, and the 
administrative director of her unit on November 9, 2004, specifically for purposes as we 
were discussing the Sell case with our hospital attorney and in light of our own 
interpretation of the Sell case we thought it was necessary to establish whether . . . an 
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primarily because their offices are only about four feet apart. R579:82. He concluded 
that Ms. Barzee was not gravely disabled or a danger to herself or others. R579:60. 
Although Dr. Whitehead did not perform a diagnostic assessment, he concluded 
that the "broad umbrella" of psychotic disorder NOS was a reasonable diagnosis given the 
"limitations of assessment", i.e., the inability to discern whether Ms. Barzee might have a 
rare seizure disorder or brain tumor. R579:61-2, 76. He also believes a diagnosis of 
delusional disorder is reasonable but she has "more symptoms than you typically see with 
someone who has delusional disorder." R579:77-8. However, contrary to all the other 
experts in this case, Dr. Whitehead believes Ms. Barzee's diagnosis is immaterial because 
the prognosis is not significantly affected by the specific type of disorder Ms. Barzee has. 
R579:62, 80. He acknowledged that other experts disagree, but "it depends on what 
articles you read" and "the jury is out" as to whether delusional disorder is more 
refractive to medicinal treatment. R579:80-l. Dr. Whitehead is vaguely aware of 
published research adopted by courts in similar cases expressly finding that delusional 
disorders are refractive to antipsychotic medication, but maintains there is a lack of 
information available on the subject. R579:81, 87-9.11 
involuntary medication procedure could be done . . . " R579:59-60. 
nThe case of United States v. Ghane, 392 F.3d 317 (8th Cir. 2004) was specifically 
noted at the hearing. R579:87-8. In Ghane, the court adopted the scientific research 
showing that patients with delusional disorders are refractory to antipsychotic medication 
and that medication is generally ineffective in treating particularly persecutory type 
delusions. The decision was issued approximately one month before Dr. Jeppson changed 
his original diagnosis of delusional disorder to psychotic disorder NOS. 
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Dr. Whitehead also agreed that Ms. Barzee's unwillingness to participate in 
treatment is due to her "polarized and irrational ideas" that are symptoms of her illness. 
R579:64. He conceded only that DUP is a "small to moderate factor" in terms of 
prognosis, noting that USH has had success when the DUP exceeded one year. R579:73, 
91, 93, 197. Dr. Whitehead cited vaguely to a 2003 report issued by the United States 
Medical Center ("USMC") in Springfield, Missouri, and its purported conclusion that 
delusional disorders are not refractory to antipsychotic medications. R579:84-6. 
However, Dr. Whitehead's recollection was incorrect.12 
Dr. Whitehead said that "in general, it is impossible to predict how any [] patient 
will react to the medication in terms of reducing their symptoms," and that "predict 
treatment effect is often difficult." R579: 64-5. However, he made "a recommend; 
not a conclusion" (R579:83), that there is a substantial probability Ms. Barzee's 
symptoms will be reduced with medication, and he thinks "chances are better than not 
that she will be restored." R579:68, 73. He also does not believe that less intrusive 
means would be likely to restore Ms. Barzee to competency. R579:71-2. 
12Dr. Raphael Morris testified that this study was irrelevant to Ms. Barzee's case 
because it did not address her specific characteristics. R579:117. Dr. Xavier Amador 
personally spoke to a Dr. Wilson who both authored the USMC report and faxed its main 
finding to Dr. Amador. R579:158. Contrary to the testimony of Dr. Whitehead, the 
report did not address delusional disorder and Dr. Wilson did not know the diagnoses of 
the patients involved in the study. Id. Dr. Amador explained, "We don't know who these 
people are." R579:159. Accordingly, the USMC report was completely "useless" and 
"irrelevant" to the cogent question of Ms. Barzee's restorability. R579:161. 
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While Dr. Whitehead asserted that scientific research "should inform clinical 
practice", he predicted a 70-75 percent chance of Ms. Barzee being restored to 
competency via antipsychotic medications "based on base rates and numbers . . . at the 
Utah State Hospital..." involving the general population. R579:68, 79, 90, 201. 
However, the State presented no evidence that any patients successfully restored included 
patients with delusions or histories similar to Ms. Barzee's. 
Dr. Whitehead believes Dr. Jeppson's proposed treatment plan is reasonable. 
R579:65. He acknowledged likely side effects from the drugs ranging from "annoying" 
things like sedation, dry mouth, blurry vision, orthostatic hypotension and constipation, to 
more serious but unlikely effects such as neuroloptic malignant syndrome, arrhythmias, 
stroke and tardive dyskinesia, and the possibility of so-called non-physical side effects 
such as severe depression, suicidal ideation, and emotional trauma. R579:65-6, 199-200. 
Dr. Whitehead believes medication is in Ms. Barzee's best medical interest and does not 
believe any side effects would impair her ability to consult with her attorneys or to engage 
in rational and reasoned choices or strategies, or to testify relevantly. R579:65-8, 70, 72. 
Dr. Raphael Morris 
Dr. Morris, who testified for the defense, is a psychiatrist practicing in San 
Diego and involved with forensic consultations. R579:99. He has been in the forensic 
field for ten years and was the director of forensic services at Bellevue Hospital Center in 
New York City for over two years. R579:100. He was in charge of treatment and 
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forensic evaluation of inmates from Rikers Island jail needing competency evaluations 
and/or treatment, and worked at Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center, the New York State 
forensic hospital. Id. He was a treating psychiatrist at the Sing Sing and Lincoln 
correctional facilities and has extensive experience working "with people who were 
awaiting restoration of competency, insanity, and other patients considered too dangerous 
to be in a regular state hospital." R579:99-100. Dr. Morris has done over 100 
competency restoration evaluations and testified in over 50 court cases involving forced 
medication. R579:100-01. Dr. Morris also spent two years at Kirby treating refractory 
patients not responsive to medication, which is a primary area of his expertise. R579:139. 
Prior to the hearing, Dr. Morris interviewed Ms. Barzee, reviewed her past 
competency evaluations, her history, the affidavits of Drs. Jeppson and Whitehead, and 
consulted with other experts who have interviewed her. R579:101. He also listened to 
the testimonies of Drs. Jeppson and Whitehead. Id. He did not diagnose Ms. Barzee but 
thought she suffered either from delusional disorder or schizophrenia. R579:130. 
Dr. Morris disagreed with Dr. Jeppson's decision to change Ms. Barzee's 
diagnosis to psychotic disorder NOS because it is based on a lack of information.13 
13Dr. Morris explained, "Psychotic NOS is simply either schizophrenia, substance 
abuse psychotic disorder, or psychotic disorder secondary to a medical condition in 
my assessment I didn't pick up anything that suggested to me that this is a neurologic 
condition. There were no focal deficits. I watched the way she walked. I didn't see any 
signs that she . . . had a stroke or something else that might cause . . . [a] psychotic 
symptom. I know she has had some medical workups . . . So the likelihood that she has a 
general medical condition causing her [psychotic symptoms] is low." R579:128-29. 
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R579:102. He characterized Ms. Barzee's belief that she receives messages from God via 
TV as a delusion involving "an idea of reference" rather than referential thinking. 
R579:103. Moreover, referential thinking may be exhibited by a person suffering from 
delusional disorder and is not inconsistent with that diagnosis. R579:104. Because it is 
inherently inaccurate, Dr. Morris and his staff would only accept a diagnosis of psychotic 
disorder NOS for about the first two weeks after a patient's admission. R579:132-33. 
Dr. Morris believes Ms. Barzee's illness began about 1994 and concurs with Dr. 
Jeppson that medicinal treatment will not end Ms. Barzee's delusions, which are the 
cause of her incompetency. R579:106-07. He R579:112, 140. The mere possibility that 
Ms. Barzee might be able to discuss her case with her attorneys without referencing her 
delusions would not make her competent if she is still having them. R579:141-42. She is 
already capable of having organized conversations with her attorneys. R579:142. 
Dr. Morris testified that Ms. Barzee's history and symptomology weigh heavily 
against her restorability. The first problem is the lengthy duration of her untreated 
psychosis (DUP), which is a critical factor in predicting restorability for any psychotic 
disorder. R579:107-08.14 In forming his conclusions, Dr. Morris relied not just upon his 
14
"First of all, it is very well established that the earlier you treat a psychotic illness 
the better your prognosis. So there is actually a tremendous amount of effort in the 
community . . . to try to get people to identify illness, treat it early, because it effects 
prognosis. That's well established.... [T]he longer you are ill, and we are talking about 
even greater than six months or up to a year without treatment, the worse you do, and it 
gets worse year by year by year." R579:108. 
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own extensive experience treating both responsive and non-responsive patients, but upon 
the current and accepted Scientific literature and research on point. R579:l 15-16.15 
Dr. Morris also explained that it is well established that the grandiose delusions 
all experts agree are exhibited by Ms. Barzee are very difficult to treat and more 
refractory to medicinal treatment than other disorders, and that treatment could actually 
make the symptoms worse. R579:l 18. One simply cannot extrapolate from general 
studies or statistics to Ms. Barzee's specific case because they do not account for 
characteristics unique to her condition, and thus are irrelevant. R579:117. 
In the context of a risk/benefit analysis of forced medication, Dr. Morris testified 
that a doctor should first look for any positive prognostic factors such as family history 
and the patient's past treatment success and whether the types of symptoms are amenable 
to treatment. R579:122. Dr. Morris found no such factors in Ms. Barzee's case, adding 
to the growing list of reasons why she is unlikely to be restored to competency via forced 
medication. R579:123. In addition, there are risks of the same potentially permanent side 
effects acknowledged by the State's witnesses. R579:123-25. 
Dr. Morris candidly stated that as a treating physician he would encourage Ms. 
15Dr. Morris discussed a 1992 paper by Well, Lobell, et.al., and a 1999 Megori 
group on the same subject. That research demonstrated significantly improved prognosis 
when a person is treated within six months of illness. R579:120. Dr. Morris also cited 
several other studies demonstrating the critical importance of early treatment, including 
one that concluded six months is the cutoff time for positive prognosis. R579:120-21. 
The State presented no evidence of restoring any patient to competency where the DUP 
exceeded two years, much less where it likely exceeds ten years as in this case. R579:197. 
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Barzee to take medication, just as he would any patient suffering from a mental illness. 
R579:l 19, 126-27, 130. Nonetheless, because of the nature of Ms. Barzee's delusions, 
the DUP, and the absence of any positive prognostic factors, Dr. Morris concluded that 
her prognosis for restoration to competency via involuntary medication is not even likely, 
much less substantially likely. R579:122, 128, 137, 145. Moreover, "it is unlikely that 
she is going to make any kind of significant response to medication [such that] it is even 
more unlikely that she is going to be restored to competency." R579:l 15-16, 122, 145. 
Dr. Xavier Amador 
Dr. Amador testified for the defense and is a clinical psychologist who received 
his Master's Degree and Ph.D. in clinical psychology from New York University and has 
been involved with numerous evaluations, psychiatric assessments and diagnoses, and a 
range of forensic evaluations. R579:147. He was trained in both the scientist and 
practitioner models, conducting and evaluating research and evidence-based practices, 
along with his clinical training. Id. He has been an instructor and professor at Columbia 
University and New York University and served as director of psychology at the New 
York State Psychiatric Institute, which is affiliated with Columbia University. R579:148. 
He was a professor in the joint postdoctoral fellowship in forensic psychiatry at Columbia 
University and Cornell University, ran the Diagnosis and Evaluation Center for Psychotic 
Disorders at Columbia University, and has worked in six different hospitals, including 
two state hospitals in two different states. R579:148. 
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Dr. Amador explained that while clinical experience is a valid source of 
information when attempting to predict the likelihood of competency restoration through 
medication, it is just one "slice[] of the pie" such that professionals are trained to rely on 
the data generated by scientific research. R5 79:149-151. Dr. Amador has been involved 
in studies directly related to the treatment of refractory psychosis and maintains a private 
practice. R579:178-79. He has conducted peer reviews in about 20 psychiatry journals, 
authored or co-authored more than 100 peer reviewed articles, edited two books, and 
written a number of books about psychotic disorders. R579:156-57, 176. 
Notably, Dr. Amador has been a co-chair in the revision and clarification of the 
authoritative DSM-IV, including those sections pertinent to this case. R579:152. He has 
co-authored about ten treatment studies as a co-investigator and has consulted for several 
drug companies in the course of drug trials, resulting in both published and unpublished 
data. R579:165. He has been involved in evaluating individuals for restoration to 
competency in both federal and state courts, and has substantial expertise on the issue of 
involuntary treatment. R579:176, 179-80. Dr. Amador is in the business of second-
guessing treating physicians, a role that is both accepted and appreciated and often 
solicited by treating practitioners and others. R597:184. 
Dr. Amador reviewed evaluations, reports and other materials concerning Ms. 
Barzee and has spent over 15 hours observing and interviewing her almost since the 
beginning of her residency at USH. R579:154, 156. He has also reviewed materials 
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prepared by an investigator for the defense, which materials include many hours of 
interviews with Ms. Barzee's family and others associated with her. R579:156. 
Dr. Amador observed that Ms. Barzee suffers from grandiose and persecutory 
delusions and thus concurs with the USH's original diagnoses of delusional disorder. 
R579:164. He is "perplexed" as to why Dr. Jeppson changed the diagnosis to psychotic 
disorder NOS and does npt understand his explanation for the change, particularly 
because the diagnosis is premised upon a lack of information. R579:l 54-55.16 The DSM-
IV does not support Dr. Jeppson's change in diagnosis as most patients with delusional 
disorder exhibit referential thinking. R579:154. 
Dr. Amador also concurs with both Drs. Jeppson and Morris that even if Ms. 
Barzee responds to treatment her delusions will not be eliminated. R579:167. They will 
still influence her judgment and understanding, thereby impairing her ability to make 
reasoned choices and weigh strategies and options. R579:167-69, 171-72. "The 
fundamental truth of belief doesn't change just because someone stops talking. . . . Just 
because [Ms. Barzee] can talk about other things isn't going to suddenly render her 
competent." R579:172-73. It is her delusions that render her incompetent, not her 
16Dr. Amador explained, "The other reason I don't understand [the change in 
diagnosis] is that this is a diagnosis you give when you don't have information. And 
there has been two years to gather information. Ms. Barzee does not need to sit there and 
tell you, 'I'm delusional' You just need to sit and listen, and as a clinician you can 
decide whether what she is talking about is delusional or not. For example, listening to 
her talk about some of her beliefs about things that have happened to her it is not that 
difficult to infer or to discern, rather, an onset of delusions." R579:155-56. 
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tendency to talk about them. R579:173, 191. For competency to be restored, there must 
be a reduction in the certainty of Ms. Barzee's beliefs, but the State's witnesses testified 
that only her outward behavior will change. R579:174. 
Dr. Amador explained that DUP is a critically important factor in assessing the 
likelihood of successfully treating and restoring a patient with antipsychotic medications. 
R579:162. He has peer-reviewed approximately 15 articles on the subject and cited 
extensive publications and studies that have uniformly, unequivocally, and repeatedly 
demonstrated that "after about a year of untreated psychosis people typically do not 
respond [to antipsychotic medication]." R579:162, 177. Ms. Barzee has suffered from 
mental illness for at least 13 years which is "a very significant factor [reducing]... her 
chances of responding to antipsychotic medication . . . substantially." R579:163-64. 
Further, the grandiose and persecutory types of delusions Ms. Barzee suffers have proven 
resistant to antipsychotic medication. R579:165,193-94. 
Dr. Amador's conclusions are based upon his clinical experience, the scientific 
research, his involvement as a co-author and co-investigator in several studies, and drug 
trials where he was a consultant, and where this refractory response was repeatedly 
manifest in patients exhibiting Ms. Barzee's same symptomology. R579:165-66. He also 
noted a federal case17 where the court was "even more pessimistic" than he was about the 
likelihood of restorability in a patient suffering from delusional disorder. R579:160-61. 
X1
 United States v. Ghane, 392 F.3d 317 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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Dr. Amador concluded that because of the nature of Ms. Barzee's delusions and 
the extensive DUP, there is a substantial unlikelihood that antipsychotic medication will 
restore her to competency, or perhaps a 20 percent chance.18 R579:164, 166-67,175-76. 
In any event, Ms. Barzee's delusions will persist and thereby impair her ability to make 
reasoned choices and decisions in the course of her defense at trial. R579:172-73, 191. 
Dr. Amador also expressed concern about side effects, particularly the trauma 
caused by treating a patient against her will. R579:187. Because Ms. Barzee's delusions 
are "intimately tied" to her sense of identity, while it might be medically appropriate in a 
"vacuum" to medicate her, forced medication would not be appropriate. R579:190-93. 
There are alternative modalities of intervention, such as motivational enhancement 
therapy, that would be more appropriate in Ms. Barzee's case. R579:186-87, 190-91.19 
The trial court's findings and conclusions (attached as Addendum A), 
On June 20, 2006, the trial court issued a "Ruling on Motion to Compel 
18
 The Court in Sell also noted expert testimony "that Sell suffered only from 
delusional disorder, which, in that expert's view, 'medication rarely helps'" (Sell at 170). 
19Criticizing the State's experts' "cookie cutter approach", Dr. Amador testified, 
"[I]f you are asking me, [based on] my medical clinical experience and opinion, is this the 
right thing for this patient, independent of the Sell issue, we haven't even gone in this 
direction, I think this would be a very traumatic thing for Ms. Barzee to be treated against 
her will. I think she would be vulnerable to depression, vulnerable to having symptoms 
of stress reaction, potentially [post traumatic stress disorder]. There is research on this. I 
have seen i t . . . . how do you deal with people, once you force medication down their 
throat, that they don't think they need? If you are going to do that you better be sitting 
ready. Again, I think these doctors are ready to do that. But it is serious business to force 
medication against somebody's will, very serious business." R579:190-91. 
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Medication," finding the evidence clear and convincing that the Sell factors had been met 
thereby allowing USH to medicate Ms. Barzee against her will. R530-68. The court 
found that while all of the witnesses were knowledgeable and experienced, Drs. Jeppson 
and Whitehead were more familiar with Ms. Barzee and thus better suited to determine 
the best treatment modality and the likelihood of success. R557-58. 
The trial court concluded that the scientific data presented by defense experts 
indicating Ms. Barzee's likely refractory response to medication was not authoritative or 
weighty, because "it is not only competency restorations rates in general that the court is 
concerned about, but also the likelihood that this particular defendant's competency will 
be restored through the administration of antipsychotic medication." R558-59 (emphasis 
in original). Notwithstanding his contrary testimony, the trial court also found Dr. 
Jeppson had significant experience in treating and restoring to competency patients with 
delusional disorder, that this experience utrump[ed]" the scientific data such that he was 
in the best position to determine the likelihood of success in Ms. Barzee's case. R559. 
Accordingly, the trial court found there was a substantial likelihood of restoring 
Ms. Barzee to competency through forced medication, noting that while trauma may be 
likely, that was acceptable so long as it did not undermine Ms. Barzee's ability to assist in 
her defense. R560, 562. Additional facts will be cited in the argument as warranted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Compelled medication is a violation of Ms. Barzee's liberty interests under both 
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the federal and state constitutional due process provisions. The State's evidence was 
comprised of sweeping generalizations that failed or refused to account for the specific 
aspects of Ms. Barzee's illness. The trial court's reliance on this evidence and its findings 
that the State met its burden of proof are clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE SELL FACTORS WERE 
MET IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND INCORRECT. 
Under the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution, a defendant has "a 
significant constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs." Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003) 
(citations and quotations omitted). While there may be occasions when that liberty 
interest is outweighed by certain factors, "those instances may be rare." Id. at 180. 
The State had the burden below of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that Ms. Barzee's liberty interests were forfeit under Sell.20 The State failed to meet its 
burden with respect to each and every factor. The State's evidence was conclusory and 
ignored facts unique to this case and to Ms. Barzee in particular. However, the argument 
20(1) the State has an important interest in restoring Ms. Barzee to competency; 
(2) involuntary medication will significantly further the State's important interest 
in that it will have 
(a) a substantial likelihood of rendering Ms. Barzee competent, and 
(b) a substantial unlikelihood of creating side effects that will significantly 
interfere with Ms. Barzee's ability to assist counsel in her defense; 
(3) involuntary medication is necessary to further the State's interest; and 
(4) medication is medically appropriate for Ms. Barzee. Id. 
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herein will focus primarily on the second factor in Sell because it is the most compelling. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT ADMINISTRATION OF ANTI-
PSYCHOTIC MEDICATION WILL SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER THE 
STATE'S INTERESTS IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND INCORRECT. 
A. The evidence is clear and convincing that Ms. Barzee is substantially 
unlikely to be restored to competency via compelled administration 
of antipsychotic medication. 
The second factor of Sell requires the district court to "conclude that involuntary 
medication will significantly further" the State's interests, including that "administration 
of the drugs is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial." Id. at 
181 (emphasis in original). The State's evidence in this case falls far short of this 
standard and the trial court's contrary finding is clearly erroneous.21 
The fundamental flaw in both the State's evidence and the trial court's ruling is 
the conclusory application of a restoration rate derived from a general hospital population 
21The trial court never defined the term "substantial likelihood." This Court has 
defined it in the context of a petition for post-conviction relief as an "intermediate 
burden" that is "higher than a probability but lower than beyond a reasonable doubt". 
Julian v. State, 52 P.3d 1168, 1172 (Utah 2002) (citation omitted). In this case, the 
evidence must be clear and convincing that there is a substantial likelihood of restoring 
Ms. Barzee to competency with medication. WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 2d 
Ed. (1980), defines "substantial" as "of or having substance . . . real; actual; true; not 
imaginary... strong; solid; firm." Id. at 1420. "Likelihood" is defined, "the fact of 
being likely to happen" (Id. at 819). In light of the fundamental liberty interests at stake 
in this case, the law must impose a high standard that requires more than the mere 
speculation that Ms. Barzee would "hopefully" be restored to competency via forced 
medication with a view to wait and "see if she could respond to it." R579:14, 18-20. 
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to a truly unique patient. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005).22 
Despite the trial court's express recognition of the State's burden to show that Ms. Barzee 
is likely to become competent (R558-59), its ruling disregards her, sanctioning instead the 
paternalistic view that "doctor knows best" while standing for the proposition that the 
general restoration rate of the treating hospital can be applied to a specific patient. If that 
rate is at least 75 percent as the State's witnesses testified in this case, every patient is 
substantially likely to be restored to competency through the use of antipsychotic 
medications, notwithstanding the rarity of the patient's symptomology or history. Neither 
the record evidence nor common sense support these conclusions. 
In its Ruling, the trial court found relevant the opinions of eight experts. Drs. 
Nancy B. Cohn and Jeffrey A. Kovnick evaluated Ms. Barzee in 2003 and rendered the 
initial conclusions of incompetency. R531-32. The court noted, "Dr. Cohn concluded 
that, while Defendant's deeply entrenched delusional beliefs are among the most 
22
"Instead of analyzing Evans as an individual, the report simply sets up syllogisms 
to explain its conclusions: (1) atypical antipsychotic medications are generally effective, 
produce few side effects, and are medically appropriate, (2) Evans will be given atypical 
antipsychotic medications, (3) therefore, atypical antipsychotic medication will be 
effective, produce few side effects, and be medically appropriate for Evans. To hold that 
this type of analysis satisfies [Sell]... would be to find the government necessarily meets 
its burden in every case it wishes to use atypical anti-psychotic medication. We do not 
believe that Sell's analysis permits such deference.... [T]he government, considering all 
of the particular characteristics of the individual defendant relevant to such a 
determination, must . . . [demonstrate] that the proposed treatment plan, as applied to this 
particular defendant, is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand 
trial . . ." Id. at 241-42 (quotations omitted; emphasis in original). 
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refractory to pharmacological intervention, administering antipsychotic medications to 
Defendant could potentially play some role in achieving competency for her . . . . Dr. 
Kovnick1 stated that in recent years the use of antipsychotic medications to treat 
Delusional Disorder has found increasing favor, and, therefor, that medicating Defendant 
with antipsychotic drugs may help in the dissolution of her delusional beliefs." R532. 
Dr. Berge "did not know whether the administration of antipsychotic medication 
would have a beneficial effect in restoring Ms. Barzee to competency." R532-33. Dr. 
Nielsen also "did not know whether medicating Defendant would result in a restoration of 
competency [and] . . . most people whose symptoms were primarily of a delusional nature 
do not respond favorably to antipsychotic medication." R533-34. While Dr. Nielsen 
believed Ms. Barzee exhibited some schizophrenic symptoms suggesting "the possibility 
of a more positive response to psychotropic medication . . . the likelihood of antipsychotic 
medication restoring a person to competency typically lessened the longer a person 
suffered from psychotic symptoms." R534. 
The trial court iterated Dr. Raphael Morris' testimony that because Ms. Barzee's 
illness had gone untreated at least 13 years and her "incompetency is based directly upon 
her delusions, the administration of antipsychotic medication would likely not have a 
marked impact on her competence to proceed" (R539-541); and that the real possibility of 
severe side effects and the substantial unlikelihood of competency restoration "simply 
[do] not justify medicating [Ms. Barzee] against her will." R540-41. 
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Referencing Dr. Xavier Amador's expertise including his "revision of relevant 
sections of the DSM-IV" (R542), the court then noted, "Dr. Amador is not a forensic 
psychologist and has never worked on restoring patients to competency in the context of a 
criminal case." R542.23 The court recounted Dr. Amador's testimony that "all of the 
evaluators concluded [Ms. Barzee] was suffering from severe grandiose delusions with 
religious themes" which are most resistant to treatment, her illness was untreated for at 
least 13 years and "research shows that after approximately one year of untreated 
psychosis, patients typically do not respond." R543-44. Therefore, the prognosis for 
treatment "was not good" and competency is substantially unlikely, especially since she 
will continue to have delusions even if the treatment is effective; and "even though [Dr. 
Amador] has been involved in the treatment of hundreds of patients with clinical histories 
similar to [Ms. Barzee's], he has not yet met a patient with such a long history of 
untreated delusions who has responded to anti-psychotic medication." R543-45. 
In contrast to the six experts related above, Drs. Jeppson and Whitehead both 
testified in a conclusory manner of a substantial likelihood of restoring Ms. Barzee to 
competency via antipsychotic medications, even though she will continue to have 
delusions. R538; R579:51, 68, 73. Both vaguely acknowledged the opposing research 
23Butsee, R579:148, 176, 179-80: Dr. Amador was a professor in the joint 
postdoctoral fellowship in forensic psychiatry at Columbia University and Cornell 
University, has been involved in evaluating individuals for restoration to competency in 
both federal and state courts, and has substantial expertise on involuntary treatment and 
refractory psychosis. 
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demonstrating that grandiose delusions, which they testified are Ms. Barzee's most 
prominent symptoms (579:15,42, 87), are resistant to treatment. R579.42-3, 87. Neither 
Dr. Jeppson nor Dr. Whitehead have significant experience treating patients with these 
"very rare" delusions and neither provided any information about how many, if any, of 
the few such patients they have seen were restored to competency. R579:31-2, 81. From 
this inexpert position, Dr. Whitehead derided the contrary research based on what he 
characterized as a lack of information on the subject, and both he and Dr. Jeppson 
refused to give significant weight to the scientific research demonstrating that because 
Ms. Barzee's illness has gone untreated for approximately 13 years the chance of 
competency restoration is substantially unlikely. R579:44-5, 89, 91.24 
In short, while refusing to consider Ms. Barzee's history, symptoms, and any 
other factor specific to her,25 Drs. Jeppson and Whitehead concluded from the general 
competency restoration rate for the USH there is about a 75 percent chance that Ms. 
24In an attempt to rebut substantial and persuasive defense evidence that DUP is a 
significant factor that reduces the likelihood of competency restoration, Dr. Whitehead 
generally stated that USH has successfully restored patients with a DUP exceeding one 
year. R579:197. However, Dr. Whitehead failed to elaborate regarding how many such 
patients were successfully treated, how many exhibited symptoms or histories similar to 
Ms. Barzee's, or how long the DUP was for any such patient[s] successfully treated. In 
other words, this testimony was completely irrelevant and unhelpful to the State. 
25Dr. Jeppson briefly testified in a conclusory manner that because Ms. Barzee is 
female and exhibits positive symptoms (delusions rather than flat affect), the prognosis 
for treatment is better. R579:23. However, he did not explain why this might be so and 
provided no foundation to support his conclusions. Therefore, even construed in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's ruling, this conclusory statement does not support it. 
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Barzee will be restored to competency. R579:50-l; 63, 68, 73, 80-1. See, United States 
v. Lindauer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62872 (US Dist. Ct. So. Dist. NY) (characterizing an 
expert witness' testimony as "bland assurance and utter lack of substantiation" for failing 
to account for the defendant's particular characteristics in concluding a substantial 
likelihood of restoration) (attached as Addendum C). 
Dr. Whitehead even asserted that Ms. Barzee's diagnosis has negligible impact 
on her chances of restoration. R579:80-1. In other words, according to the State's 
witnesses at the evidentiary hearing and contrary to the conclusions of every other expert 
in this case,26 Ms. Barzee's particular characteristics are irrelevant to the question of 
whether forced medication is substantially likely to render her competent. Sell in no way 
permits such blind deference. 
In United States v. Lindauer, supra, which is strikingly similar to this case, the 
court declined to compel medication. See Addendum C. Government witnesses 
similarly offered "forriiulaic and conclusory" testimony of a substantial likelihood of 
restoration. Id. at 41. As in this case, notwithstanding differing diagnoses from various 
experts, "[a]s to the symptoms [of grandiose and paranoid delusions] that [made Ms. 
Lindauer] incompetent to stand trial, there was no disagreement"; and there was 
persuasive evidence that those symptoms are refractory to antipsychotic medication. Id. 
26See, e.g., R532; R577:41, 44, 60, 69; R578:ll, 13, 18-22; R579:107-08, 112, 
115-18, 122-23, 128, 137, 140, 145, 163-66, 193-94. 
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at 10. Ms. Lindauer's symptoms of "grandiosity and paranoia" included her belief that "a 
statement by a radio announcer" referred to her {Id. at 12), which seems analogous to Ms. 
Barzee's belief that God speaks to her through movies. Further, Ms. Lindauer's denial 
that she suffered from a mental illness "is characteristic of delusional patients." Id. at 16-
17. There was also expert testimony that "coerced medication" "will have a high 
likelihood of intensifying [the patients'] delusions, their agitation, their mistrust, their 
feelings of being persecuted . . . and "delusions of long standing are very difficult to treat, 
in large measure because the individual has built [her] entire identity around the belief in 
their validity." Id. at 35, 42. These similar facts are compelling in this case. 
From a position of professional expertise, knowledge, and experience, both Drs. 
Amador and Morris have an overwhelming and unequaled advantage. R99-100, 139, 
147-152, 156-57, 165, 176, 178-180, 182-84. As an expert witness in over 50 cases, Dr. 
Morris' expertise with patients refractory to antipsychotic medication provides a stark 
contrast to the State's inexpert clinicians. R579:139. Dr. Amador's clinical experience 
alone greatly exceeds that of Drs. Jeppson and Whitehead combined, not to mention his 
additional credentials and his revision of those relevant portions of the very manual that 
Drs. Jeppson and Whitehead concededly should have relied upon in forming their 
diagnoses in this case. R579.T5, 35, 37, 41-2, 54, 47-152, 156-57, 165, 176, 178-180, 
182-84. Drs. Jeppson and Whitehead have no such expertise. 
Nonetheless, although Dr. Jeppson, admittedly "not. . .an expert witness", met 
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with Ms. Barzee as infrequently as just a few minutes a month over a two-year period 
(R579:17),27 and although Dr. Whitehead met with her just once for a short consult about 
forced medication (R579:59-60, 76), the trial court found them most persuasive because 
Dr. Jeppson's "familiarity with [Ms. Barzee's] condition makes them better suited to 
know what type of treatment modality will assist [her] and what the chances of success 
will be if [she] is administered antipsychotic medication." R558; R579:31-2.28 The 
subsequent event of Dr. Jeppson's untimely passing would seem to render this finding at 
least obsolete. However, it is also clearly erroneous. 
Based upon the undisputed facts, Dr. Amador, who spent at least 15 hours with 
Ms. Barzee, is probably more familiar with her than Dr. Jeppson was. R579:l 1, 14, 17, 
154, 156. According to Dr. Jeppson, he may have spent as little as two hours total with 
Ms. Barzee over the entire course of her commitment and he had less expertise than Dr. 
Amador. R579:17, 31. Further, Dr. Morris apparently reviewed as much information and 
spent as much time with Ms. Barzee as Dr. Whitehead did. R579:59-60, 76, 82, 101. 
27Dr. Jeppson also testified that during the ten months prior to the evidentiary 
hearing, Ms. Barzee refused to meet with the treatment team. R579:14. 
28Also, the trial court found that neither Dr. Morris nor Dr. Amador had reviewed 
the State Hospital's records in full. R557-58. This finding is puzzling and also clearly 
erroneous because there was no reference to the "full" hospital records at the hearing, and 
no evidence from which one can conclude that any witness had access to more 
information than another, with the exception of Dr. Amador who testified that in addition 
to the materials accessible to the State's witnesses, he also reviewed extensive materials 
gathered exclusively by an investigator for the defense. R557. There is no evidence that 
any of the State's witnesses delved so deeply into Ms. Barzee's history. 
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Unlike the sweeping generalizations offered by the State's witnesses, Dr. 
Amador's expert opinion that Ms. Barzee is significantly unlikely to respond to 
medication is not an oversimplified extrapolation from a general population of unknown 
patients with ambiguous attributes. Rather, he based his conclusion on Ms. Barzee: her 
symptoms and her history in the context of authoritative and accepted scientific research 
and experience. See, fh. 26, supra. Dr. Morris' similar conclusion was based on the same 
type of information. R579:107-08, 117-18, 122-23, 128, 137, 145. 
From their comparative lack of expertise, the State's witnesses dubiously 
acknowledged yet disagreed with the scientific evidence contrary to their conclusions, 
with Dr. Jeppson admitting he "would have to read on that" and Dr. Whitehead citing a 
study that, as it turned out, he knew little about. R579:46; fa. 12, supra. 
Yet the trial court found Dr. Jeppson's supposed familiarity with Ms. Barzee 
"trump[s]" the demonstrated refractory nature of her illness, all of the scientific research 
demonstrating a substantial unlikelihood of her restoration, and the expertise of the 
defense witnesses that far exceeds that of the State's. R559. The court made these 
clearly erroneous findings notwithstanding Dr. Whitehead's admission that the scientific 
research "should inform clinical practice" (R579:201). 
The State's evidence is speculative and comprised of sweeping generalizations. 
It is limited by the inherently myopic viewpoint of USH and restoration rates for a few 
other hospitals involving unknown patients. It utterly fails to account for Ms. Barzee's 
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rare symptomology and her lengthy history of untreated illness. The trial court's finding 
that this evidence meets the clear and convincing standard is analogous to the fallacy that 
because 75 percent of all vehicles pass inspection, this particular vehicle with the 
shattered windshield and fraying tires also has a 75 percent chance of passing inspection. 
The sweeping generalizations relied upon by the trial court do not even meet the 
preponderance standard let alone rise to the level of clear and convincing. The evidence 
is overwhelming that forcible medication is substantially unlikely to render Ms. Barzee 
competent, and the trial court's finding otherwise is clearly erroneous and incorrect. 
B. The court's finding that side effects impairing Ms. Barzee's right to a 
fair trial are substantially unlikely is clearly erroneous and incorrect. 
The trial court found that involuntary medication is substantially unlikely to 
cause side effects that will interfere significantly with Ms. Barzee's ability to assist 
counsel in her trial defense. R563. This finding is clearly erroneous and incorrect. 
All experts agree many side effects may result from the medication, including 
fatigue, sedation, dry mouth, blurry vision, increased cholesterol levels, diabetes, 
constipation, tardive dyskinesia, orthostatic hypotension, and increased risk of stroke or 
heart attack. R579:20,46-8, 55-6, 65-6, 123-25, 187, 190-93, 199-200. Unsurprisingly, 
USH witnesses who desire to compel medication assert in a conclusory manner that the 
side effects would likely be mild and would not interfere with Ms. Barzee's ability to 
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assist her counsel. R:579:21, 46-8., 65-8, 70, 72.29 However, again they offer no 
information specifically about Ms. Barzee to support these bland assertions. 
From the State's sparse evidence, it is not known whether Ms. Barzee might be 
prone to or already suffering from health problems that increase her risks. Her particular 
susceptibility to any side effect is simply not addressed by the State's evidence and is 
unknown. There is no evidence as to whether certain patients are more prone to tardive 
dyskinesia or whether this potentially disfiguring side effect is a random occurrence. In 
other words, there is no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that any of 
these side effects are substantially unlikely. Should Ms. Barzee suffer a stroke while 
USH staff engage in Dr. Jeppson's proposed and hopeful wait-and-see approach, her 
ability to assist in her defense would likely be compromised. 
However, she could experience additional side effects of a traumatic nature 
because of the intimate connection between her fundamental belief that she should not 
take medication, her sense of self, and her delusions, which effects could include anxiety, 
severe depression, suicidal ideation, and PTSD. R561-62. And while the trial court 
acknowledged the likelihood of these side effects, it summarily dismissed them as "non-
physical" effects that would not undermine her ability to assist in her defense. R562. 
How such effects can be characterized as "non-physical" is not clear. It was 
29Dr. Morris observed that since the likelihood of success is so small and Ms. 
Barzee does not want medication, the substantial risks do not outweigh the speculative 
benefits. R579:123. 
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error for the trial court, prone throughout its Ruling to making broad inferences, to 
decline to find that such trauma would impact Ms. Barzee's ability to assist in her defense 
simply because no witness actually stated they would. It was the State's burden to show 
by clear and convincing evidence that they would not. 
The insufficiency of the State's evidence, and thus the inherent fallibility of the 
trial court's ruling, becomes even more apparent when considered in light of Justice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 145 (1992). While 
expressing concerns about prosecutorial attempts to manipulate material evidence and 
reiterating that "absent an extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause 
prohibits prosecuting officials from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic 
medicines for purposes of rendering an accused competent for trial, and [expressing] 
doubt that the showing can be made in most cases" (Id, at 138-39), Justice Kennedy 
observed that the state must "make a showing that there is no significant risk that the 
medication will impair or alter in any material way the defendant's capacity or 
willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel." Id. at 141 (emphasis 
added). Even construing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
ruling in this case, the State has made no such showing with its hollow assurance that Ms. 
Barzee will simply be monitored for side effects. R579:21, 46-8. 
Justice Kennedy noted that side effects can prejudice the accused "(1) by altering 
his demeanor in a manner that will prejudice his reactions and presentation in the 
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courtroom, and (2) by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel." Id. at 142. 
The concerns expressed by Justice Kennedy in Riggins are applicable here. It hardly 
seems conducive to a fair trial to forcibly cause Ms. Barzee, who is socially ostracized 
and already perceived as odd, to suffer a lengthy trial in a chronic state of fatigue and 
depression with potentially flat affect, while making embarrassing involuntary body 
movements. Ms. Barzee has a documented history of withdrawing and invoking a "vow 
of silence" when she believes "forces of evil" are attempting to manipulate her. It hardly 
seems likely that Ms. Barzee will be more helpful in assisting in her defense if forced to 
ingest antipsychotic medication that all experts concur will not eliminate her delusions 
30
"It is a fundamental assumption of the adversary system that the trier of fact 
observes the accused throughout the t r ia l . . . At all stages . . . the defendant's behavior, 
manner, facial expressions, and emotional responses, or their absence, combine to make 
an overall impression on the trier of fact, an impression that can have a powerful 
influence on the outcome of the trial. If the defendant takes the stand . . . his demeanor 
can have a great bearing on his credibility, persuasiveness, and on the degree to which he 
evokes sympathy.... [and] may also be relevant to his confrontation rights. 
"The side effects of antipsychotic drugs may alter demeanor in a way that will 
prejudice all facets of the defense. Serious due process concerns are implicated when the 
State manipulates the evidence in this way. The defendant may be restless and unable to 
sit still. The drugs can induce a condition . . . . which is characterized by tremor of the 
limbs, diminished range of facial expression, or slowed movements and speech. 
"These potential side effects would be disturbing for any patient; but when the patient is a 
criminal defendant Who is going to stand trial, the documented probability of side effects 
seems to me to render involuntary administration of the drugs by prosecuting officials 
unacceptable absent a showing by the State that the side effects will not alter the 
defendant's reactions or diminish his capacity to assist counsel.... If the defendant 
cannot be tried without his behavior and demeanor being affected in this substantial way 
by involuntary treatment, in my view the Constitution requires that society bear this cost 
in order to preserve the integrity of the trial process." Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted). 
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and will likely cause severe trauma and may make her delusions worse. R579:190-91. 
The trial court's finding that compelled administration of antipsychotic 
medication is substantially unlikely to cause side effects that will impair Ms. Barzee's 
ability to assist in her defense and receive a fair trial is clearly erroneous and incorrect. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT OTHER SELL 
FACTORS SUPPORT COMPELLED MEDICATION 
A. The evidence is not clear and convincing that an important 
government interest overrides Ms, Barzee's liberty interest. 
The trial court concluded that the State presented clear and convincing evidence 
of an important interest overriding Ms. Barzee's liberty. R555. Ms. Barzee concedes that 
the seriousness of the alleged offenses in this case cannot be denied and in the context of 
this analysis is in the State's favor. However, the inquiry does not end there. 
The trial court must also "consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating 
the Government's interest in prosecution." Sell at 180. For example, a defendant may 
face lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill thereby diminishing the 
need to prosecute. Id. "The same is true of the possibility that the defendant has already 
been confined for a significant amount of time." Id. 
However, in evaluating the importance of the State's interest in this case, the 
trial court really considered only the serious nature of the charges against Ms. Barzee and 
ignored other relevant facts. R561-63. While acknowledging that potential for 
involuntary commitment should be factored into the analysis, the trial court dismissed it 
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because it is unclear whether it is "a realistic option" (R553-54). But then the court 
determined that even if involuntary commitment is an option, it would not diminish the 
State's interest in bringing her to trial in the criminal case. R555. 
There are other special circumstances the court should have considered in this 
case but did not. The court did not consider that the dominant co-defendant, who the 
State agrees is the primary actor who manipulated Ms. Barzee in her vulnerable state of 
mental illness, remains subject to prosecution. Nor did the court adequately account for 
the fact that Ms. Barzee is not a danger to herself or others. R577:19-21, 27, 52, 60. 
These facts show that the State's interest in prosecuting Ms. Barzee in comparison to its 
interest in prosecuting the co-defendant is less than compelling. 
Because the trial court neglected to consider these special circumstances in 
evaluating the State's interest in this case, its Ruling does not support a finding by clear 
and convincing evidence that the State has established an important government interest. 
B. The evidence is not clear and convincing that involuntary medication 
is necessary to further the State's interests, or that it is medically 
appropriate, 
Ms. Barzee considers the questions of necessity and medical appropriateness 
together because they rely on similar facts. The trial court found the evidence clear and 
convincing that involuntary medication is necessary to further the State's interest and no 
less intrusive means are likely to restore competency. R564. The court focused on the 
fact that because of her beliefs and mental illness, Ms. Barzee is willing to participate in 
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very little of what USH has to offer by way of less intrusive means. Id. However, the 
State's evidence was not that alternative less intrusive modalities do not exist, only that 
they are not offered at USH. R579:26. 
While all witnesses testified that it is medically appropriate to give antipsychotic 
medications to anyone suffering from a mental illness including Ms. Barzee, the trial 
court also acknowledged Dr. Amador's testimony that "forcibly medicating [Ms. Barzee] 
would be traumatic for her and would likely make her vulnerable to symptoms of stress 
reaction and, potentially, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder." R544 (emphasis in original).31 
Mildly reprimanding the State for not addressing the key question, "is [forcible 
medication] the right thing for this patient [Ms. Barzee]" (R579:190), Dr. Amador 
explained that because such an invasion "would be a very traumatic thing" for her, he 
would recommend an alternative "evidence-based practice called motivational 
enhancement" R579:187, 190. Not only can this approach be successful where other 
modalities have failed, but it is particularly appropriate when a patient resists medication. 
R579:187-88. This less invasive therapy is geared to soften the patient's aversion to 
medication and is much more appropriate for Ms. Barzee than the doctor-knows-best 
31
 The Court in Sell held that "the court must conclude that administration of the 
drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light of his 
medical condition." Sell at 2185 (emphasis in original). But it appears from the evidence 
in this case that antipsychotic medication would be considered medically appropriate for 
virtually every person suffering from a psychotic disorder, thereby reducing the 
significance of this factor. Ms. Barzee believes it makes more sense for this Court to 
focus this analysis on whether forcible medication is medically appropriate. 
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psychoeducational approach that she is currently getting at USH. Id. Obviously, if it 
impacted Ms. Barzee's willingness to take medication voluntarily, this approach would 
ameliorate, if not eliminate, some of the more traumatic side effects. 
The State presented no evidence to rebut Dr. Amador's expert testimony 
regarding the efficacy of this less invasive approach, nor were the State's experts able to 
successfully rebut Dr. Amador's testimony that forcibly medicating Ms. Barzee would not 
be in her best medical interest. Thus, the weight of the evidence does not rise to the level 
of clear and convincing that no alternatives to compelled medication are available, or that 
it is medically appropriate. 
IV. FORCED MEDICATION DENIES MS. BARZEE OF DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.32 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides, "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." This Court has found 
greater protection in this provision than its federal counterpart in some circumstances. 
See, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) (explaining eyewitness identification 
testimony is subject to greater scrutiny under the state provision); Foote v. Board of 
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) (inmate had right to state due process at Board of 
Pardons hearing, which right is not recognized under the federal constitution); but see, 
State v. Orr, 127 P.3d 1213, fn. 7 (Utah 2005) (noting there is nothing in the language of 
32The underlying legal analysis, history, and constitutional framework in this 
section is attributed to Joan Watt of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association. 
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article I, section 7 providing greater due process protection than its federal counterpart). 
Further, this Court has relied on article I, section 7 to protect mentally ill offenders. State 
v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Utah 1988) (finding statutory provisions regarding 
guilty and mentally ill arbitrary and capricious in violation of state due process). 
That Utah has taken a leading role in the humane treatment of mentally ill 
persons is evident from the fact that Salt Lake City was the site of the first institution for 
mentally ill in the western United States. McKell, unpublished Master's thesis, History of 
the Utah State Hospital, University of Utah Library Archives. Several years prior to the 
passage of the state constitution, territorial governor George C. Woods stated, "We ought 
to have an asylum for the insane. Humanity requires it." Message of Governors 1850-
1876. Bound Volume, Utah Historical Society, Salt Lake City, Utah, pp. 159-160. Early 
territorial laws expressly provided, 
Every person guilty of any unnecessarily harsh, cruel or unkind treatment of, or 
any neglect of duty towards, any idiot, lunatic or insane person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
Laws of Utah, 1876, Ch. XI Sec. 193. Territorial laws also recognized the criminal 
nonresponsibility of individuals suffering from mental illness. Title I, Chapter 1852, 
Section 22, Compiled Laws of 1876. This statutory scheme was maintained prior to 
statehood and retained with the adoption of the state constitution. See Compiled Laws of 
Utah §4387 (1888); Revised Statutes of the State of Utah §4071 (1898). 
Until 1983 when the current version of Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305 was adopted, 
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Utah's defense for mentally ill offenders was "one of the most liberal that [could] be 
found in the country." State v. Kirkam, 319 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1958). Subsequent to 
that enactment, this Court has continued to manifest concern for the humane treatment of 
mentally ill offenders. See, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266; State v. DePlonty, 749 
P.2d 621 (Utah 1987). Thus, historically Utah has taken a leading role in establishing 
progressive standards relative to the humane treatment of the mentally ill. 
It is undisputed in this case that administration of antipsychotic medication is not 
medically necessary, as distinguished from medically appropriate. All experts who 
addressed the issue determined that Ms. Barzee does not meet the Harper33 standards for 
commitment because she is not a danger to herself or others. R579:16-17, 19-21, 27, 52, 
60. In fact, if Ms. Barzee met the Harper criteria and it was medically necessary to give 
her such medication, her treating physician would have an obligation to do so and this 
case would not be pending in its current posture before this Court. 
Of course, the real irony is that if Ms. Barzee is forced to take medication, there 
is a substantial likelihood that she will finally become a danger to herself. See, e.g., 
R561-62; R579:189-91. The State's witnesses do not address this evidence and lack the 
expertise necessary to contest it. Even the trial court noted the likelihood of trauma and a 
"significant negative effect on [Ms. Barzee's] self-esteem. However, Dr. Amador did not 
testify that these types of side effects, if they did occur, would undermine [Ms. Barzee's] 
^Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
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ability to assist her attorneys and present a defense." R561-62. 
It is undisputed that Ms. Barzee's role in the alleged offenses was at best 
induced by the primary actor, she has suffered many years with a serious untreated mental 
illness, and she is not dangerous. The singular fact distinguishing this case from any 
other where the defendant would have been released under the applicable statutory 
scheme or the State would likely have dismissed the charges after finding such an 
uncompelling defendant incompetent on three separate occasions is its high profile nature, 
which fact should have no bearing on the issue of compelled medication. 
The Sell analysis focuses primarily on the government's interest - is it important, 
is it significantly likely to be furthered, and is a deprivation of fundamental liberty 
necessary to further that interest. The final question of medical appropriateness seems 
almost an afterthought, giving seemingly token recognition to the reality that an ill and 
particularly vulnerable human being will be profoundly affected by any judicial decision. 
This token recognition is unacceptable under our state due process protections.34 
This Court should continue in the historically progressive vein established in this 
state and conclude, at the very least, that under article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, it is a violation of due process to compel medication when it is not 
34See, Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst, 138 P.3d 238, 248 (Alaska 2006) (holding 
that the "right to refuse to take psychotropic drugs is fundamental" in a civil context); 
People v. Robert S. (In re Robert S.), 213 111. 2d 30, 46 (111. 2004) (recognizing that 
"involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs [involves a] massive curtailment of 
liberty") (citations and quotations omitted). 
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medically necessary, particularly when the defendant is not dangerous as in this case. 
A. This Court should review Ms. Barzee's state law claim under the 
Exceptional Circumstances Doctrine. 
The exceptional or extraordinary circumstances doctrine allows review of issues 
that have not been raised below. See, State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah App. 1996); 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f23, 93 P.3d 186. It applies to "rare procedural 
anomalies" and is used sparingly "where [an appellate court's] failure to consider an issue 
that was not properly preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f23. While the exceptional circumstances doctrine has 
not been precisely defined, it is considered a "safety device" to insure fairness and protect 
against manifest injustice. Id. (quoting Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8) (citation omitted). 
Although Ms. Barzee's state due process argument was not raised in the trial 
court, the exceptional circumstances doctrine allows this Court to review the issue. 
Exceptional circumstances justifying review in this case include the fact that it involves 
important constitutional issues of first impression, the case has not yet gone to trial so the 
issue has not been waived and it could be raised on remand, and the issue involves 
questions of law that can easily be reviewed for the first time on appeal. Not reviewing 
her claim will result in a manifest injustice. 
A review of the important and constitutional questions of first impression in this 
case would not be complete without considering the state constitutional claim. Therefore, 
the constitutional issue should be reviewed now. The necessity of interpreting the due 
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process concerns in the context of article I, section 7, is integral to Ms. Barzee's 
argument that compelled medication in her case will constitute a violation of her 
fundamental liberty interests in the context of due process. Therefore, judicial efficiency 
would be furthered and justice served by reaching the issue now. 
As outlined above, the trial court concluded that Ms. Barzee's fundamental 
liberty interests under due process will not be violated by the compelled administration of 
antipsychotic medication. Under such circumstances and in light of the fact that this 
Court has already agreed to hear her federal claim, manifest injustice will be prevented by 
considering the state constitutional issue at this juncture. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial 
court to compel medication in this case and, because there is no evidence that Ms. 
Barzee has made any progress toward competency in three years and any contrary 
findings from the trial court are clearly erroneous, order that Ms. Barzee be released 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-15-6 (9). 
Respectfully submitted this j ^ Q day of October, 2006. 
/ ^ X t e v i d ^ Finlayson 
Scott C. Williams 
Jennifer K. Gowans 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v s . 
WANDA BARZEE, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL 
MEDICATION 
Case No. 031901886 
Judge J u d i t h S. A t h e r t o n 
This case i s before the court on t h e S t a t e ' s Motion t o Compel 
Medication. At a hearing on February 16, 2006. Defendant was 
present with her a t to rneys Scott Williams and David F i n l a y s o n . 
The S ta t e was represented by Clark Harms, A l i c i a Cook, and Kent 
Morgan. The court has reviewed t h e p a r t i e s ' memoranda, t h e 
re levant case law, and a l l app l icab le s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s . 
Procedural H i s to ry 
On March 18, 2003, Defendant was charged with two coun t s of 
aggravated sexual a s sau l t , two counts of aggravated b u r g l a r y , one 
count of aggravated kidnaping, and one count of a t t e m p t e d 
aggravated kidnaping (or in the a l t e r n a t i v e , consp i racy t o commit 
aggravated kidnaping). On April 9, 2003, t h i s cou r t g r a n t e d 
Defendant's s t i pu la t ed p e t i t i o n to i n q u i r e i n t o D e f e n d a n t ' s 
competency t o proceed. Dr. Nancy B. Cohn and Dr. Je f f rey A. Kovnick 
evaluated defendant, and, in November of 2003, both determined i h a i 
Defendant suffered from a mental i l l n e s s and was incompeten t t o 
proceed. The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d to t h e i r f i nd ings , and r on J a n u a r y 
9, 2004, the cour t found Defendant incompetent t o p r o c e e d . 
Defendant was t r a n s p o r t e d to the Utah S t a t e H o s p i t a l ( S t a t e 
Hospital) . 
At a review on August 10, 2004, a f t e r hear ing t e s t imony from 
Dr. Gerald Berge and argument from the p a r t i e s , the cour t conc luded 
tha t Defendant was s t i l l incompetent t o proceed, but t h a t t h e r e was 
a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t she may become competent i n t h e 
foreseeable fu ture . On September 16, 2005, t h e cour t conduc ted a 
second scheduled competency review hear ing and, a f t e r h e a r i n g 
testimony from Dr. Eric Nielsen, determined t h a t Defendant was 
s t i l l incompetent t o proceed. On October 14, 2005, t he S t a t e f i l e d 
a motion for a medication hearing and for forced m e d i c a t i o n of 
Defendant. After the February 16, 2006 h e a r i n g , the p a r t i e s f i l e d 
add i t iona l memoranda. 
Relevant Facts 
I . Dr. Nancy Cohen and Dr. Je f fe rv Kovnick 
In November, 2004, both Dr. Cohn and Dr. Kovnick conc luded 
tha t Defendant suffered from a mental i l l n e s s t h a t r e n d e r e d h e r 
incompetent to proceed under sec t ion 77-15-5, Utah Code Ann . (1953 , 
as amended) . According to Dr. Cohn, Defendant demons t r a t ed 
mul t ip le ind ica t ions of a psychot ic mental d i s o r d e r , i n c l u d i n g 
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for Defendant's de lu s iona l b e l i e f s to abate over t ime so long as 
she remains separated from Mr. Mi tche l l . According t o Dr. Berge, 
while Defendant's competency had improved, she remained incompetent 
t o proceed. The S t a t e Hospital had offered Defendant s e v e r a l 
treatment moda l i t i e s , inc luding ind iv idua l and group t he r apy , bu t 
she had opted not to p a r t i c i p a t e . The h o s p i t a l had not medicated 
Defendant, and Dr. Berge did not know whether the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
ant ipsychot ic medication would have a b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t in 
r e s to r ing Defendant 's competency. 
I I I . Dr. Eric Nielsen 
Following Defendant 's recommitment to t he S t a t e H o s p i t a l , Dr. 
Eric Nielsen performed a competency e v a l u a t i o n . He i n t e r v i e w e d 
Defendant on four s e p a r a t e occasions and t e s t i f i e d a t Defendan t ' s 
next competency review hear ing , held on September 16, 2005. Dr. 
Nielsen concluded t h a t Defendant was su f f e r ing from a s u b s t a n t i a l 
mental i l l n e s s . manifested pr imar i ly by g rand iose d e l u s i o n a l 
b e l i e f s . He found t h a t the most app rop r i a t e d i a g n o s i s for 
Defendant was Psychot ic Disorder, Not Otherwise Spec i f i ed 
("Psychotic Disorder, NOS"), concluding t h a t Defendant was 
incompetent to proceed because her de lus iona l b e l i e f s p reven ted her 
from engaging in reasoned choice about her l e g a l s t r a t e g i e s and 
options and would a l so prevent her from t e s t i f y i n g r e l e v a n t l y . He 
concluded tha t Defendant had shown no s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s toward 
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competency from the time she was first ordered into treatment. She 
continued to refuse medication and refused to actively participate 
in therapy programs. However, Dr. Nielsen did not know whether 
medicating Defendant would result in a restoration of competency 
because he believed that most people whose symptoms were primarily 
of a delusional nature do not respond favorably to antipsychotic 
medication. Nevertheless, he also felt that certain aspects of 
Defendant's thought disorder, such as the vague, rambling quality 
of her speech, her unresponsiveness to questions, and the need to 
continually derail any conversation not associated with her 
delusional beliefs, are atypical of people who are strictly 
afflicted with a delusional disorder and more akin to persons with 
schizophrenic symptoms. Accordingly, those qualities suggested the 
possibility of a more positive response to psychotropic medication. 
Dr. Nielsen believed that Defendant would not be restored to 
competency without the use of antipsychotic medication, noting that 
the likelihood of antipsychotic medication restoring a person to 
competency typically lessened the longer a person suffered from 
psychotic symptoms. Finally, Dr. Nielsen concluded that while 
Defendant remained at the State Hospital she posed no serious 
potential harm to herself or others. 
IV. Dr. Kreq Jeppson 
Dr. Kreg Jeppson is a psychiatrist in the forensic unit at the 
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State Hospital and, with the exception of a two-month period, has 
been Defendant's treating physician since March of 2DD4. When 
Defendant was first admitted, he diagnosed her with Delusional 
Disorder. However, Defendant has not fully cooperated with 
attempts to gain additional information about her psychological 
condition (e.g. refusing to submit to a neuroconsult or an MRI of 
her brain) . Thus, despite his original diagnosis, over time and as 
a result of a change in symptoms, particularly the onset of 
referential -chinking, he developed a working diagnosis of Psychotic 
Disorder, NOS, finding her mental illness to be characterized by 
grandiose and persecutory delusions, paranoia, thought disorder, 
and referential thinking. According to Dr. Jeppson, while 
Defendant concedes that people view her beliefs as odd or 
different, she does not believe that she suffers from a mental 
illness or that her thinking is delusional or that she needs 
psychological or psychiatric treatment, Defendant believes that 
those involved in her care at the State Hospital are "evil" and are 
"working against God's plan." She believes it is God's will that 
she not participate in treatment. As a result, she has rejected 
each treatment modality offered, including individual therapy, 
group therapy, and voluntary medication, believing that "Jesus" is 
the only medicine she needs. In light of Defendant's unwillingness 
to participate in treatment, she has made little, if any, progress 
towards restoration of competency. 
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Dr. Jeppson' s standard pract ice i s to administer an t ipsycho t ic 
medication to pat ients exhibiting the types of symptoms displayed 
by Defendant,2 and tha t without the administration of an t ipsycho t ic 
medication Defendant i s unlikely to make any fur ther progress 
towards restoration of competency or to experience amel iorat ion of 
her mental i l lness . Dr. Jeppson would try one, two, or th ree drugs 
individually at various doses. If no signs of improvement 
resulted, he would then s t a r t to combine the drugs. He would begin 
his treatment with 1 milligram of Risperdal once a day. He would 
then t i t r a t e the dose up to 3 or 4 milligrams a day over the course 
of three or four months. If there was only moderate improvement, 
he might increase the dosage up to 5 milligrams d a i l y . If no 
improvement was indicated, he would stop using Risperdal and begin 
administering 100 milligrams of Seroquel dai ly . Over the course of 
weeks, he would increase the dosage to 400 mill igrams per day and 
sustain th i s for three to four months. If no improvement was made, 
he would then either combine dosages of Risperdal and Seroquel or, 
perhaps, switch to Zyprexa. 
Several side effects , including fatigue or sedat ion , weight 
gain, possible r i se in cholesterol levels , d iabe tes , dry mouth, 
constipation, and or thos ta t ic hypotension, would l i k e l y accompany 
the use of antipsychotic medications, although none would dissuade 
Dr. Jeppson also t e s t i f i e d tha t in h is experience, even pe r sons s u f f e r i n g 
from Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type, can be s u c c e s s f u l l y t r e a t e d with 
medication. 
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him from medicating Defendant. Dr. Jeppson also believed that 
most of the side effects would be time-limited and could be 
mitigated through careful monitoring. Unlikely side effects 
include tardive dyskinesia and increased risk of heart attack. 
The use of antipsychotic medication would not undermine Defendant's 
ability to consult with her attorneys and, if the medication is 
successful, she would have an increased ability to engage in 
rational decision making about her case. 
Although the drugs would not eliminate her mental illness or 
her delusions, they would assist her in becoming more cooperative 
and more concerned about her treatment and day-to-day activities by 
reducing both the intensity of, and her preoccupation with, her 
delusional beliefs. He found that involuntarily medicating 
Defendant would be in her best medical interest because the 
medication would give her a fuller, more functional life and would 
allow her to proceed forward with her case. Defendant's present 
unwillingness to cooperate has made it difficult for hospital staff 
to ensure the maintenance of her basic health needs. Without the 
involuntary administration of medication, Defendant would simply be 
warehoused at the State Hospital without any treatment or care 
designed to improve her competency or her overall well-being. He 
further felt that medication had a 70% to 80% likelihood of 
restoring Defendant's competence and would likely take eight to 
twelve months with signs of improvement probably occurring within 
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two to four months. Finally, Dr. Jeppson concluded that Defendant 
is neither gravely disabled nor an immediate danger to herself or 
others so long as she remains in the controlled environment of the 
State Hospital. 
V. Dr. Paul Whitehead 
Dr. Paul Whitehead is a psychiatrist in the forensic unit at 
the State Hospital and has consulted with Dr. Jeppson concerning 
Defendant's diagnosis and treatment. Dr. Whitehead agrees with Dr. 
Jeppson in every relevant area. Based upon his own assessment of 
Defendant's symptoms, he believes that the diagnosis of Psychotic 
Disorder, NOS is reasonable, particularly in light of her lack of 
cooperation in the evaluation process and in describing her 
experiences and her unwillingness to see a neurologist or 
participate in any type of psychological testing. Based upon his 
own evaluation of Defendant, he believes that Delusional Disorder 
is not the most accurate diagnosis because she exhibits more 
symptoms than a typical patient with that diagnosis 
Dr. Whitehead agrees that medication is the cornerstone of 
treatment for patients with a psychotic disorder because it helps 
reduce psychotic thinking, normalizes the thought process, and, in 
Defendant's case, is essential to reducing her psychotic symptoms. 
Dr. Whitehead believes that Dr. Jeppson's treatment plan is a 
reasonable approach to administering medication to Defendant and 
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that the medication's likely side effects would not dissuade him 
from medicating he^ r. Medication would help Defendant organize her 
thoughts, think rationally, and, thereby, better consult with her 
attorneys and prepare a meaningful defense. He concluded that it 
is substantially likely that Defendant will be restored to 
competency through the administration of antipsychotic medication 
and is necessary for her to progress toward competency restoration. 
VI. Dr. Raphael Morris 
Dr. Raphael Morris is a forensic psychiatrist with a private 
practice in San Diego, California. For the past ten years he has 
both treated and evaluated patients who required competency* 
restoration. Dr. Morris has been the director of forensic services 
at Bellevue Hospital Center in New York City where he was in charge 
of forensic evaluations and treatment of inmates. He has also 
worked at the Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center in New York 
treating patients who were not responding to medication, and he has 
been a treating psychiatrist at Sing Sing Correctional Facility. 
Dr. Morris has performed over one hundred competency restoration 
evaluations and has testified as an expert in numerous cases where 
involuntary medication was an issue. Based upon his experience and 
his assessment of Defendant, he disagrees with Dr. Jeppson that 
Defendant has Psychotic Disorder, NOS and believes the more 
accurate diagnosis is Delusional Disorder or, possibly, 
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Schizophrenia. 
Dr. Morris challenged Dr. Jeppson's conclusion that Defendant 
has Psychotic Disorder, NOS because she exhibits symptoms of 
referential thinking. According to Dr. Morris, nothing about 
referential thinking precludes a diagnosis of Delusional Disorder. 
Significantly, Dr. Morris believes that Defendant's problem is not 
so much the delusional ideas themselves but the way in which they 
dominate her life. If she was not so preoccupied with her 
delusions, she might be able to talk about and better weigh her 
legal options separate from her delusions. However, although Dr. 
Morris did not expressly disagree with the antipsychotic 
medications Dr. Jeppson testified he would administer to Defendant, 
he did testify that the treatment plan for Defendant was less than 
ideal. This is so, he asserted, because the dosage amounts of the 
medications to be administered were inconsistent with the 
manufacturer's recommendations and, therefore, would simply be 
ineffective in restoring Defendant to competency. 
For several reasons Dr. Morris believes that the 
administration of antipsychotic medications has only a 25% to 35% 
chance of restoring Defendant to competency. First, Defendant's 
thought processes are dominated by her delusions, and antipsychotic 
medication would not eliminate these. Because Defendant's 
incompetency is based directly upon her delusions, the 
administration of antipsychotic medication would likely not have a 
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marked impact on her competence to proceed. Second, generally, the 
longer a person's delusional thinking has gone untreated, the less 
likely antipsychotic medication would result in improved 
competency. In Defendant's case, her delusions have not been 
treated for nearly thirteen years. Therefore, in his view, 
successful treatment with antipsychotic medication is highly 
unlikely. Finally, Defendant has been previously diagnosed with 
Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type. According to Dr. Morris, it 
is well-accepted by the psychiatric community that antipsychotic 
medication does not work well in treating persons with this type of 
psychotic disorder. 
In addition, Dr. Morris believes that it is distinctly 
possible that the administration of antipsychotic medication would 
result in severe side effects including tardive dyskinesia, which 
can be permanent, weight gain, sedation, diabetes, heart problems, 
and orthostatic hypotension. This possibility, in combination with 
the limited likelihood that Defendant would respond favorably to 
antipsychotic medication, simply does not justify medicating 
Defendant against her will. Nevertheless, under cross-examination 
Dr. Morris testified that despite the various reasons in support of 
his conclusion that antipsychotic medication will not restore 
Defendant to competency, if Defendant were his patient he would 
treat her with antipsychotic drugs despite the risk factors. He 
also testified that medicating Defendant would be medically 
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appropriate and conceded that i t i s possible t ha t medicating 
Defendant could prove helpful. 
VII. Dr. Xavier Amador 
Dr. Xavier Amador i s a pract icing c l i n i c a l psychologist in the 
State of New York and an adjunct Professor of Psychology at 
Columbia University. He has over twenty years of c l i n i c a l 
experience evaluating and diagnosing persons with psychotic and 
mood disorders in a variety of contexts, including the criminal 
jus t ice se t t ing . He has direct ly evaluated and t rea ted , supervised 
evaluations and treatment of, or conducted c l i n i c a l research on, 
more than 1,000 pat ients with c l i n i c a l h i s t o r i e s l ike tha t of 
defendant, who have a decade or more of untreated psychosis not 
characterized by prominent delusions. In addition t o his c l i n i c a l 
experience, Dr. Amador has been involved in research and s tud ies 
addressing the treatment of pa t i en t s whose symptoms are 
unresponsive to medication. He has also edited books, acted as a 
peer reviewer for approximately twenty journals in psychia t ry , 
authored or co-authored more than 100 peer-reviewed a r t i c l e s , 
assisted in the revision of relevant sect ions of the DSM-IV, and 
consulted on drug t r i a l s with various drug companies. Dr. Amador 
is not a forensic psychologist and has never worked on res to r ing 
pat ients to competency in the context of a criminal case. 
According to Dr. Amador, although Drs. Cohen and Kovnick gave 
13 
differing diagnoses, each diagnosis f a l l s within the ambit of 
psychotic disorder and, in addition, a l l of the evalua tors 
concluded that Defendant was suffering from severe grandiose 
delusions with re l ig ious themes. He was, however, perplexed by the 
diagnosis of Psychotic Disorder, NOS provided by Drs. Jeppson and 
Whitehead because the very reason for giving t h i s d iagnos is , 
namely, referent ia l thinking by Defendant, does not preclude a 
diagnosis of Delusional Disorder. Based upon his own assessment of 
Defendant, he has diagnosed her with Delusional Disorder, Grandiose 
Type. Dr. Amador t e s t i f i ed that the pa r t i cu la r diagnosis rendered 
has some relevance to predicting successful t rea tment with 
antipsychotic medication. 
Dr. Amador t e s t i f i e d that the length of time from the onset 
of the mental i l l ne s s to the f i r s t treatment i s an important 
predictor in determining whether a pa t ien t wi l l respond to 
treatment from antipsychotic medication. The longer the time 
period from onset to f i r s t treatment, the less l i k e l y the 
administration of antipsychotic medication wil l have a successful 
impact. According to Dr. Amador, research shows t ha t a f t e r 
approximately one year of untreated psychosis, pa t i en t s t y p i c a l l y 
do not respond. This is a s ignif icant factor with respect to 
Defendant because her psychotic disorder has gone unt rea ted for 
thir teen years or more. Thus, the prognosis for successful 
treatment with medication on the basis of duration of unt rea ted 
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psychosis is not good. 
In addition, Dr. Amador testified that his own clinical 
experience, as well as authoritative research data, shows that 
grandiose delusions are the most resistant to treatment with 
antipsychotic medications. Defendant's grandiose religious 
delusions, specifically her belief that God controls everything she 
does, will not change even with the administration of medication. 
Dr. Amador agrees with Dr. Jeppson that the administration of 
medication will make Defendant feel less inclined to talk about her 
delusions, but that her delusions would always be present. 
However, feeling less inclined to talk about one's delusions is not 
the same as restoring a person to competency. Only if the 
medication reduces the severity of one's delusions could it result 
in a restoration of competence. 
Dr. Amador acknowledged that patients diagnosed with 
Delusional Disorder can be successfully treated, that patients with 
grandiose delusions can become competent, that involuntary 
medication can help mentally ill persons improve, and that if he 
could, he would medicate Defendant in order to restore her to 
competency. Nevertheless, he remains firm in his belief that 
forcibly medicating Defendant would be traumatic for her and would 
likely send her into a depression and make her vulnerable to 
symptoms of stress reaction and, potentially, Post-Traumiatic Stress 
Disorder. Dr. Amador concluded that it is not substantially likely 
15 
tha t the admin i s t ra t ion of an t ipsycho t i c medica t ion would reduce 
the s e v e r i t y of Defendant 's de lus ions . He e s t ima ted t h a t t h e r e i s 
approximately a 20% chance of successful t r ea tmen t fo r a d i a g n o s i s 
of Delusional Disorder and a 30% chance of success for a d i a g n o s i s 
of Psychotic Disorder, NOS. Indeed, he r e p o r t s t h a t even though he 
has been involved in the t reatment of hundreds of p a t i e n t s with 
c l i n i c a l h i s t o r i e s s imi la r to Defendant ' s , he has not yet met a 
pa t i en t with such a long a h i s t o r y of u n t r e a t e d d e l u s i o n s who has 
responded to an t ipsycho t i c medicat ion. 
Legal Analysis 
Defendants who have been found incompetent t o proceed t o t r i a l 
have a l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t in being free from unwanted med ica t i on . 
See U.S. Const. , Amend. V (the S ta te may not " d e p r i v e " a person of 
" l i b e r t y . . . without due process of law.") . See a l s o Washington 
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 211 (1990) ( recogniz ing >Na s i g n i f i c a n t 
l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t in avoiding the unwanted a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of a n t i -
psychotic d rugs") ; Riaains v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992) 
(same). Never the less , United S ta tes Supreme Court has e s t a b l i s h e d 
a l ega l framework whereby a defendant ' s l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t may be 
overcome. 
The Cons t i tu t ion permits the S ta t e t o f o r c i b l y a d m i n i s t e r 
an t ipsychot ic drugs to render an incompetent defendant f ac ing 
ser ious criminal charges competent to s tand t r i a l . S e l l v. United 
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States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) The State must show by c l ea r and 
convincing evidence3 that the treatment i s medically appropr ia te , 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that wil l undermine the 
fairness of the defendant's t r i a l , and, in the absence of l e s s 
intrusive a l te rna t ives , i s necessary to s ign i f i can t ly fur ther 
important governmental t r i a l - r e l a t e d i n t e r e s t s . Id. at 179. A 
court must apply a four-part balancing t e s t . 4 
"Firs t , [the} court must find that important [State] i n t e r e s t s 
are at s take." Id. at 180 (emphasis removed). See also Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-15-6.5(4) (d) ( I ) . Bringing to t r i a l a defendant who has 
been charged with a serious crime is an important Sta te i n t e r e s t . 
3Although the United States Supreme Court did not address in 
Sell what standard of proof applies to the factors t h a t must be 
considered, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded t h a t 
the required findings must be supported by clear and convincing 
evidence. See United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2nd Ci r . 
2004) ("[T]he relevant findings [under Sel l! must be supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. ") . In United States v. Bradley, 417 
F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005) the Tenth Circuit agreed. See id at 
1114 ("The Second Circuit determined the remaining Sel l f ac to r s 
depend upon factual findings and ought to be proved by the 
government by clear and convincing evidence. Recognizing the v i t a l 
consti tutional l i b e r t y in te res t at stake, we agree .") . In 
addition, recent legis la t ion enacted by the Utah Leg i s l a tu re 
specifically s ta tes that "the court [must] find[] by c l ea r and 
convincing evidence that the involuntary adminis t ra t ion of 
antipsychotic medication i s appropr ia te / ' Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-
6.5(6) (a), before i t permits a defendant to be medicated involun-
t a r i l y . 
4In the 2006 session, the Utah Legislature enacted l e g i s l a t i o n 
that addressed the issue of involuntary medication of incompetent 
defendants, essent ia l ly codifying the Sell fac tors . See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-15-6.5. 
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See id. Although the State's interest in bringing a defendant to 
trial is important, this importance can be reduced by specific 
circumstances of the case. For example, if a defendant is likely 
to serve only a few years in prison and the amount of time the 
defendant has already spent in confinement waiting to be rendered 
competent has been two or three years (which could be credited 
toward any eventual sentence), the State's interests are lessened 
in importance. Moreover, if there is the possibility of 
involuntary civil commitment if a trial could not be held, this too 
would lessen the importance of the State's interests. See id. 
However, the Supreme Court was careful to note that the ^potential 
for future confinement affects, but does not totally undermine, the 
strength of the need for prosecution." Id. 
Second, the court must find that involuntarily medicating a 
defendant will significantly further the State's interest in 
bringing a defendant to trial, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-
6.5(4) (d) (ii); that is, the court must find that the medication is 
both substantially likely to render the defendant competent to 
stand trial and substantially unlikely to have side effects that 
will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist 
counsel in presenting a trial defense. See id. at 181. See also 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6. 5 (3) (b) - (c) ) . Because different drugs 
have different side effects, the State "must propose a course of 
treatment in which it specifies the particular drug io be 
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admin i s t e red / ' United S t a t e s v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 240 (4th C i r . 
2005), "including the dose r ange . " Id. a t 241. See a l s o Uni ted 
State- v. Alqere, 396 F. Supp.2d 734, 741 (E.D. La. 2005) ( the S t a t e 
must propose treatment s p e c i f i c t o the defendant) ; Uni ted S t a t e s v . 
Mi l l e r , 292 F. Supp.2d 163, 164 (D. Me. 2003) (the S t a t e must show 
tha t the "proposed regimen of an t ip sycho t i c medicat ion i s m e d i c a l l y 
appropr ia te for a defendant in the condi t ion and c i r cums tances of 
t h i s Defendant. ") (emphasis added)) . 
Third, the court must find t h a t means l e s s i n t r u s i v e t h a n 
medication are un l ike ly t o achieve s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e same r e s u l t s . 
See i d . See a lso Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 - 1 5 - 6 . 5 ( 3 ) ( a ) , ( d ) . For 
example, i f i t were the case t h a t the t r i a l cour t could s imply 
i s sue an order d i r e c t i n g t h e defendant to take the med ica t ion and 
t h i s would suff ice , then t h e r e would c l e a r l y be a l e s s i n t r u s i v e 
means t o rendering the defendant competent than f o r c i b l y med ica t i ng 
her . 
Fourth, the t r i a l cour t "must conclude t h a t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
the drugs i s medically a p p r o p r i a t e , i . e . , in the p a t i e n t ' s b e s t 
medical i n t e r e s t in l i g h t of [her] medical c o n d i t i o n . " Id . 
(emphasis in or ig ina l ) . See a l so Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6 . 5 (3) (e) . 
The foregoing l ega l s tandard u c o n t r o l [ s ] when the s o l e purpose 
of forced chemical t rea tment i s t o render a defendant competent for 
t r i a l . " United S ta tes v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Ci r . 2004) . 
However, the Supreme Court a l so ind ica ted t h a t a 
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court need not consider whether to allow forced 
medication for that kind of purpose, if forced medication 
is warranted for a different purpose, such as the 
purposes . . . related to the [defendant's] 
dangerousness, or purposes related to the [defendant's] 
own interests where refusal to take drugs puts [her] 
health gravely at risk. 
Sell, 539 U.S. at 182-83 (emphasis in original). Thus, before 
proceeding to apply the Sell standard, the court must first 
consider whether involuntarily medicating Defendant is 
constitutionally justifiable on alternative grounds set forth by 
the Supreme Court, such as to render a defendant non-dangerous. 
See United States v. White, 431 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2005) (in 
Sell, the Supreme Court admonished trial courts nto consider 
whether involuntary medication is appropriate on grounds of 
dangerousness before considering whether doing so would be 
appropriate to restore an inmate's competence to stand trial.") ; 
United States v. Morrison, 415 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 2005) (an 
inquiry into involuntarily medicating a defendant on dangerousness 
grounds should precede the inquiry required by Sell). See also 
Rjqgins, 504 U.S. at 135 (involuntary medication is 
constitutionally permissible if it is "essential for the sake of 
[the defendant's] own safety or the safety of others."); Harper, 
494 U.S. at 227 (involuntary medication is constitutionally 
permissible if uthe inmate is dangerous to himself or others and 
the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest."). 
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Discussion 
The State argues that Defendant's symptoms, especially her 
referential thinking, strongly suggest that she suffers from 
Psychotic Disorder, NOS. While at the State Hospital, she has made 
little, if any, progress in competency restoration. The State 
Hospital has exhausted all treatment modalities at its disposal in 
seeking to comply with the court's order to restore Defendant to 
competency with the exception of administering Defendant 
antipsychotic medication. Defendant has refused to participate in 
any type of therapy and has adamantly refused to consider taking 
antipsychotic medication, although treatment through medication has 
been offered to her. 
According to the State, all of the Sell requirements are 
satisfied in Defendant's case. First, given the seriousness of the 
charges leveled against Defendant, bringing her to trial is an 
important State interest; second, involuntarily medicating 
Defendant will significantly further the State's important 
interest. According to the State, administering antipsychotic 
medication to Defendant is substantially likely to render Defendant 
competent to stand trial and substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that will interfere with her ability to assist counsel. 
Third, no less intrusive means are available to the State to 
restore Defendant to competency, and fourth, the administration of 
antipsychotic medication to Defendant is in her best medical 
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interest in light of her medical condition. For these reasons, the 
State argues that the court should permit the State Hospital to 
involuntarily medicate Defendant with antipsychotic medication. 
Defendant argues that all of the Sell requirements are not 
satisfied in her case. Specifically, she asserts that 
involuntarily administering to her antipsychotic medication will 
not significantly further the State's interests in bringing her to 
trial. According to Defendant, the overwhelming experience of 
clinicians in forensic psychology and scholarly studies strongly 
suggest that antipsychotic medication is highly unlikely to restore 
to competence a person with Defendant's symptoms. Moreover, even 
if the administration of antipsychotic medication could 
successfully restore her to competency, their side affects would 
interfere with her ability to assist counsel in her defense. 
I. Introduction 
As noted above, the Sell factors need not be considered if 
there are reasons alternative to restoration of competency that 
constitutionally justify forcibly medicating Defendant, such as 
Defendant's dangerousness or the possibility that she may suffer 
grave health risks as a result of refusing medication. In 
Defendant's case, both parties acknowledge that so long as 
Defendant remains in the forensic unit of the State Hospital she is 
neither a danger to herself or others nor is her refusal to take 
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antipsychotic medication likely to pose any grave health risks. 
Although Defendant has occasionally fasted for extended periods of 
time, 'raising the possibility of a health risk, she has ever been 
violent or in any way assaultive towards hospital staff or medical 
personnel. At the February 16th hearing, the State's expert 
witnesses, Dr. Jeppson and Dr. Whitehead, both concluded that 
Defendant is neither gravely disabled as a result of her refusal to 
take medication nor is she a danger to herself or others while she 
remains in the controlled environment of the State Hospital. 
Based upon the foregoing evidence, it is the court's 
conclusion that alternative reasons for authorizing involuntary 
medication, other than restoration to competency, are not present 
and, therefore, that the court must apply the factors enumerated in 
Sell to determine whether forced medication is constitutionally 
permitted in Defendant's case. 
II. Important State Interest 
The State has an interest in bringing Defendant to trial 
under Sell. That Defendant has been indicted on serious criminal 
offenses is evidenced by the significant length of incarceration 
she faces if convicted. See United State v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 
160 (2nd Cir. 2004) ("'Both the seriousness of the crime and [the 
defendant's] perceived dangerousness to society are evident from 
the substantial sentence [the defendant] faces if convicted.'" 
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(quoting United States v. Gomez, 289 F.3d 71, 86 (2nd Cir 2002), 
vacated and remanded by, 539 U.S. 939 (2003)). Defendant has been 
charged with two counts of aggravated sexual assaul t and one count 
of aggravated kidnaping, each of which carr ies a sentence of 6,10, 
or 15 years to l i f e in prison. She has also been charged with two 
counts of aggravated burglary, each of which ca r r i es a sentence of 
5 years to l i fe in prison, and one count of conspiracy to commit 
kidnaping, which car r ies a sentence of 1 to 15 years . Clearly 
Defendant has been charged with serious crimes which the State has 
a s ignif icant in te res t in timely prosecuting. Nevertheless, the 
Sell Court also indicated that certain "circumstances may lessen 
the importance of [the S ta te ' s ] i n t e r e s t . " Se l l , 539 U.S. at 180. 
For example, "fai lure to take drugs voluntar i ly . . . may mean 
lengthy confinement in an i n s t i t u t i on for the mentally i l l — and 
that would diminish the r isks that ordinar i ly a t tach to freeing 
without punishment one who has committed a serious cr ime." Id. 
The standard in Utah for involuntar i ly committing a person for 
mental health treatment requires that there be 
clear and convincing evidence tha t : (a) the proposed 
pat ient has a mental i l l ne s s ; (b) because of the proposed 
p a t i e n t ' s mental i l lness [she] poses a subs t an t i a l 
danger5 . . . of physical injury to others or [her]self , 
5A person poses a " subs t an t i a l danger" to o thers when, as a r e s u l t of 
mental i l l n e s s , his or her behavior p laces him or her 
(a) . . . at se r ious r i s k t o : (I) commit s u i c i d e , ( i i ) i n f l i c t 
se r ious bodily in jury on himself or herse l f ; or ( i i i ) because of h i s 
or her actions or inac t ion , suffer se r ious bodi ly in jury because he 
or she is incapable of providing the basic n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e , such 
as food, c lothing, and s h e l t e r ; (r>) . . . a t s e r ious r i s k t o cause 
or attempt to cause ser ious bodi ly in jury ; or ©) has i n f l i c t e d or 
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which may include the i nab i l i t y to provide the bas ic 
necess i t ies such as food, clothing, and she l t e r , i f 
allowed to remain at l i be r ty ; ©) the patient lacks the 
a b i l i t y to engage in a ra t ional decision-making process 
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as 
demonstrated by evidence of i n a b i l i t y to weigh the 
possible r isks of accepting or re ject ing treatment; (d) 
there i s no appropriate l e s s - r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e rna t i ve to 
a court order of commitment; and (e) the local mental 
health authority can provide the individual with 
treatment that i s adequate and appropriate to [her] 
conditions and needs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-15-631 (10) (a) - (e) . As previously discussed, 
the pa r t i e s agree that Defendant i s not a subs tant ia l danger to 
herself or others, though the State r e l i e s upon the caveat t ha t 
th is i s so at leas t while she i s confined in the State Hosp i t a l ' s 
Forensic Unit. Presumably, the State would argue tha t outs ide the 
State Hospital Defendant would pose a substant ia l danger to herse l f 
or o thers . Based upon the evidence presented to the cour t , i t i s 
not c lear whether involuntary commitment i s , a t p r e sen t t a 
r e a l i s t i c option in Defendant's case. If i t i s not, then the 
S ta te ' s in te res t in prosecuting Defendant remains undiminished. 
However, even if the conditions for involuntary commitment are 
sa t i s f i ed , the "potential for future confinement a f fec t s , but does 
not t o t a l l y undermine, the strength of the need for p rosecu t ion . " 
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. In Defendant's case, an involuntary 
attempted to i n f l i c t serious bodi ly in ju ry on another . 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-15-602(13) . "Serious bodi ly in jury" i s def ined as xxbodily 
injury which involves a subs tan t i a l r i s k of death, unconsciousness , extreme 
physical pa in , pro t rac ted and obvious disf igurement , or p r o t r a c t e d l o s s or 
impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mennal f a c u l t y . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-15-602(12). 
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commitment could l a s t for years or simply months. If Defendant i s 
unlikely to face lengthy confinement, then the involuntary 
commitment would have l i t t l e impact on the importance of the 
State 's in te res t in bringing her to t r i a l . See id. (". . . lengthy 
confinement in an ins t i tu t ion for the mentally i l l . . . would 
diminish the r i sks that ordinarily attach to freeing without 
punishment one who has committed a serious crime.") (emphasis 
added) ) . On the other hand, if Defendant were t o face a 
significant length of time in confinement if i nvo lun t a r i l y 
committed, the State makes the legit imate argument tha t t h i s type 
of delay in bringing Defendant to t r i a l xvwould l i k e l y diminish 
witness ava i l ab i l i ty , recol lec t ion[ , ] and a b i l i t y to t e s t i f y 
accurately. I t would also l ikely inh ib i t [Defendant's] a b i l i t y to 
accurately remember events and fac ts , thus inh ib i t ing her a b i l i t y 
to ass i s t in her own defense." S t a t e ' s Supplemental Mem. in Supp. 
at 8-9. See also id. ("[I]t may be d i f f i cu l t or impossible t o t r y 
a defendant who regains competence af ter years of commitment during 
which memories may fade and evidence may be los t . " ) . Thus, even i f 
Defendant would face involuntary commitment, the S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t s 
in prosecuting Defendant are not s ign i f ican t ly diminished. 
Therefore, the cour t ' s concludes that the State has shown by c lea r 
and convincing evidence that i t has a s ign i f ican t i n t e r e s t in 
timely prosecuting defendant. 
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I I I . Involuntary Medication and Furthering the S t a t e ' s I n t e r e s t s 
To determine that involuntary administration of an t ipsycho t ic 
medication would s ignif icant ly further the S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t in 
prosecuting defendant the court must find that t reatment i s (1) 
substantial ly l ike ly to render Defendant competent to proceed to 
t r i a l and (2) substant ia l ly unlikely to have side e f fec t s t h a t w i l l 
significantly undermine her ab i l i ty to consult with her a t to rneys 
and ass i s t them in presenting a defense. See Se l l , 539 U.S. at 
181. 
A. Likelihood that Defendant Will Be Rendered Competent 
Although a l l of the experts who t e s t i f i e d at the February 16th 
hearing agreed that providing antipsychotic medication to a p a t i e n t 
with Defendant's symptoms i s essent ia l to any treatment modali ty, 
they disagreed on whether involuntari ly administering an t ipsycho t i c 
medication is subs tant ia l ly l ikely to render her competent to stand 
t r i a l . On the one hand, Dr. Amador suggests t h a t published 
research, rather than c l in ica l experience, i s the proper ba s i s for 
making that determination, arguing tha t , while c l i n i c a l experience 
is certainly important, p rac t i t ioners ' knowledge i s l imi ted to the 
location where they pract ice and the pa t i en t s they see . According 
to Dr. Amador, t h i s l imitat ion mandates reference to published 
research whenever possible to avoid fa lse assumptions and, 
ultimately, false conclusions about how a pa t i en t should be 
"created. 
27 
Relying on published research as well as their own experience, 
Dr. Morris and Dr. Amador each contend that it is highly unlikely 
that Defendant can be rendered competent to stand trial by forcibly 
medicating her with antipsychotic drugs. On the other hand, Dr. 
Jeppson and Dr. Whitehead relying primarily upon their own clinical 
experience and information on restoration rates from other 
hospitals, conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that 
Defendant will be restored to competency if given antipsychotic 
medication. 
Each witness who testified at the February 16th hearing is 
knowledgeable and experienced. The court now must decide whose 
testimony is most persuasive and convincing. Dr. Morris testified 
that he reviewed Defendant's past competency evaluations, her 
treatment history, the affidavits of Dr. Jeppson and Dr. Whitehead, 
and interviewed Defendant once on the morning of the February 16th 
hearing. Dr. Amador testified that he reviewed evaluations, 
reports, and other materials related to Defendant and spent fifteen 
hours personally observing her over several years. His first 
interview occurred on September 18, 2003; the second on October 20, 
2003, the third on November 3, 2003, and the last on August 10, 
2004. He also reviewed materials collected by a defense 
investigator, which included many hours of interviews with family 
members and other individuals acquainted with Defendant. However, 
neither witness indicated that he had reviewed the State Hospital's 
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records in full, and their interaction with Defendant was at best 
limited. 
As the State points out, neither Dr. Morris nor Dr. Amador had 
the quantity or quality of information about Defendant's mental 
health as Dr. Jeppson. Although Dr. Amador contends that being a 
treating physician is likely disadvantageous, the court disagrees. 
Dr. Jeppson' s, and to a lesser extent Dr. Whitehead's, familiarity 
with Defendant's condition makes them better suited to know what 
type of treatment modality will assist Defendant and what the 
chances of success will be if Defendant is administered 
antipsychotic medication. Dr. Jeppson has treated Defendant at the 
State Hospital for over two years. Unlike Defendant's witnesses, 
Dr. Jeppson has had the advantage of seeing and interacting with 
Defendant on almost a weekly basis since March of 2004. He was 
aware of her condition when she was initially admitted and has been 
in the best position to witness any changes in her symptoms. This 
is an important factor the court must consider. 
In addition, as Dr. Amador testified, it may be true that as 
a general matter there is a low likelihood that patients diagnosed 
with Delusional Disorder and whose psychosis has not been treated 
for many years can be restored to competency. This has certainly 
been the personal clinical experience of Dr. Morris and Dr. Amador. 
However, as important as the statistical data may be, in the 
court's view it is neither as authoritative nor weighty as the 
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testimony of Defendant's actual treating physician. It is not only 
competency restoration rates in general that the court is concerned 
abouty but also the likelihood that this particular defendant's 
competency will be restored through the administration of 
antipsychotic medication. Dr. Jeppson and Dr. Whitehead have had 
significant success treating patients with symptoms similar to 
Defendant's. While their success rate in the clinical setting may 
be inconsistent with the statistical data, that is of lesser 
consequence because it is Dr. Jeppson himself who will continue to 
treat Defendant. Clearly, he has developed expertise in restoring 
delusional patients to competency notwithstanding the fact that 
there has been significant delay from the onset of psychosis to 
initial treatment. Dr. Jeppson' s clinical experience, his success 
rate in restoring patients to competency who exhibit symptoms 
similar to Defendant's, his interaction with Defendant over the 
past two years, and the fact that he is the actual physician who 
will continue to treat Defendant trump any statistical data 
concerning general rates of successful restoration to competency of 
patients with Defendant's symptoms. Given these circumstances, Dr. 
Jeppson is in the best position to know the likelihood that 
Defendant will respond to his treatment plan and, ultimately, be 
restored to competency. 
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the testimony 
of the State's witnesses is more persuasive on the issue of whether 
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the use of antipsychotic medication will render Defendant competent 
to proceed to trial. The court therefore finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood that if 
Defendant is administered antipsychotic medication pursuant to Dr. 
Jeppson's treatment plan, over time her delusional beliefs will 
become less prominent, she will become less preoccupied with her 
delusions, and, ultimately, her competency to proceed to trial will 
be restored. 
B. Likelihood that Side Effects from Medication Will Affect 
Defendant's Ability to Consult with Counsel 
Even if there is a substantial likelihood that the 
administration of antipsychotic medication to Defendant will render 
her competent to proceed, unless the proposed medication is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere 
significantly with her ability to assist counsel in conducting a 
trial defense, the court cannot conclude that the involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic medication will further the State's 
interests. Dr. Jeppson, Dr. Whitehead, and Dr. Morris basically 
agree that the likely side effects to the medication would be 
fatigue, sedation, dry mouth, and blurry vision. Other possible, 
but less likely, side effects include rise in cholesterol levels, 
diabetes, constipation, tardive dyskinesia, orthostatic 
hypotension, and increased risk of heart attack. However, Dr. 
Jeppson indicated that the likely side effects are often time-
limited. In his view, none of the likely side effects would 
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undermine Defendant's ability to assist her attorneys and, if 
successful, Defendant should have an increased ability to engage in 
rational decision making about her case. Dr. Whitehead testified 
that the likely side effects to the medication may cause discomfort 
but are not dangerous, and the problems associated with the 
unlikely side effects can be mitigated through careful monitoring. 
According to Dr. Whitehead, the side effects from the medication 
would not interfere with Defendant's ability to consult with her 
attorney and would help her organize her thinking, better assist 
her attorneys, and prepare a meaningful defense. Dr. Morris 
testified that because he believes the proposed medication will not 
restore Defendant to competency, giving her antipsychotic 
medication is not worth the risk of having Defendant suffer the 
possible side effects. In addition, however, Dr. Morris also 
testified that despite the risks, if Defendant were his patient he 
would attempt to medicate her with antipsychotic drugs. 
Although Dr. Amador did not specifically testify to physical 
side effects of the proposed antipsychotic medication, he did state 
that forcibly medicating Defendant would be traumatic for her and 
would likely send her into a depression and make her vulnerable to 
symptoms of stress reaction and, potentially, Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder. These unfavorable emotional/ psychological side effects 
are likely to occur, he argued, because Defendant's delusions are 
intimately connected to who she is as a person and, therefore, 
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treatment could have a significant negative effect on her self-
esteem. However, Dr. Amador did not testify that these types of 
side .affects, if they did occur, would undermine Defendant's 
ability to assist her attorneys and present a defense. 
Based upon the testimony provided, the court finds that there 
is a low probability that Defendant will suffer any debilitating or 
serious permanent physical side effects from being administered 
antipsychotic medication. In addition, although it is probable 
that Defendant will experience fatigue, sedation, dry mouth, etc. 
from the medication, the discomfort she will feel will likely be 
time-limited and, moreover, as Dr. Whitehead stated, their negative 
effects can be mitigated through careful monitoring. Importantly, 
if the medication is successful, Defendant will be in a better 
position to engage in rational discourse about her case, and the 
likely side effects will do nothing to diminish her ability to 
consult with her attorneys. As noted by Dr. Amador, Defendant may 
experience certain non-physical side effects, such as anxiety, 
trauma, depression, or elevated levels of stress. Given 
Defendant's strident opposition to being medicated, these side 
effects may be likely. However, no evidence was presented that the 
non-physical side effects will undermine Defendant's ability to 
assist her attorneys. Moreover, if the administration of 
antipsychotic medication is successful, it is probable that 
whatever anxiety, depression, or stress Defendant experiences will 
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be short-lived. For the reasons set forth above, the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that involuntarily administering 
antip,sychotic medication to Defendant is substantially unlikely to 
have side effects that will interfere significantly with her 
ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense. 
IV. Necessity of Involuntary Medication 
Before the court may order antipsychotic drugs to be 
involuntarily administered, the "court must conclude that 
involuntary medication is necessary to further [the State's] 
interests." Id. at 181. To satisfy this requirement, the State 
must demonstrate that "alternative, less intrusive treatments [than 
involuntary medication] are [] likely to achieve substantially the 
same results/' id. , and that there are no "less intrusive means for 
administering the drugs [than involuntary administration], e.g., a 
court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power. " Id. 
Both Dr. Jeppson and Dr. Whitehead testified that Defendant has 
been offered various treatment modalities in an attempt to restore 
her to competency, including the voluntary administration of 
antipsychotic medication, but that she has been unwilling to 
participate in treatment in any meaningful way. Moreover, because 
Defendant believes that those involved in her care at the State 
Hospital are "evil" and are "working against God's plan," that 
cooperating with suggested treatment options is contrary to God7 s 
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will for her, and, f inal ly, that she does not believe herself to be 
mentally i l l , i t i s highly unlikely that she wil l , at some future 
time, opt to par t ic ipate in treatment. According to Dr. Jeppson 
and Dr. Whitehead, as well as Dr. Nielsen, to the extent t h a t 
Defendant refuses to par t ic ipa te with treatment options offered to 
her, the only a l ternat ive available for making progress towards 
competency restoration and amelioration of Defendant's mental 
i l lness i s the administration of antipsychotic medication. 
Based upon the evidence presented, the court finds by c l ea r 
and convincing evidence that involuntary medication i s necessary to 
further the State 's in te res t and tha t there are no t reatments l e s s 
intrusive than administering antipsychotic medication l i k e l y to 
achieve substantial ly the same r e s u l t s . 
V. Medical Appropriateness of Administering Antipsychotic 
Medication 
Lastly, the court must determine "that the adminis t ra t ion of 
drugs i s medically appropriate, i . e . , in [Defendant's] best medical 
in te res t in light of his medical condit ion." Id. Both Dr. Jeppson 
and Dr. Whitehead stated that the treatment of choice for a p a t i e n t 
suffering from a psychotic disorder l ike Defendant's i s the 
administration of antipsychotic medication. In addit ion, although 
there was some disagreement among the doctors about the dosages 
that should be given to Defendant in order to r es to re her t o 
competency, there was- l i t t le if any disagreement that the drugs Dr. 
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Jeppson plans to administer to Defendant are the kinds of 
antipsychotic drugs normally given to patients suffering from a 
mental illness similar to Defendant's. Dr. Jeppson testified that 
medicating Defendant is in her best medical interest because the 
therapeutic effect of the medication will be to give her a fuller, 
more functional life and it will allow her to proceed forward with 
her case. In addition, at present, Defendant's unwillingness to 
cooperate has made it difficult for Hospital staff to ensure that 
her basic health needs are met. Medicating Defendant will likely 
alleviate this problem. Dr. Whitehead also testified that 
medicating Defendant with antipsychotic drugs is in her best 
medical interest. The medication will allow her to organize and 
improve her thinking, relate more appropriately to her family and 
generally function better. Dr. Whitehead further testified that 
the alternative of simply warehousing Defendant at the State 
Hospital without treatment would clearly not be in her best 
interest. 
Finally, the court notes that there is at least tacit 
agreement from Dr. Morris and Dr. Amador that administering 
antipsychotic medication to Defendant would be in her best medical 
interest. Although Dr. Morris and Dr. Amador disagreed with Dr. 
Jeppson and Dr. Whitehead about the efficacy of administering 
antipsychotic medication to Defendant, the likelihood of severe 
side effects would result, and whether she should be given drugs 
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against her will, they nevertheless agreed that if Defendant was 
their patient, they too would treat her with antipsychotic 
medication in order to improve her mental health and restore her to 
competency. 
Based upon the foregoing evidence, and in light of Defendant's 
mental health condition, the court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that administering antipsychotic medication to Defendant 
would be in her best medical interest. 
Conclusion 
Although criminal defendants found incompetent to proceed to 
trial have a liberty interest in being free from unwanted 
medication, in Sell v. United States the United States Supreme 
Court established a legal framework whereby a defendant's liberty 
interest in this regard may be overcome. That framework requires 
that before a defendant may be involuntarily medicated, the court 
must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) important State 
interests are at stake; (2) involuntary medication will 
significantly further the State's interest, i.e., the medication is 
both substantially likely to render the defendant competent to 
stand trial and substantially unlikely to have side effects that 
will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist 
counsel in conducting a trial defense/ (3) involuntarily medicating 
a defendant is necessary to further the State's interests and that 
37 
less intrusive means considered by the court are unlikely to 
achieve substantially the same results; and (4) administration of 
the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best 
medical interest in light of the defendant's medical condition. 
Based upon a careful assessment of the expert testimony 
provided at the February 16th hearing and the foregoing standard 
set forth by the Supreme Court, the court finds that clear and 
convincing evidence has been presented sufficient to satisfy all 
four requirements. Therefore, the court grants the State's Motion 
to Compel Medication. 
DATED this l^ day of June, 2006. 
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Aigued March 3, 2003 
Decided June 16,2003 
Defendant was indicted tor health caie fraud, 
attempted minder, conspiracy, and solicitation to 
commit violence After a hearing, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, 
Donald J Stohi, J , leversed magistrate judge's 
finding that defendant posed danger to himself and 
othei s, but affirmed holding that foicible 
medication to lestoie defendant to competency was 
wan anted Defendant and the Government 
appealed The United States Court of Appeals foi 
the Eighth Cncuit, 282 F 3d 560, affirmed 
Certioian was granted The Supieme Court, Justice 
Bieyei, held that (1) pretnal order affirming 
magisliate judge's oidei requiring defendant 
involuntaiily to leceive medication in ordei to 
lendei defendant competent to stand trial was 
immediately appealable as a collateial ordei, (2) 
Fifth Amendment Due Piocess Clause permits the 
Government involuntarily to administer 
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant 
facing serious criminal charges m order to lender 
that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if 
the tieatment is medically appropiiate, is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may 
undername the fairness of the trial, and, taking 
account ot less intrusive alternatives, is necessaiy 
significantly to fuithei impoitant governmental 
tiial-ielated interests, and (3) assuming that 
defendant was not dangeious to himself oi others, 
he could not be oideied involuntarily to take 
antipsychotic drugs solely to lendei him competent 
to stand trial without consideration of important 
questions 
Vacated and remanded 
Justice Scaha filed dissenting opinion m which 
Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined 
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For purpose of determining whether important 
governmental interests are at stake as required when 
considering whether involuntarily to admmistei 
antipsychotic drugs to render a mentally ill 
defendant competent to stand trial, the 
Government's interest m bringing to trial an 
individual accused of a serious crime against the 
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the facts of the individual case m evaluating the 
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circumstances may lessen the importance of that 
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considering whether involuntarily to administer 
antipsychotic drugs to render a mentally ill 
defendant competent to stand trial, a court must find 
that admmistiation of the drugs is substantially 
likely to rendei the defendant competent to stand 
trial, and that administration of the drugs is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that will 
mterfeie significantly with the defendant's ability to 
assist counsel in conducting a tiial defense, thereby 
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257Ak436 Custody and Confinement 
257Ak436 1 k In General Most Cited 
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In order to find that involuntary medication of a 
mentally ill defendant is necessary to further 
important state interests, as required when 
considering whether mvoluntanly to administer 
antipsychotic drugs to rendei a mentally ill 
defendant competent to stand tiial, a court must find 
that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are 
unlikely to achieve substantially the same results, 
and must consider less intrusive means foi 
admimsteimg the drugs, such as a court order to the 
defendant backed by the contempt power, before 
considenng more intrusive methods 
[7] Mental Health 257A €=^436.1 
257A Mental Health 
257AIV Disabilities and Privileges of Mentally 
Disordered Persons 
257AIV(E) Crimes 
257Ak436 Custody and Confinement 
257Ak436 1 k In General Most Cited 
Cases 
In oi dei to find that involuntary medication of a 
mentally ill defendant is medically appropnate, as 
required when considering whether involuntarily to 
admmistei antipsychotic drugs to rendei a mentally 
ill defendant competent to stand trial, a court must 
find that it is m the defendant's best medical interest 
m light of his medical condition and the specific 
kinds of drugs at issue, including then side effects 
and levels of success 
[8] Mental Health 257A €^>436.1 
257A Mental Health 
257AIV Disabilities and Pnvileges of Mentally 
Disoideied Peisons 
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257AIV(E) Crimes 
257Ak436 Custody and Confinement 
257Ak436 1 k In General Most Cited 
Cases 
Assuming that defendant was not dangerous to 
himself or others, he could not be ordered 
mvoluntanly to take antipsychotic drugs solely to 
render him competent to stand trial on attempted 
murdei and other charges without consideration of 
important questions about trial-related side effects 
and nsks of drugs to be used and whether they were 
likely to undermine fairness of trial, and 
consideration of effect on importance of 
governmental interest in prosecution by facts that 
defendant had already been confined at prison 
medical center for a long period of time, and that 
his refusal to take antipsychotic drugs might result 
m further lengthy confinement, where magistrate 
approved forced medication of defendant 
substantially, if not primarily, upon grounds of his 
dangerousness to others 
**2176 Syllabus™* 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared 
by the Repoiter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader See United 
States v Detroit Timbei & Lwnbei Co, 
200 U S 321, 337, 26 SCt 282, 50 L Ed 
499 
A Federal Magistrate Judge (Magistrate) initially 
found petitioner Sell, who has a long history of 
mental illness, competent to stand trial for fraud and 
released him on bail, but later revoked bail because 
Sell's condition had worsened Sell subsequently 
asked the Magistrate to reconsider his competence 
to stand trial for fraud and attempted murder The 
Magistrate had him examined at a United States 
Medical Centei for Federal Prisoners (Medical 
Center), found him mentally incompetent to stand 
trial, and ordered his hospitalization to determine 
whether he would attain the capacity to allow his 
trial to proceed While there, Sell refused the 
staffs recommendation to take antipsychotic 
medication Medical Center authorities decided to 
allow involuntary medication, which Sell 
challenged m court The Magistrate authorized 
urn to Ong U S Govt Works 
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foiced administration of antipsychotic drugs, fi 
nding that Sell was a danger to himself and others, 
that medication was the only way to render him less 
**2177 dangerous, that any serious side effects 
could be ameliorated, that the benefits to Sell 
outweighed the risks, and that the drugs weie 
substantially likely to leturn Sell to competence In 
affirming, the District Court found the Magistrate's 
dangeiousness finding clearly erroneous but 
concluded that medication was the only viable hope 
of rendenng Sell competent to stand trial and was 
necessary to serve the Government's interest m 
obtaining an adjudication of his guilt or innocence 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed Focusing solely on 
the fraud charges, it found that the Government had 
an essential interest m bunging Sell to trial, that the 
tieatment was medically appiopnate, and that the 
medical evidence indicated a leasonable probability 
that Sell would fairly be able to participate in his 
trial 
Held 
1 The Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to heai the 
appeal The District Court's pietrial order was an 
appealable "collateral ordei" withm the exceptions 
to the rule that only final judgments aie appealable 
The order conclusively determines the disputed 
question whether Sell has a legal right to avoid 
foiced medication Coopers & Lybiand v Livesay 
437 U S 463, 468, 98 S Ct 2454, 57 L Ed 2d 351 
It also lesolves an important issue, for involuntary 
medical treatment raises questions of cleai 
constitutional importance Ibid And the issue is 
effectively unieviewable on appeal *167 fiom a 
final judgment, ibid, since, by the time of trial, Sell 
will have undergone forced medication-the very 
harm that he seeks to avoid and which cannot be 
undone by an acquittal Pp 2181-2183 
2 Under the framework of Washington v Haiper 
494 U S 210, 110 SCt 1028, 108 L Ed 2d 178 
and Riggins v Nevada 504 U S 127, 112 SCt 
1810, 118 L Ed 2d 479, the Constitution permits the 
Government involuntarily to admmistei 
antipsychotic drugs to rendei a mentally ill 
defendant competent to stand trial on senous 
ciimmal chaiges if the tieatment is medically 
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appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that may undermine the trial's fairness, and, 
takmg account of less mtruswe alternatives, is 
necessary significantly to further important 
governmental trial-related interests Pp 2183-2186 
(a) This standard will permit forced medication 
solely for trial competence purposes m certain 
instances But these instances may be rare, because 
the standard says or fairly implies the following 
First, a court must find that impoitant governmental 
interests are at stake The Government's interest m 
bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious 
crime is important However, courts must consider 
each case's facts in evaluating this interest because 
special circumstances may lessen its importance, 
eg a defendant's refusal to take drugs may mean 
lengthy confinement m an institution, which would 
dimmish the risks of fleeing without punishment 
one who has committed a venous crime In 
addition to its substantial mterest in timely 
prosecution, the Government has a concomitant 
interest in assuring a defendant a fair tiial Second, 
the court must conclude that forced medication will 
significantly furthei those concomitant state 
mteiests It must find that medication is 
substantially likely to render the defendant 
competent to stand trial and substantially unlikely to 
have side effects that will interfere significantly 
with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in 
conducting a defense Third, the court must 
conclude that involuntary medication is necessary 
to further those interests and find that alternative, 
less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve 
substantially the same results Fourth, the court 
must conclude that administering the drugs is 
medically appropi late Pp 2183-2185 
(b) The court applying these standards is trying to 
determine whether forced medication is necessary 
to further the Government's interest in rendering the 
defendant competent to stand trial If a **2178 
court authorizes medication on an alternative 
ground, such as dangeiousness, the need to considei 
authonzation on trial competence grounds will 
likely disappear There are often strong reasons for 
a court to consider alternative grounds fust For 
one thing, the inquiry into whethei medication is 
nm to Ong U S Govt Works 
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permissible to rendei an individual nondangerous is 
usually more objective and manageable than the 
inquiry into whether medication is permissible to 
lender a defendant competent For another, *168 
courts typically address involuntary medical 
heatment as a civil matter If a court decides that 
medication cannot be authorized on alternative 
giounds, its findings will help to inform expert 
opinion and judicial decisionmaking in respect to a 
lequest to administer drugs for trial competence 
purposes Pp 2185-2186 
3 The Eighth Cncuit erred m approving forced 
medication solely to lender Sell competent to stand 
trial Because that court and the Distnct Court held 
the Magistrate's dangerousness finding clearly 
erroneous, this Court assumes that Sell was not 
dangeious And on that hypothetical assumption, 
the Eighth Cncuit ened m reaching its conclusion 
Foi one thing, the Magistrate did not find foiced 
medication legally justified on trial competence 
grounds alone Moieovei, the experts at the 
Magistrate's heanng focused mainly on 
dangerousness The failure to focus on trial 
competence could well have mattered, foi this Court 
cannot tell whether the medication's side effects 
were likely to undermine the fairness of Sell's trial, 
a question not necessarily relevant when 
dangeiousness is pnmaiily at issue Finally, the 
lowei couits did not consider that Sell has been 
confined at the Medical Center for a long time, and 
that his refusal to be medicated might result m 
further lengthy confinement Those factors, the 
fust because a defendant may receive credit towaid 
a sentence for time served and the second because it 
reduces the likelihood of the defendant's committing 
future dimes, moderate the importance of the 
governmental mteiest m prosecution The 
Government may pursue its forced medication 
lequest on the giounds discussed m this Court's 
opinion but should do so based on current 
encumstances, since Sell's condition may have 
changed ovei time Pp 2186-2187 
282 F 3d 560, vacated and lemanded 
BREYER, J , dehveied the opinion of the Court, m 
which REHNQUIST, C J , and STEVENS, 
© 2006 Thomson/West No ( 
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KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ , 
joined SCALIA, J , filed a dissenting opinion, m 
which O'CONNOR and THOMAS, JJ , joined, post, 
p 2187 
Norman S London, Federal Public Defender, Lee 
T Lawless, St Louis, Missouri, Lewis, Rice & 
Fmgersh, L C , Barry A Short, Neal F Perryman, 
Mark N Light, Sandra F Spermo, Aaron L Pawhtz 
, St Louis, Missouri, for Petitioner 
Theodore B Olson, Solicitor General, Michael 
Cheitoff, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R 
Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Lisa Schiavo 
Blatt, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Joseph C 
Wyderko, Department of Justice, Washington, D C , 
for the United States For U S Supreme Court 
bnefs, see 2002 WL 32001698 (Pet Bnef)2003 WL 
193605 (Resp Bnef)2003 WL 546412 (Reply Brief) 
*169 Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the 
Court 
The question presented is whether the Constitution 
permits the Government to administer antipsychotic 
drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal 
defendant-m order to render that defendant 
competent to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent, 
crimes We conclude that the Constitution allows 
the Government to administer those drugs, even 
against the defendant's will, m limited 
circumstances, i e, upon satisfaction of conditions 
that we shall describe Because the Court of 
Appeals did not find **2179 that the requisite 




Petitioner Charles Sell, once a practicing dentist, 
has a long and unfortunate history of mental illness 
In September 1982, after telling doctois that the 
gold he used for fillings had been contaminated by 
communists, Sell was hospitalized, treated with 
antipsychotic medication, and subsequently 
discharged App 146 In June 1984, Sell called 
to Ong U S Govt Works 
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the police to say that a leopaid was outside his 
office boaidmg a bus, and he then asked the police 
to shoot him Id at 148, Record Forensic Report, 
p 1 (June 20, 1997 (Sealed)) Sell *170 was again 
hospitalized and subsequently released On various 
occasions, he complained that public officials, for 
example, a State Governor and a police chief, were 
trying to kill him Id at 4 In April 1997, he told 
law enfoi cement personnel that he "spoke to God 
last night," and that "God told me every [Federal 
Bureau of Investigation] person I kill, a soul will be 
saved " Id at 1 
In May 1997, the Government charged Sell with 
submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment 
See 18 U S C § 1035(a)(2) A Federal Magistrate 
Judge (Magistiate), aftei oidermg a psychiatric 
examination, found Sell "currently competent," but 
noted that Sell might expenence "a psychotic 
episode" m the future App 321 The Magistrate 
released Sell on bail A grand jury later produced a 
superseding indictment charging Sell and his wife 
with 56 counts of mail fraud, 6 counts of Medicaid 
fraud, and 1 count of money laundering Id at 
12 22 
In eaily 1998, the Government claimed that Sell had 
sought to intimidate a witness The Magistiate held 
a bail Ievocation hearing Sell's behavior at his 
initial appearance was, in the judge's words, " ' 
totally out of control,' " involving "screaming and 
shouting,' the use of "personal insults" and "lacial 
epithets," and spitting "m the judge's face " Id at 
322 A psychiatust leported that Sell could not 
sleep because he expected the Fedeial Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to " 'come busting through the 
dooi,' " and concluded that Sell's condition had 
worsened Ibid After considering that report and 
other testimony, the Magistrate i evoked Sell's bail 
In Apnl 1998, the grand juiy issued a new 
indictment chaiging Sell with attempting to muidei 
the FBI agent who had anested him and a formei 
employee who planned to testify against him in the 
fiaud case Id at 23 29 The attempted muider 
and fiaud cases were joined foi trial 
reconsider his competence to stand trial The 
Magistiate sent Sell to the *171 United States 
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners (Medical 
Center) at Springfield, Missouri, for examination 
Subsequently the Magistrate found that Sell was " 
mentally incompetent to stand trial " Id at 323 
He ordered Sell to "be hospitalized for tieatment" at 
the Medical Center for up to four months, "to 
determine whether there was a substantial 
probability that [Sell] would attain the capacity to 
allow his trial to proceed " Ibid 
Two months later, Medical Center staff 
recommended that Sell take antipsychotic 
medication Sell refused to do so The staff 
sought permission to administer the medication 
against Sell's will That effort is the subject of the 
present proceedings 
B 
We here review the last of five hierarchically 
ordered lower court and Medical Center 
determinations First, in June 1999, Medical 
Center staff sought permission fiom institutional 
authorities to administer antipsychotic drugs to Sell 
involuntarily A reviewing psychiatrist held a 
hearing and considered Sell's prior history, Sell's 
current persecutional beliefs (for example, that 
Government officials were trying to suppress his 
knowledge about events in Waco, Texas, and had 
sent him **2180 to Alaska to silence him), staff 
medical opinions (foi example, that "Sell's 
symptoms point to a diagnosis of Delusional 
Disorder but there well may be an underlying 
Schizophrenic Process"), staff medical concerns 
(for example, about "the peisistence of Di Sell's 
belief that the Courts, FBI, and federal government 
in general are against him"), an outside medical 
expert's opinion (that Sell suffered only from 
delusional disorder, which, m that expert's view, " 
medication rarely helps"), and Sell's own views, as 
well as those of othei laypersons who know him (to 
the effect that he did not suffer from a senous 
mental illness) Id at 147-150 
In early 1999, Sell asked the Magistrate to The reviewing psychiatrist then authorized 
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mvoluntaiy admmistiation of the drugs, both (1) 
because Sell was "mentally*172 ill and dangerous, 
and medication is necessary to treat the mental 
illness," and (2) so that Sell would "become 
competent foi tual "Id at 145 The leviewmg 
psychiatrist added that he considered Sell " 
dangeious based on thieats and delusions if outside, 
but not necessarily in[side] prison" and that Sell 
was "[a]ble to function" in prison in the "open 
population " Id at 144 
Second, the Medical Center administratively 
reviewed the determination of its reviewing 
psychiatrist A Bureau of Prisons official 
considered the evidence that had been presented at 
the initial heaung, referred to Sell's delusions, noted 
differences of professional opinion as to proper 
classification and tieatment, and concluded that 
antipsychotic medication repiesents the medical 
intervention "most likely" to "ameliorate" Sell's 
symptoms, that other u]ess lestnctive interventions" 
are "unlikely" to woik, and that Sell's "pervasive 
belief that he was "being targeted foi nefarious 
actions by various governmental parties," along 
with the "current charges of conspnacy to commit 
murdei," made Sell "a potential risk to the safety of 
one oi moie others m the community" Id, at 
154-155 The reviewing official "upheld" the " 
heaung officer's decision that [Sell] would benefit 
from the utilization of anti-psychotic medication " 
Id at 157 
Third, m July 1999, Sell filed a court motion 
contesting the Medical Centei's right involuntarily 
to administer antipsychotic drugs In September 
1999, the Magistrate who had ordered Sell sent to 
the Medical Centei held a hearing The evidence 
introduced at the hearing for the most part 
lephcated the evidence introduced at the 
administrative hearing, with two exceptions First, 
the witnesses exploied the question of the 
medication's effectiveness more thoroughly 
Second, Medical Center doctors testified about an 
incident that took place at the Medical Center aftei 
the administrative pioceedings weie completed In 
July 1999, Sell had appioached one of the Medical 
Centei's nuises, suggested* 173 that he was m love 
with hei, criticized hei for having nothing to do 
© 2006 Thomson/West No < 
Page 7 
nly Op Serv 5131, 16 Fla L Weekly Fed S 359, 188 
R 6512 
with him, and, when told that his behavior was 
inappropriate, added " 'I can't help i t ' " Id, at 
168-170, 325 He subsequently made remarks or 
acted in ways indicating that this kind of conduct 
would continue The Medical Center doctors 
testified that, given Sell's prior behavior, diagnosis, 
and current beliefs, boundary-breaching incidents of 
this sort were not harmless and, when coupled with 
Sell's inability or unwillingness to desist, indicated 
that he was a safety risk even withm the institution 
They added that he had been moved to a locked cell 
In August 2000, the Magistrate found that "the 
government has made a substantial and very strong 
showing that Dr Sell is a danger to himself and 
otheis at the institution in which he is currently 
incarcerated", that "the government has shown that 
anti-psychotic medication is the only way to render 
him less dangerous", that newer drugs and/oi 
changing drugs will "ameliorat [e]" any "serious 
side effects", that "the benefits to Dr Sell far 
outweigh any risks", and that "there is a substantial 
probability that" the drugs will **2181 "retur[n]" 
Sell "to competency" Id, at 333-334 The 
Magistrate concluded that "the government has 
shown in as strong a manner as possible, that 
anti-psychotic medications are the only way to 
render the defendant not dangerous and competent 
to stand trial" Id, at 335 The Magistrate issued 
an order authorizing the involuntary administration 
of antipsychotic drugs to Sell, id at 331, but stayed 
that order to allow Sell to appeal the matter to the 
Federal District Court, id at 337 
Fourth, the District Court reviewed the record and, 
in April 2001, issued an opinion The court 
addressed the Magistrate's finding "that defendant 
piesents a danger to himself or others sufficient" to 
warrant involuntary administration of antipsychotic 
drugs Id, at 349 After noting that Sell 
subsequently had "been leturned to an open ward," 
the District Court held the Magistrate's " 
dangerousness" *174 finding "clearly erroneous" 
Id, at 349, and n 5 The court limited its 
determination to Sell's "dangerousness at this tune 
to himself and to those aiound him in his 
institutional context" Id, at 349 (emphasis in 
onginal) 
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Nonetheless, the Distiict Court affumed the 
Magistrate's order permitting Sell's involuntary 
medication The court wrote that "anti-psychotic 
drugs are medically appropriate," that "they 
represent the only viable hope of rendering 
defendant competent to stand trial," and that " 
administration of such drugs appears necessary to 
serve the government's compelling interest m 
obtaining an adjudication of defendant's guilt or 
innocence of numerous and serious charges" 
(including fraud and attempted murder) Id, at 354 
The court added that it was "premature" to 
consider whether "the effects of medication might 
prejudice [Sell's] defense at trial" Id at 351, 352 
The Government and Sell both appealed 
Fifth, in March 2002, a divided panel of the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment 
282 F 3d 560 (CA8 2002) The majority affirmed 
the District Court's determination that Sell was not 
dangerous The majority noted that, according to 
the District Court, Sell's behavior at the Medical 
Center "amounted at most to an 'inappropriate 
famihanty and even infatuation' with a nurse" Id, 
at 565 The Court of Appeals agreed, "[u]pon 
leview," that "the evidence does not support a 
finding that Sell posed a danger to himself or others 
at the Medical Center " Ibid 
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the District 
Court's older requning medication in order to 
render Sell competent to stand trial Focusing 
solely on the senous fraud charges, the panel 
majority concluded that the "government has an 
essential interest m bringing a defendant to t u a l " 
Id, at 568 It added that the District Court " 
correctly concluded that there were no less intrusive 
means " Ibid After reviewing the conflicting views 
of the experts, id, at 568-571, the panel majority 
found antipsychotic drug treatment "medically* 175 
appropriate" for Sell, id at 571 It added that the " 
medical evidence piesented indicated a reasonable 
piobabihty that Sell will fanly be able to participate 
in his trial" Id at 572 One member of the panel 
dissented primarily on the ground that the fraud and 
money laundering charges were "not serious enough 
to wan ant the forced medication of the defendant" 
Id at 574 (opinion of Bye, J ) 
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We granted certiorari to determine whether the 
Eighth Circuit "erred in rejecting" Sell's argument 
that "allowing the government to administer 
antipsychotic medication agamsl his will solely to 
render him competent to stand trial for non-violent 
offenses," Brief for Petitioner I, violated the 
Constitution-m effect by improperly depriving Sell 
of an important "liberty" that the Constitution 
guarantees, Amdt 5 
n 
We first examine whether the Eighth Cncuit had 
jurisdiction to decide Sell's appeal **2182 The 
District Court's judgment, from which Sell had 
appealed, was a pretrial order That judgment 
affirmed a Magistrate's order requiring Sell 
involuntarily to receive medication The 
Magistrate entered that order pursuant to an earlier 
delegation from the District Court of legal authority 
to conduct pretrial proceedmgs App 340, see 28 
U S C § 636(b)(1)(A) The order embodied legal 
conclusions related to the Medical Center's 
administrative efforts to medicate Sell, these efforts 
giew out of Sell's provisional commitment, and that 
provisional commitment took place pursuant to an 
earlier Magistrate's order seeking a medical 
determination about Sell's future competence to 
stand trial Cf Riggins v Nevada, 504 U S 127, 
112 SCt 1810, 118 L E d 2 d 479 (1992) 
(reviewing, as part of criminal proceeding, trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to discontinue 
medication), Stack v Boyle, 342 U S 1, 6-7, 72 
S Ct 1, 96 LEd 3 (1951) (distiict court's denial of 
defendant's motion to reduce bail is part of criminal 
proceeding and is not reviewable m separate habeas 
action) 
[1] *176 How was it possible for Sell to appeal 
from such an order9 The law normally requires a 
defendant to wait until the end of the trial to obtain 
appellate review of a pretrial order The relevant 
jurisdictional statute, 28 U S C § 1291, authorizes 
federal courts of appeals to review '''final decisions 
of the district courts " (Emphasis added) And the 
term "final decision" normally refers to a final 
judgment, such as a judgment of guilt, that 
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terminates a criminal proceeding 
Nonetheless, theie aie exceptions to this rule The 
Court has held that a piehmmary oi interim decision 
is appealable as a "collateral older" when it (1) " 
conclusively determine[s] the disputed question," 
(2) "resolve[s] an important issue completely 
separate fiom the merits of the action," and (3) is " 
effectively umeviewable on appeal fiom a final 
judgment" Coopeis <£ Lybiand v Livesay, 437 
U S 463, 468, 98 SCt 2454, 57 L Ed 2d 351 
(1978) And this District Court order does appeal 
to fall within the "collateial older" exception 
[2] The order (1) "conclusively determme[s] the 
disputed question," namely, whether Sell has a legal 
right to avoid forced medication Ibid The order 
also (2) "resolve[s] an important issue," foi, as this 
Court's cases make clear, involuntary medical 
tieatment raises questions of cleai constitutional 
importance Ibid See Winston v Lee, 470 U S 
753, 759, 105 SCt 1611, 84 L Ed 2d 662 (1985) (" 
A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's 
body implicates expectations of privacy and 
security" of gieat magnitude), see also Riggins, 
supia at 133-134, 112 SCt 1810, Ciuzan v 
Duectoi Mo Dept of Health, 497 U S 261, 
278-279, 110 SCt 2841, 111 L E d 2 d 224 (1990), 
Washington v Haipei, 494 U S 210, 221-222, 110 
SCt 1028, 108 LEd2d 178 (1990) At the same 
time, the basic issue-whether Sell must undergo 
medication against his will-is "completely separate 
from the merits of the action," i e whether Sell is 
guilty or innocent of the dimes charged Coopeis 
& Lybiand, 437 U S , at 468, 98 SCt 2454 The 
issue is wholly separate as well from questions 
concerning trial pioceduies Finally, the issue is 
(3) "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment" Ibid By the time of tnal Sell will have 
undergone *177 foiced medication-the very harm 
that he seeks to avoid He cannot undo that harm 
even if he is acquitted Indeed, if he is acquitted, 
there will be no appeal through which he might 
obtain leview Cf Stack, supia at 6-7, 72 S Ct 1 
(permitting appeal of oidei setting high bail as " 
collateial oidei") These consideiations, 
particularly those involving the severity of the 
inclusion and conespondmg importance of the 
© 2006 Thomson/West No ( 
Page 9 
nly Op Serv 5131, 16Fla L Weekly Fed S 359, 188 
R 6512 
constitutional issue, readily distinguish Sell's case 
from the examples raised by the dissent See post 
at 2190 (opinion of SCALIA, J ) 
We add that the question presented here, whether 
Sell has a legal right to avoid forced medication, 
perhaps m part **2183 because medication may 
make a trial unfair, differs from the question 
whether forced medication did make a tnal unfair 
The first question focuses upon the right to avoid 
administration of the drugs What may happen at 
trial is relevant, but only as a prediction See infia 
at 2184-2185 The second question focuses upon 
the right to a fan trial It asks what did happen as a 
result of having administered the medication An 
oidmary appeal comes too late for a defendant to 
enforce the first right, an ordinary appeal permits 
vindication of the second 
We conclude that the District Court order from 
which Sell appealed was an appealable "collateral 
order " The Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal And we consequently have jurisdiction 
to decide the question presented, whether 
involuntary medication violates Sell's constitutional 
lights 
III 
We turn now to the basic question presented Does 
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to 
render Sell competent to stand trial 
unconstitutionally deprive him of his "liberty" to 
reject medical treatment9 U S Const, Amdt 5 
(Federal Government may not "depnv[e]" any 
person of "liberty without due process of law") 
Two prior precedents,* 178 Haiper, supra and 
Riggins v Nevada, 504 U S 127, 112 SCt 1810, 
118 L E d 2 d 479 (1992), set forth the framework 
for determining the legal answer 
In Haipei, this Court recognized that an individual 
has a "significant" constitutionally protected " 
liberty interest" in "avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs " 494 U S , at 
221, 110 SCt 1028 The Court considered a state 
law authorizing forced administration of those drugs 
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"to inmates who are giavely disabled or represent 
a significant danger to themselves or others " Id, at 
226, 110 SCt 1028 The State had established " 
by a medical finding" that Harper, a mentally ill 
prison inmate, had "a mental disorder which is 
likely to cause harm if not treated " Id, at 222, 110 
S Ct 1028 The treatment decision had been made 
"by a psychiatrist," it had been approved by "a 
reviewing psychiatrist," and it "ordered" medication 
only because that was "in the prisoner's medical 
interests, given the legitimate needs of his 
institutional confinement" Ibid 
The Court found that the State's interest m 
administering medication was "legitimate]" and " 
important]," id at 225, 110 SCt 1028, and it 
held that "the Due Process Clause permits the State 
to tieat a prison inmate who has a serious mental 
illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if 
the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the 
treatment is m the inmate's medical interest," id at 
227, 110 SCt 1028 The Court concluded that, m 
the circumstances, the state law authorizing 
mvoluntaiy treatment amounted to a constitutionally 
permissible "accommodation between an inmate's 
liberty mteiest in avoiding the forced administration 
of antipsychotic drugs and the State's interests m 
providing appropnate medical treatment to reduce 
the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious 
mental disorder represents to himself or others " 
Id at 236, 110 SCt 1028 
In Riggins the Court repeated that an individual has 
a constitutionally protected liberty "interest in 
avoiding involuntary administration of 
antipsychotic drugs"-an interest *179 that only an " 
essential" or "ovemding" state interest might 
overcome 504 U S , at 134, 135, 112 SCt 1810 
The Court suggested that, m principle, forced 
medication in Older to render a defendant 
competent to stand hial for murder was 
constitutionally permissible The Court, citing 
Haipei noted that the State "would have satisfied 
due process if the piosecution had demonstrated 
that tieatment with antipsychotic medication was 
medically appropriate and, consideimg less 
intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of 
Riggms' own safety oi the safety of otheis " 504 
U S , at 135, 112 SCt 1810 {emphasis added) 
And it said that the **2184 State "[sjimilaily 
might have been able to justify medically 
appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by 
establishing that it could not obtam an adjudication 
of Riggms' guilt or innocence" of the murder charge 
"by using less intrusive means" Ibid (emphasis 
added) Because the trial court had permitted 
forced medication of Riggms without taking 
account of his "liberty interest,' with a consequent 
possibility of trial prejudice, the Court reversed 
Riggms1 conviction and remanded for further 
proceedings Id, at 137-138, 112 SCt 1810 
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, 
emphasized that antipsychotic drugs might have 
side effects that would interfere with the defendant's 
ability to receive a fan trial Id at 145, 112 S Ct 
1810 (finding forced medication likely justified 
only where State shows drugs would not 
significantly affect defendants "behavior and 
demeanor") 
[3] These two cases, Harper and Riggins indicate 
that the Constitution permits the Government 
involuntarily to admimstei antipsychotic drugs to a 
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal 
charges in order to render that defendant competent 
to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically 
appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, 
and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is 
necessary significantly to further important 
governmental trial-related interests 
*180 This standard will permit involuntary 
administration of drugs solely for trial competence 
purposes in certain instances But those instances 
may be rare That is because the standard says or 
fairly implies the following 
[4] First, a court must find that impoitant 
governmental interests are at stake The 
Government's interest m bringing to tiial an 
individual accused of a serious crime is important 
That is so whether the offense is a serious crime 
against the person oi a serious crime against 
pioperty In both instances the Government seeks 
to protect through application of the criminal law 
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the basic human need for security See Riggins 
supia at 135-136, 112 SCt 1810 (" '[P]ower to 
bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme 
of 'ordered liberty" and prerequisite to social 
justice and peace' " (quoting Illinois v Allen 397 
U S 337, 347, 90 SCt 1057, 25 L E d 2 d 353 
(1970) (Biennan, J , concurring))) 
Courts, however, must consider the facts of the 
individual case in evaluating the Government's 
mteiest in prosecution Special circumstances may 
lessen the importance of that interest The 
defendant's failuie to take drugs voluntarily, foi 
example, may mean lengthy confinement in an 
institution for the mentally lll-and that would 
dimmish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing 
without punishment one who has committed a 
serious crime We do not mean to suggest that 
civil commitment is a substitute for a criminal trial 
The Government has a substantial interest m timely 
prosecution And it may be difficult or impossible 
to try a defendant who legams competence after 
years of commitment durmg which memories may 
fade and evidence may be lost The potential for 
future confinement affects, but does not totally 
undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution 
The same is true of the possibility that the 
defendant has already been confined for a 
significant amount of time (for which he would 
leceive credit towaid any sentence ultimately 
imposed, see 18 U S C § 3585(b)) Moreover, the 
Government has a concomitant, constitutionally 
essential mteiest in assuring that the defendant's 
tiial is a fair one 
[5] *181 Second, the court must conclude that 
involuntary medication will significantly fwthei 
those concomitant state interests It must find that 
administration of the drugs is substantially likely to 
render the defendant competent to stand trial At 
the same time, it must find that administration of the 
drugs is substantially **2185 unlikely to have side 
effects that will interfere significantly with the 
defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a 
tiial defense, theieby rendering the trial unfair See 
Riggins 504 U S , at 142 145, 112 SCt 1810 
(KENNEDY, J , concurring in judgment) 
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[6] Third, the court must conclude that involuntary 
medication is necessaiy to furthei those interests 
The court must find that any alternative, less 
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve 
substantially the same results Cf Brief for 
American Psychological Association as Amicus 
Cwiae 10-14 (nondrug therapies may be effective 
in restoring psychotic defendants to competence), 
but cf Brief for American Psychiatric Association 
et al as Amici Curiae 13-22 (alternative treatments 
for psychosis commonly not as effective as 
medication) And the court must consider less 
intrusive means for administering the drugs, eg a 
court order to the defendant backed by the contempt 
power, before considering more intrusive methods 
[7] Fourth, as we have said, the court must conclude 
that administration of the drugs is medically 
appi opriate, i e in the patient's best medical 
interest m light of his medical condition The 
specific kinds of drugs at issue may matter here as 
elsewhere Different kinds of antipsychotic drugs 
may produce different side effects and enjoy 
different levels of success 
We emphasize that the court applying these 
standards is seeking to determine whether 
involuntary administration of drugs is necessary 
significantly to further a particular governmental 
interest, namely, the interest m rendermg the 
defendant competent to stand trial A court need 
not consider whether to allow forced medication for 
that kind of purpose, *182 if forced medication is 
wan anted for a different purpose, such as the 
purposes set out in Harper related to the 
individual's dangerousness, or purposes related to 
the individual's own interests where refusal to take 
drugs puts his health gravely at risk 494 U S , at 
225-226, 110 S C t 1028 There are often strong 
reasons for a court to determine whether forced 
administration of drugs can be justified on these 
alternative grounds before turning to the trial 
competence question 
For one thing, the inquiry into whether medication 
is permissible, say, to render an individual 
nondangerous is usually more "objective and 
manageable" than the inquiry into whether 
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medication is permissible to render a defendant 
competent Riggins, supia, at 140, 112 SCt 1810 
(KENNEDY, J , concurring in judgment) The 
medical experts may find it easiei to provide an 
informed opinion about whether, given the risk of 
side effects, particular drugs are medically 
appropriate and necessary to control a patient's 
potentially dangeious behavior (or to avoid serious 
harm to the patient himself) than to try to balance 
harms and benefits related to the more 
quintessential^ legal questions of trial fairness and 
competence 
For another thing, courts typically address 
involuntary medical treatment as a civil matter, and 
justify it on these alternative, Ha?"pe?-typt grounds 
Every State provides avenues through which, for 
example, a doctor or institution can seek 
appointment of a guardian with the power to make a 
decision authorizing medication-when m the best 
interests of a patient who lacks the mental 
competence to make such a decision Eg, 
Ala Code §§ 26-2A-102(a), 26-2A-105, 26-2A-108 
(West 1992), Alaska Stat §§ 13 26 105(a), 
13 26 116(b) (2002), Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 
14-5303, 14-5312 (West 1995), Ark Code Ann §§ 
28-65-205, 28-65-301 (1987) And courts, in civil 
proceedings, may authorize involuntary medication 
where the patient's failure to accept treatment 
thieatens injury to the patient or others See, eg, 
28 CFR § 549 43 (2002), cf 18 U S C § 4246 
*183 If a court authonzes medication on these 
alternative giounds, the need to considei 
authonzation on trial competence **2186 grounds 
will likely disappear Even if a court decides 
medication cannot be authorized on the alternative 
grounds, the findings underlying such a decision 
will help to inform expert opinion and judicial 
decisionmaking in respect to a request to administer 
drugs foi trial competence purposes At the least, 
they will facilitate duect medical and legal focus 
upon such questions as Why is it medically 
appiopnate forcibly to administer antipsychotic 
dings to an individual who (1) is not dangerous and 
(2) is competent to make up his own mmd about 
tieatment9 Can bringing such an individual to trial 
alone justify m whole (or at least in significant part) 
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administration of a drug that may have adverse side 
effects, including side effects that may to some 
extent impair a defense at trial7 We consequently 
believe that a court, asked to approve forced 
administration of drugs for purposes of rendering a 
defendant competent to stand trial, should ordinarily 
determine whether the Government seeks, or has 
first sought, permission for forced administration of 
drugs on these other Harper-Xype grounds, and, if 
not, why not 
When a court must nonetheless reach the trial 
competence question, the factors discussed above, 
supra, at 2184-2185, should help it make the 
ultimate constitutionally requued judgment Has 
the Government, in light of the efficacy, the side 
effects, the possible alternatives, and the medical 
appropriateness of a particular couise of 
antipsychotic drug treatment, shown a need for that 
treatment sufficiently important to overcome the 
individual's protected mteiest m refusing it9 See 
Harper, supra, at 221-223, 110 SCt 1028, 
Riggins, supra, at 134-135, 112 S Ct 1810 
IV 
The Medical Center and the Magistrate in this case, 
applying standards roughly comparable to those set 
forth here and m Harper, approved forced 
medication substantially, if not primarily, upon 
grounds of Sell's dangerousness to others *184 
But the District Court and the Eighth Circuit took a 
different approach The District Court found " 
cleaily erroneous" the Magistrate's conclusion 
regarding dangerousness, and the Court of Appeals 
agreed Both courts approved forced medication 
solely m order to render Sell competent to stand 
trial 
We shall assume that the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion about Sell's dangerousness was correct 
But we make that assumption only because the 
Government did not contest, and the parties have 
not argued, that particular matter If anything, the 
recoid before us, described in Part I, suggests the 
contrary 
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The Court of Appeals apparently agreed with the 
District Court that "Sell's inappropriate behavior 
amounted at most to an 'inappropriate familiarity 
and even infatuation' with a nurse " 282 F 3d, at 
565 That being so, it also agreed that "the 
evidence does not support a finding that Sell posed 
a danger to himself or others at the Medical Center " 
Ibid The Court of Appeals, however, did not 
discuss the potential differences (described by a 
psychiatrist testifying before the Magistrate) 
between ordinary "over-familiarity" and the same 
conduct engaged m persistently by a patient with 
Sell's behavioral history and mental illness Nor 
did it explain why those differences should be 
minimized in light of the fact that the testifying 
psychiatrists concluded that Sell was dangerous, 
while Sell's own expert denied, not Sell's 
dangerousness, but the efficacy of the drugs 
proposed for tieatment 
The District Court's opinion, while more thorough, 
places weight upon the Medical Centei's decision, 
taken aftei the Magistrate's healing, to return Sell to 
the general prison population It does not explain 
whether that return leflected an improvement m 
Sell's condition or whethei the Medical Center saw 
it as permanent rather than temporary Cf Harper 
supia at 227, and n 10, 110 SCt 1028 (indicating 
that physical *185 lestramts and seclusion **2187 
often not acceptable substitutes for medication) 
[8] Regaidless, as we have said, we must assume 
that Sell was not dangerous And on that 
hypothetical assumption, we find that the Court of 
Appeals was wrong to approve forced medication 
solely to render Sell competent to stand trial For 
one thing, the Magistiate's opinion makes clear that 
he did not find foiced medication legally justified 
on hial competence grounds alone Rather, the 
Magistrate concluded that Sell was dangerous, and 
he wiote that forced medication was "the only way 
to render the defendant not dangeious and 
competent to stand trial" App 335 (emphasis 
added) 
Moieovei, the lecoid of the hearing before the 
Magistiate shows that the experts themselves 
focused mainly upon the dangerousness issue 
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Consequently the experts did not pose important 
questions-questions, for example, about trial-related 
side effects and nsks-the answers to which could 
have helped determine whether forced medication 
was warranted on trial competence grounds alone 
Rather, the Medical Center's experts conceded that 
their proposed medications had "significant" side 
effects and that "there has to be a cost benefit 
analysis" Id, at 185 (testimony of Dr DeMier), 
id, at 236 (testimony of Dr Wolfson) And in 
making their "cost-benefit" judgments, they 
pnmarily took into account Sell's dangerousness, 
not the need to bring him to trial 
The failure to focus upon trial competence could 
well have mattered Whether a particular drug will 
tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with 
communication with counsel, prevent rapid reaction 
to trial developments, or diminish the ability to 
express emotions are matters important m 
determining the permissibility of medication to 
restore competence, Riggins, 504 U S , at 142-145, 
112 SCt 1810 (KENNEDY, J , concurring in 
judgment), but not necessarily relevant when 
dangerousness is primarily at issue We cannot tell 
whether *186 the side effects of antipsychotic 
medication were likely to undermine the fairness of 
a trial m Sell's case 
Finally, the lower courts did not consider that Sell 
has already been confined at the Medical Center for 
a long period of time, and that his refusal to take 
antipsychotic drugs might result m further lengthy 
confinement Those factors, the first because a 
defendant ordinarily receives credit toward a 
sentence for time served, 18 U S C § 3585(b), and 
the second because it reduces the likelihood of the 
defendant's committmg future crimes, 
moderate-though they do not elimmate-the 
importance of the governmental interest in 
piosecution See supra, at 2184 
V 
For these reasons, we believe that the present oiders 
authorizing forced administration of antipsychotic 
drugs cannot stand The Government may pursue 
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its request for forced medication on the grounds 
discussed in this opinion, including grounds related 
to the danger Sell poses to himself or others Since 
Sell's medical condition may have changed over 
time, the Government should do so on the basis of 
cunent circumstances 
The judgment of the Eighth Circuit is vacated, and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion 
// is so oi dei ed 
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice O'CONNOR 
and Justice THOMAS join, dissenting 
The Distiict Court never entered a final judgment in 
this case, which should have led the Court of 
Appeals to wonder whether it had any business 
entertaining petitionees appeal Instead, without so 
much as acknowledging that Congress has limited 
court-of-appeals jurisdiction to "appeals from all 
final decisions of the district courts of the United 
States," 28 U S C § 1291 (emphasis added), and 
appeals fiom certain specified interlocutory oiders, 
**2188 see § 1292, the Court of Appeals*187 
proceeded to the merits of Sell's interlocutory 
appeal 282 F 3d 560 ( C A 8 2002) Perhaps this 
failure to discuss jui is diction was attributable to the 
United States' refusal to contest the point there (as it 
has refused here, see Brief for United States 10, n 
5), or to the panel's unexpressed agreement with the 
conclusion leached by other Courts of Appeals, that 
pretiial forced-medication oiders aie appealable 
undei the "collateial oidei doctrine," see, eg, 
United States v Moigan 193 F 3d 252, 258-259 
( C A 4 1999), United States v Biandon, 158 F 3d 
947, 950-951 (C A 6 1998) But this Court's cases 
do not authorize appeal fiom the District Court's 
April 4, 2001, order, which was neither a "final 
decision" under § 1291 nor part of the class of 
specified mterlocutoiy oiders m § 1292 We 
theiefoie lack junsdiction, and I would vacate the 
Comt of Appeals' decision and remand with 
instructions to dismiss 
After petitioner's indictment, a Magistrate Judge 
found that petitioner was incompetent to stand trial 
because he was unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him and to 
assist m his defense As required by 18 U S C § 
4241(d), the Magistrate Judge committed petitioner 
to the custody of the Attorney General, and 
petitioner was hospitalized to determine whether 
there was a substantial probability that in the 
foreseeable future he would attain the capacity to 
stand trial On June 9, 1999, a reviewing 
psychiatrist determined, after a § 549 43 
administrative hearing FN1 , that petitioner should 
be required to take *188 antipsychotic medication, 
finding the medication necessary to render 
petitioner competent for trill and medically 
appropriate to treat his mental illness Petitioner's 
administrative appeal from thai decision F N 2 was 
denied with a written statement of reasons 
FN1 Title 28 CFR § 549 43 (2002) 
provides the standards and procedures 
used to determine whether a person m the 
custody of the Attorney General may be 
involuntarily medicated Before that can 
be done, a reviewing psychiatrist must 
determine that it is "necessary in order to 
attempt to make the inmate competent for 
tiial or is necessary because the inmate is 
dangerous to self or others, is gravely 
disabled, or is unable to function m the 
open population of a mental health referral 
center or a regular prison," § 549 43(a)(5) 
FN2 Section 549 43(a)(6) provides "The 
inmate may submit an appeal to the 
institution mental health division 
administrator regarding the decision withm 
24 hours of the decision and the 
admmistiator shall review the decision 
within 24 horns of the inmate's appeal " 
At that point the Government possessed the 
requisite authority to administer forced medication 
Petitioner responded, not by appealing to the courts 
the § 549 43 administrative determination, see 5 
U S C § 702, but by moving in the District Court 
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overseeing his criminal prosecution for a hearing 
regarding the appropriateness of his medication A 
Magistrate Judge gi anted the motion and held a 
hearing The Government then requested from the 
Magistiate Judge an older authorizing the 
involuntary medication of petitioner, which the 
Magistrate Judge entered™3 On April 4, 2001, 
the District Court affirmed this Magistrate Judge's 
order, and it is from this order that petitioner 
appealed to the Eighth Circuit 
FN3 It is not appaient why this order was 
necessary, since the Government had 
aheady received authorization to medicate 
petitioner pursuant to § 549 43 If the 
Magistrate Judge had denied the 
Government's motion (or if this Court were 
to leverse the Magistrate Judge's order) the 
Buieau of Pnsons' administrative decision 
ordering petitioner's forcible medication 
would remain m place Which is to 
suggest that, m addition to the 
jurisdictional defect of mterlocutormess to 
which my opinion is addressed, there may 
be no jurisdiction because, at the tune this 
suit was filed, petitioner failed to meet the " 
remediability" requirement of Article III 
standing See Steel Co v Citizens foi 
Bettei Envuonment 523 U S 83, 118 
SCt 1003, 140 LEd2d 210 (1998) The 
Court of Appeals should address this 
jurisdictional issue on lemand 
**2189II 
Petitionei and the United States maintain that 28 
U S C § 1291, which permits the courts of appeals 
to review "all *189 final decisions of the district 
courts of the United States" (emphasis added), 
allowed the Court of Appeals to review the Distiict 
Court's Apnl 4, 2001, ordei We have described § 
1291, however, as a "final judgment rule," 
Flanagan v United States, 465 U S 259, 263, 104 
SCt 1051, 79 L Ed 2d 288 (1984), which "[i]n a 
criminal case prohibits appellate review until 
conviction and imposition of sentence" ibid 
(emphasis added) See also Abney v United States 
431 U S 651, 656-657, 97 SCt 2034, 52 L Ed 2d 
651 (1977) We have invented FN4 a narrow 
exception to this statutory command the so-called " 
collateral order" doctrine, which permits appeal of 
district court orders that (1) "conclusively 
determine the disputed question," (2) "resolve an 
important issue completely separate from the merits 
of the action," and (3) are "effectively unreviewable 
on appeal from a final judgment" Coopers & 
Lybiand v Livesay 437 U S 463, 468, 98 SCt 
2454, 57 L E d 2 d 351 (1978) But the District 
Court's April 4, 2001, order fails to satisfy the third 
requirement of this test 
FN4 I use the term "invented" advisedly 
The statutory text provides no basis 
Our decision in Riggins v Nevada, 504 U S 127, 
112 SCt 1810, 118 L E d 2 d 479 (1992), 
demonstrates that the Distiict Court's April 4, 2001, 
older is reviewable on appeal from conviction and 
sentence The defendant in Riggins had been 
involuntarily medicated while a pretrial detainee, 
and he argued, on appeal from his murder 
conviction that the State of Nevada had 
contravened the substantive-due-process standards 
set forth in Washington v Ha?per, 494 U S 210, 
110 SCt 1028, 108 L E d 2 d 178 (1990) Rather 
than holding that review of this claim was not 
possible on appeal from a criminal conviction, the 
Riggins Court held that forced medication of a 
criminal defendant that fails to comply with Harpei 
creates an unacceptable risk of trial error and 
entitles the defendant to automatic vacatur of his 
conviction 504 U S , at 135-138, 112 SCt 1810 
The Court is therefore wrong to say that "[a]n 
ordinary appeal comes too late for a defendant to 
enforce" this right, ante at 2183, and appellate 
leview of any substantive-due-process challenge to 
the District Court's *190 April 4, 2001, order must 
wait until after conviction and sentence have been 
imposed FN5 
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FN 5 To be sure, the order here is 
unreviewable after final judgment if the 
defendant is acquitted But the " 
unreviewability" leg of our collateral-oider 
doctrine-which, as it is framed requires 
that the interlocutory order be 4 effectively 
unieviewable on appeal fiom a final 
judgment' Coopei s & Lybi and v Livesay 
437 U S 463, 468, 98 SCt 2454, 57 
LEd2d 351 (1978) (emphasis added)-is 
not satisfied by the possibility that the 
aggrieved party will have no occasion to 
appeal 
It is true that, if petitioner must wait until final 
judgment to appeal he will not receive the type of 
lemedy he would piefer a predepnvation injunction 
rather than the postdepnvation vacatur of 
conviction provided by Riggins But that ground 
foi interlocutory appeal is emphatically rejected by 
our cases See, eg Flanagan sup?a (disallowing 
interlocutory appeal of an order disqualifying 
defense counsel), United States v Hollywood 
Motoi Cai Co 458 U S 263, 102 SCt 3081, 73 
LEd2d 754 (1982) (per cwiam) (disallowing 
mteilocutory appeal of an order denying motion to 
dismiss indictment on grounds of prosecutorial 
vmdictiveness), Can oil v United States 354 U S 
394, 77 SCt 1332, 1 L E d 2 d 1442 (1957) 
(disallowing interlocutory appeal of an order 
denying motion to suppress evidence) 
We have until today interpreted the collateral-order 
exception to § 1291 ' with the utmost stnetness' 
in criminal cases Midland Asphalt Coip v United 
States 489 U S 794, 799, 109 SCt 1494, 103 
LEd2d 879 (1989) (emphasis added) In **2190 
the 54 years since we invented the exception, see 
Cohen v Beneficial Industnal Loan Coip 337 
U S 541, 69 SCt 1221, 93 L Ed 1528 (1949), we 
have found only three types of prejudgment orders 
m criminal cases appealable denials of motions to 
leduce bail, Stack \ Boyle 342 U S 1, 72 S Ct 1, 
96 LEd 3 (1951), denials of motions to dismiss on 
double jeopaidy grounds, Abney supia and denials 
of motions to dismiss under the Speech oi Debate 
Clause, Helstoski v Meanoi 442 U S 500, 99 S Ct 
2445 61 LEd 2d 30 (1979) The fust of these 
© 2006 Thomson/West No CI 
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exceptions was justified on the ground that the 
denial of a motion to reduce bail becomes moot 
(and thus effectively unreviewable) on appeal *191 
from conviction See Flanagan supra at 266, 104 
SCt 1051 As Riggins demonstrates, that is not 
the case here The interlocutory appeals m Abney 
and Helstoski were justified on the ground that it 
was appropriate to interrupt the trial when the 
precise right asserted was the light not to be tned 
See Abney sup?a at 660-661, 97 SCt 2034, 
Helstoski sup?a at 507-508, 99 SCt 2445 
Petitioner does not assert a right not to be tried, but 
a right not to be medicated 
B 
Today's narrow holding will allow criminal 
defendants m petitioner's position to engage in 
opportunistic behavior They can, for example, 
voluntarily take their medication until halfway 
through trial, then abruptly refuse and demand an 
interlocutory appeal from the order that medication 
continue on a compulsory basis This sort of 
concern for the disruption of criminal 
proceedmgs-strangely missing from the Court's 
discussion today-is what has led us to state many 
times that we interpret the collateral-order 
exception narrowly m criminal cases See Midland 
Asphalt Coip supra at 799, 109 S Ct 1494, 
Flanagan 465 U S , at 264, 104 S Ct 1051 
But the adverse effects of today's narrow holding 
are as nothing compared to the adverse effects of 
the new rule of law that underlies the holding The 
Court's opinion announces that appellate 
jurisdiction is proper because review after 
conviction and sentence will come only after "Sell 
will have undeigone forced medication-the very 
harm that he seeks to avoid" Ante at 2182 This 
analysis effects a breathtaking expansion of 
appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders If 
it is applied faithfully (and some appellate panels 
will be eager to apply it faithfully), any criminal 
defendant who asserts that a trial court order will, if 
implemented, cause an immediate violation of his 
constitutional (oi perhaps even statutory7) rights 
may immediately appeal He is empowered to hold 
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up the trial for months by claiming that review after 
final judgment "would come too late" to prevent the 
violation A trial-court order requiring the 
defendants 92 to wear an electronic bracelet could 
be attacked as an immediate infringement of the 
constitutional light to "bodily integrity", an older 
lefusmg to allow the defendant to wear a T-shirt 
that says "Black Power" m fiont of the jury could 
be attacked as an immediate violation of First 
Amendment rights, and an order compelling 
testimony could be attacked as an immediate denial 
of Fifth Amendment rights All these orders would 
be immediately appealable Flanagan and Cairoll 
which held that appellate leview of ordeis that 
might infringe a defendant's constitutionally 
protected lights still had to wait until final 
judgment, are seemingly overruled The nanow 
gate of entry to the collateral-order doctrine-hitherto 
traversable by only (1) orders unreviewable on 
appeal fiom judgment and (2) orders denying an 
asserted right not to be tued-has been generously 
widened 
The Court dismisses these concerns in a single 
sentence immediately following its assertion that the 
order here meets the three Cb/ze/7-exception 
lequirements of (1) conclusively determining the 
disputed question (correct), (2) resolving an 
important issue separate from the merits of the 
**2191 action (correct), and (3) being 
unreviewable on appeal (quite plainly incorrect) 
That sentence leads as follows "These 
considerations, particularly those involving the 
severity of the intrusion and corresponding 
importance of the constitutional issue, readily 
distinguish Sell's case from the examples raised by 
the dissent" Ante at 2182 That is a brand new 
consideiation put forwaid m lebuttal, not at all 
discussed in the body of the Court's analysis, which 
lehes on the giound that (contrary to my contention) 
this order is not leviewable on appeal The Court's 
last-minute addition must mean that it is revising the 
Cohen test, to dispense with the thud requirement 
(unreviewable on appeal) only when the impoitant 
sepaiate issue in question involves a 'seveie 
intiuswn and hence an impoitant constitutional 
issue ' Of course I welcome this nan owing of a 
misguided revision-but I still *193 would not favor 
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the revision, not only because it is a novelty with no 
basis in our prior opinions, but also because of the 
uncertainty, and the obvious opportunity for 
gamesmanship, that the revision-as-narrowed 
produces If, however, I did make this more 
limited addition to the textually unsupported Cohen 
doctrine, I would at least do so in an undisguised 
fashion 
* * * 
Petitioner could have obtained pre-trial / review of 
the § 549 43 medication order by filing suit under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U S C § 551 et 
seq or even by filing a Bivens v Six Unknown Fed 
Naicotics Agents, 403 U S 388, 91 SCt 1999, 29 
LEd2d 619 (1971), action, which is available to 
federal pretrial detainees challenging the conditions 
of their confinement, see, eg, Lyons v United 
States Marshals, 840 F 2d 202 (C A 3 1988) In 
such a suit, he could have obtained immediate 
appellate review of denial of relief™6 But if he 
chooses to challenge his forced medication in the 
context of a criminal trial, he must abide by the 
limitations attached to such a challenge-which 
prevent him from stopping the proceedmgs m their 
tracks Petitioner's mistaken litigation strategy, and 
this Court's desire to decide an interesting 
constitutional issue, do not justify a disregard of the 
limits that Congress has imposed on courts of 
appeals' (and our own) jurisdiction We should 
vacate the judgment here, and remand the case to 
the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss 
FN6 Petitioner points out that there are 
disadvantages to such an approach-for 
example, lack of constitutional entitlement 
to appointed counsel m a Bivens action 
That does not entitle him or us to disregard 
the limits on appellate jurisdiction 
U S ,2003 
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— F.Supp.2d —-, 2006 WL 2560622 (S.D.N.Y.) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court,S.D. New York. 
UNITED STATES of America 
v. 
Susan LINDAUER, a/k/a "Symbol Susan", Defendant. 
No. S2 03 CR. 807(MBM). 
Sept. 6, 2006. 
Background: Defendant was charged with conspiring to act and acting as an unregistered agent of 
the government of Iraq, in particular the Iraq Intelligence Service (IIS) and engaging in various 
forbidden financial transactions with that government. Government moved for order compelling 
administration of psychotropic drugs to render her competent to stand trial. 
Holding: The District Court, Mukasey, J., held that government failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that defendant would likely be substantially rendered competent by forced 
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1-257AIV Disabilities and Privileges of Mentally Disordered Persons 
C-257AME1 Crimes 
c«^257Ak436 Custody and Confinement 
c-257Ak436.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
In prosecution for attempting to influence an unnamed government official, government failed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant would likely be substantially rendered 
competent by forced psychotropic medication or substantially unlikely to suffer effects that would 
impinge upon a fair trial, as required to involuntarily administer medication; government's interest in 
prosecuting the case was diminished by the fact that defendant posed no threat to herself or others, 
and there were gaps in the medical literature and an absence of controlled studies indicating that 
forced medication would render her competent, and a reasonable possibility existed that forced 
medication would simply strengthen defendant's paranoid tendencies and distance her further from 
her lawyer. 
Michael J. Garcia, Esq., United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Edward C. 
O'Callaghan, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, New York City, for Plaintiff. 
Sanford Talkin, Esq., Talkm, Muccigrosso & Roberts LLP. , New York City, for Defendant. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
MUKASEY, District Judge. 
*1 Susan Undauer is charged in four counts with conspiring to act and acting as an unregistered 
agent of the government of Iraq, in particular the Iraq Intelligence Service ("IIS"), from October 1999 
until February 2004, and engaging in various forbidden financial transactions with that government 
during that period, apparently in connection with her alleged role as agent of that government. At 
least a half dozen mental health professionals, including a psychologist and a psychiatrist retained by 
the defense, and several psychologists and psychiatrists employed, and one psychiatrist retained, by 
the government, have found her mentally incompetent to stand trial, due principally to delusions of 
grandiosity and paranoia that make her unable to assist meaningfully in her own defense and 
understand the nature of the proceedings she faces. Defendant, but not her lawyer, has refused to 
accept the diagnosis and has refused to take psychotropic drugs that government physicians wish to 
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administer in aid of rendering her competent to stand trial. The government has moved pursuant to 
Sell v. United States. 539 U.S. 166. 123 S.Ct. 2174. 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003) for an order compelling 
administration of such drugs. Lindauer, through and with the approval of her lawyer, opposes the 
motion. 
Sell is discussed at greater length below, but in summary it requires that in order to obtain such 
relief, the government show that important government interests are at stake in prosecuting the 
particular case at issue, that administration of psychotropic drugs is substantially likely to render the 
defendant competent to stand trial and substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere 
with her ability to assist in presenting a defense, that involuntary administration of such drugs is 
necessary to advance the government's interests because less drastic measures will not suffice, and 
that administration of such drugs is in defendant's best medical interest in light of her over-all 
medical condition. See id. at 180-82, 123 S.Ct. 2174. Our Court of Appeals has held that it is the 
government's burden to establish each of these criteria by clear and convincing evidence. See United 
States v. Gomes. 387 F.3d 157. 160 (2d Cir.2004). 
Based on the evidence presented at a Sell hearing on May 4 and May 9, 2006, for the reasons 
explained below, the government has failed to carry this burden with respect to one, and possibly 
two, of these criteria-possibly as to the importance of the government's interest and certainly as to 
the likelihood that the proposed medication will succeed. Accordingly, the motion is denied. 
I. 
A. The Indictment 
Count One of the indictment charges Lindauer with participating in a conspiracy with two other named 
defendants, Raed Noman Al-Anbuke and Wisam Noman Al-Anbuke, to act in the United States as 
agents of the government of Iraq without notification to the Attorney General, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. 5 951 (2000). The two defendants bearing the name Al-Anbuke are sons of a former Iraqi 
diplomat who have already pleaded guilty, been sentenced to time served, and left the United States, 
I believe for Iraq. Their charged conduct, as explained by the government in pretrial submissions, 
involved principally obtaining the names of expatriate Iraqis in this country who were acting against 
the interest of the Saddam Hussein regime, and turning them over to IIS. It bears emphasis here that 
it was never the government's theory that Lindauer participated in such conduct, or indeed that she 
even knew the Al-Anbuke brothers. Rather, she and they were charged together only because both 
allegedly conspired with IIS. 
*2 Although it is concededly a risky business to judge the thrust of underlying charged conduct from 
the overt acts set forth in an indictment, the acts attributed to Lindauer in the indictment are the 
following: meetings in 1999 and October 2001 with IIS officers, at the latter of which she accepted an 
unspecified task; acceptance in January 2002 of $232.77 and on two dates in February of $311.10 
and $270.00, respectively, for travel, lodging and meal expenses; travel from February 23 to March 
8, 2002, to Iraq, via Jordan, and meetings there in venues that included the Al Rashid Hotel in 
Baghdad, where she accepted $5,000; a meeting in Manhattan where she accepted $200.00 for 
travel, lodging and meal expenses; delivery on January 8, 2003, to the home of an unspecified 
government official, of a letter in which she conveyed "her established access to, and contacts with, 
members of the Saddam Hussein regime, in an unsuccessful attempt to influence United States 
foreign policy." (Indictment 1] 3n) Thereafter, she is alleged to have engaged in a series of acts 
involving an undercover FBI agent posing as a member of the Libyan intelligence service, all 
apparently directed at supporting what are referred to as "resistance groups in post-war 
Iraq" (Indictment H 3o), by which I conclude is meant groups resisting the United States and its allies 
and the post-war Iraqi government. 
Lindauer has been reported in numerous news articles to be a cousin, to a remote degree of 
consanguinity, of Andrew Card, a former White House chief of staff in the current administration. E.g., 
David Samuels, Susan Lindauer's Mission to Baghdad, New York Times Magazine, Aug. 29, 2004, at 
25. Although Lindauer is reported in the cited article to have contacted Card during her period of 
contact with Iraqi officials, it is uncertain whether he is the unspecified "government official" referred 
to in the indictment. 
The substantive counts of the indictment charge defendant with acting as an unregistered agent of 
the Iraqi government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951 (Count Two); accepting about $10,000 from IIS 
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as payment for "various services and activities," including her trip to Baghdad in violation of 18 U.S.C 
§ 2332d (Count Five); and engaging in financial transactions with the government of Iraq in relation 
to her trip to Iraq in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (Count Six). 
From these charges, it appears that the high-water mark of defendant's efforts to act as an 
unregistered agent for the Iraqi government was her delivery of a letter in January 2003 to the home 
of an unspecified government official, in what is described even in the indictment as "an unsuccessful 
effort to influence United States foreign policy." (Indictment H 3n) 
The maximum sentence on the conspiracy count is five years; the maximum sentence on each of the 
substantive counts is ten years. 
B. Defendant's Mental Status In Relation to This Case 
1. Procedural Background 
*3 At the instance of her attorney, Lindauer was examined initially in January 2005 by Sanford L 
Drob, Ph.D., a psychologist. Thereafter, in May and July 2005, she was examined by Dr. Stuart B. 
Kleinman, a government-retained psychiatrist. In September 2005, she agreed to go voluntarily to 
the Federal Medical Center, a Bureau of Prisons facility in Carswell, Texas, to undergo examination 
and, if necessary, treatment. There, she was examined and/or her records and other documentation 
reviewed by at least two psychologists and two psychiatrists on the staff of that facility. In addition, 
her records and other documentation were reviewed by Dr. Robert L. Goldstein, a psychiatrist 
retained by the defense. Whatever their differences in diagnosis, or as to the efficacy of forced 
medication, all agreed that Lindauer suffers grandiose and paranoid delusions. 
At the Sell hearing, the court heard testimony from Dr. Collin J. Vas, a staff psychiatrist at the 
Carswell, Texas facility where defendant was evaluated; Dr. Stuart B. Kleinman, a psychiatrist 
retained by the government; and Dr. Robert L. Goldstein, a psychiatrist retained by defendant. In 
addition, eight reports from mental health professionals were received in evidence at the hearing 
pursuant to stipulation, including reports by the witnesses who testified. These were the following: (i) 
Report of Sanford L. Drob, Ph.D., February 28, 2005; (ii) Report of Stuart B. Kleinman, M.D., 
September 13, 2005; (iii) Report of James A. Shadduck, Ph.D., (reviewed by Robert E. Gregg, Ph.D.) 
December 13, 2005; (iv) Report of Collin J. Vas, December 19, 2005; (v) Report of James A. 
Shadduck, Ph.D., (reviewed by another psychologist whose signature was indecipherable), December 
28, 2005; (vi) Report of William M. Pederson, M.D., December 29, 2005 (supplemented by Letter of 
William M. Pederson, M.D. to the Court, January 19, 2006); (vii) Report of Robert Lloyd Goldstein, 
M.D., March 20, 2006; (viii) Report of Stuart B. Kleinman, M.D., April 7, 2 0 0 6 ^ 
Of the witnesses who testified at the hearing, the parties plainly placed principal reliance on the two 
outside retained psychiatrists-the government on Dr. Kleinman and defendant on Dr. Goldstein. Both 
are well credentialed and highly accomplished. ( Compare 5/4/06 Tr. 53-55 with 5/9/06 Tr. 3-4) 
Post-hearing submissions concluded on June 13, 2006. 
2. Diagnoses 
Most of the reports referred to above, and some of the testimony at the hearing, dealt with the 
defendant's diagnosis, using categories from a publication known as the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, or DSM-IV-TR. There was disagreement as to the 
diagnosis but, so far as I can discern, no material controversy. Thus, those arrayed on the 
government side agreed on a diagnosis of psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified ( e.g., 5/4/06 
Tr. 9-10), whereas Dr. Robert Goldstein, defendant's retained psychiatrist, offered a diagnosis of 
delusional disorder, mixed type (5/9/06 Tr. 6; Goldstein Report 3/20/06, p. 2). A psychologist at 
Carswell wrote that defendant's "inability to fully acknowledge and discuss her current symptoms of 
mental illness limits the accuracy with which she can currently be diagnosed." (Shadduck Report 
12/13/05 at 4) However, the focus of the hearing, and of the court's concern, was rather on the 
symptoms that make defendant incompetent to stand trial, and to what degree those symptoms are 
amenable to treatment by forced psychotropic medication. ( See 5/4/06 Tr. 35) C[T]he name of the 
disorder is important, but the symptoms are what we're treating.") As to the symptoms that make 
defendant incompetent to stand trial, there was no disagreement, and no testimony suggesting that 
the label attached to the syndrome of which they may be a part matters at all in determining whether 
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they will yield to medication, forced or otherwise. 
*4 Dr. Kleinman, the government's retained psychiatrist, testified to three groups of symptoms that 
led him to his diagnosis of psychotic disorder not otherwise specified: (a) hallucinations, defined as 
distorted sensory perceptions, of three types: auditory, visual and tactile; (b) delusions, defined as 
false fixed beliefs, of two types: grandiose and persecutory; and (c) mood disturbances, hypomanic 
or manic. (5/4/06 Tr. 59) However, as he explained, it is only the delusions-false fixed beliefs-that 
interfere significantly with defendant's ability to assist in her own defense; it is not the hallucinations 
or the mood disorder. (5/4/06 Tr. 66) 
Here, it may be useful to examine at least briefly the delusions the doctors perceived so that their 
effect on defendant's ability to assist her defense can be appreciated. Dr. Kleinman describes a 
history of psychotic phenomena and episodes going back to defendant's childhood, possibly as early 
as the age of 7, including purported gifts of prophecy and spiritual visitations (Kleinman 9/13/05 
Report at 8-11; 5/4/06 Tr. at 93) as well as mood disturbance ( id. at 12-14) and three varieties of 
hallucinations (Kleinman 9/13/05 Report at 14-21). He then cites five examples of Lindauer's own 
writings as reflecting delusions of grandiosity: she suggests that she reported 11 bombings before 
they occurred, suggests that she speaks with divine inspiration, places herself at the center of events 
in the Middle East, and declares herself to be an angel. Further, he cites seven of her writings as 
evidence of paranoid delusions: that she was under government surveillance from hidden cameras 
inside her apartment; that the CIA and FBI were after her because of difficulties in this country's 
relationship with Syria; that the Egyptian government had made an attempt on her life; that the 
intelligence community was subverting her, including by blowing up the modem on her computer; 
that men next door had videotaped her on instructions of President Clinton; and that other threats 
and surveillance had been carried out against her ( id. at 26-32). As a further example of both 
grandiosity and paranoia, he cites evidence that Lindauer has believed that objectively neutral 
environmental stimuli-such as lights going on or off, or a statement by a radio announcer-refer 
specifically to her ( id. at 32-33). 
Although Dr. Kleinman testified at the hearing that he usually likes to conduct personal interviews of 
people whose mental state is at issue in legal proceedings, he added that he is aware that such 
people are motivated to either exaggerate or minimize symptoms, and so he relied on what he called 
"collateral data," which I take to mean journals and correspondence and other pre-existing 
statements by the subject that were made before there was any intent to influence the outcome of a 
legal proceeding. (5/4/06 Tr. 61) His initial report relied almost exclusively on such data. 
Dr. Drob, the defense psychologist, based his conclusions solely on interviews with Lindauer, and 
reported only grandiose delusions, although he did report her claim that the government fabricated 
documents in connection with the current case. (Drob Report 2/28/05 at 7) He noted that defendant 
is adamant that she is in fact "an important government operative and that all her actions were in 
fact sanctioned by the intelligence branches of the United States government." ( Id. at 5) She was, 
she claimed, a "back door channel between the U.S. and Iraq." ( Id. at 6) He said that she insisted 
also she is owed and was cheated out of millions of dollars for negotiating with Libya, apparently to 
secure reparations in connection with the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland. ( Id. at 5, 6) Although Dr. Drob was resolutely agnostic even as to claims by Lindauer about 
her involvement in the Lockerbie negotiations, her role in getting weapons inspectors into Iraq, and 
her involvement in getting President Clinton to prevent a nuclear terrorist act in the United States in 
1995, characterizing such claims only as "extremely unlikely" ( id. at 13), he did conclude that "when 
Ms. Lindauer begins to speak about her psychic powers it becomes eminently clear that she is 
delusional, and that the grandiose claims she makes about her participation in government affairs 
(although they may contain kernels of truth) are in all likelihood largely the product of her own 
psychotically disturbed imagination." ( Id. at 14) He dismissed her claim that she had prophesies 
about the Iraq war when she was a little girl, and knew days in advance of every specific target in 
Iraq and every assassination, as "delusional on its face." ( Id . ) 
* 5 Dr. Goldstein, the defense psychiatrist, was somewhat less tentative, dismissing as "classic 
examples of the grandiose variety" her claims that she was "a preeminent government operative who 
was not sufficiently appreciated" and had contact with high-level government figures, and was 
possessed of psychic powers. (Goldstein Report 5/20/06 at 3) He reported also that "many of Ms. 
Lindauer's delusions are classic examples of the persecutory type". ( Id . ) 
Dr. Drob's report explained that defendant's delusions interfere in two ways with her ability to assist 
counsel in her defense. First, because her delusions relate at least in part to the crime with which she 
is charged, they generate endless and perforce futile requests that her lawyer contact witnesses who 
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she claims would support her description of the underlying events, and otherwise follow leads that 
exist only in her imagination. Second, her delusions make her resistant to the idea of pursuing a 
defense based on mental illness. (Drob Report 2/28/05 at 14-15) 
Dr. Kleinman teased out in somewhat greater detail the way in which defendant's delusions interfere 
with her ability both to understand the case and to assist in her own defense. He pointed out that her 
assessment of the evidence and of the likelihood she will prevail at trial is based on her own view of 
reality, including that she was a Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency "asset"; 
that she has gathered witnesses, including people from outside the United States, to testify to her 
value as an intelligence and anti-terrorism "asset"; that jurors are more likely to think negatively of 
the government than of her if they see evidence that she accepted payment from Iraqi 
representatives; and that the government may avoid confronting her for fear of what she might 
disclose. (Kleinman Report 9/13/05 at 28-43) He pointed out also that her view of plea negotiations is 
influenced by her delusions insofar as she believes the government will withdraw the charges against 
her when prosecutors realize those charges are based on "bad information" and in order to avoid 
embarrassing disclosures she could make ( id. at 44-45) 
All of the mental health professionals who treated the subject agreed that defendant has resisted the 
idea that she suffers from any mental illness. Thus, Dr. Kleinman noted her insistence "that she does 
not suffer from mental illness, and that she categorically rejects using a defense based on" such 
illness ( id. at 46); Dr. Drob stated that defendant "denies that she suffers from or has any history of 
mental illness" (Drob Report 2/28/05 at 4). The psychologists and psychiatrists at Carswell said that 
although defendant cooperated initially, she became angry and uncooperative when it was suggested 
that she was mentally ill. ( See Shadduck Report 12/13/05 at 3; Pederson Report 12/29/05 at 3) Dr. 
Goldstein reported that such denial is characteristic of delusional patients. (Goldstein Report 3/20/06 
at 5) This presents obvious obstacles to enlisting her assistance in framing a defense based on her 
mental condition. 
*6 Although defendant denies she is mentally ill, she is plainly aware of what others think, and so, as 
Dr. Kleinman noted, she "is disposed to dissimulate, i.e., minimize the presence and extent of her 
psychiatric difficulties, especially to mental health professionals-whom she distrusts and generally 
dislikes." (Kleinman Report 12/13/05 at 8) She acknowledged to him that if she testifies at her trial 
she will have to avoid touching on such subjects as her psychic powers, but "also noted that when 
(metaphorically) attacked by others she has spontaneously uttered prophecies." ( Id. at 46) 
There appears to be no dispute that defendant's delusions are of long duration. As noted, Dr. 
Kleinman found in his initial report that her writings suggest they go back to childhood, perhaps as 
early as age 7. (Kleinman Report 9/13/05 at 8-11; 5/4/06 Tr. at 93; see supra at 9) Dr. Shadduck, a 
psychologist at the Carswell facility, relying principally on interviews with defendant and the reports of 
Dr. Drob and Dr. Kleinman, concluded that "Ms. Lindauer appears to have developed increasingly 
severe symptoms of mental illness over the past several years." (Shadduck Report 12/13/05 at 1, 5) 
It appears from Dr. Kleinman's initial report that even lay people can perceive that Lindauer is not 
mentally stable. A neighbor reported that Lindauer seemed "mildly schizophrenic." (Kleinman Report 
9/13/05 at 35) However, the uniform view of those who addressed the subject of dangerousness was 
that whatever may be her mental condition otherwise, Ms. Lindauer is not a danger either to herself 
or to others. ( See Pederson Report 12/29/05 at 6, reporting " no evidence of 
dangerousness" (emphasis in original); Shadduck Report 12/13/05 at 4; 5/4/06 Tr. 39) 
C. Proposed Medication 
As noted, the dispute here concerns whether, having refused voluntary medication, defendant should 
be forced to take medication so as to render her competent to stand trial. That decision turns on 
whether the requirements of Sell v. United States, supra, have been met. Before any discussion of 
the evidence in this record relating to the issue of forced medication, it would be useful to review in 
some detail the requirements of Sell and Gomes, supra. 
1. Legal Prerequisites to Forced Medication 
As noted, Sell establishes a four-part test for determining whether a defendant may be forced to take 
antipsychotic medication. "First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at 
stake." Sell, 539 U.S. at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174 (emphasis in original). The Court found that prosecution 
of a defendant charged with a serious crime is such an interest. Id, However, Sell admonishes courts 
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to "consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the Government's interest in prosecution. 
Special circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest/' Id^ As an "example" of such a 
circumstance, the Court hypothesized a defendant whose refusal to take drugs voluntarily "may mean 
lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill-and that would diminish the risks that 
ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious crime." IdL Of 
course, that is not the case here, where Lindauer has been found not to present a danger either to 
herself or to'others ( see supra at — ) and would not be so confined. But again, the hypothetical 
defendant discussed in Sell is only an example of "special circumstances"; by definition, an example 
does not define the universe of "special circumstances." 
* 7 "Second, the court must conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further those 
concomitant ••• interests."Id. at 181, 123 S.Ct. 2174 (emphasis in original). This requires a finding 
"that administration of the drugs is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand 
trial. At the same time, it must find that administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have 
side effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting 
a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair." Id^ No further explanation is provided or example 
offered of what might constitute "substantial" likelihood of success, "substantial" unlikelihood of 
adverse results, or "significant" interference with conduct of a trial defense. 
"Third, the court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests. 
The court must find that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve 
substantially the same results." Id. (emphasis in original). The court here is directed to "consider less 
intrusive means for administering the drugs, e.g., a court order to the defendant backed by the 
contempt power, before considering more intrusive methods." Id. 
"Fourth,••• the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in 
the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition." Id^ Here, the Court suggests 
consideration of the type of drug to be used and its projected side effects and level of success. Id^ 
Consideration of the factors relating to this fourth element may differ from the consideration 
necessary to resolve the second element, which also involves weighing likelihood of restoring 
competence against likelihood of adverse side effects, in that the second element focuses on 
favorable and unfavorable outcomes only insofar as they affect a trial, whereas the fourth element 
focuses on the defendant's medical well-being in the large. 
The defendant in Sell, a one-time practicing dentist who had been treated, apparently successfully, 
with antipsychotic drugs before he became ensnared in the case that bears his name, 539 U.S. at 
169, 123 S.Ct. 2174f was charged with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment, and money 
laundering. Id. at 170, 123 S.Ct. 2174. 
Sell did not prescribe the standard the government must meet in establishing each of these four 
elements. That gap is filled by United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.2004), where our Court 
of Appeals endorsed a requirement that the government prove its case by clear and convincing 
evidence. See id. at 160. 
Gomes also fills a couple of other gaps in Sell, albeit with much less explicit direction. In Gomes, it 
appears that the only witnesses were mental health professionals employed at the facility where the 
government proposed to treat the defendant, and they projected "a 70 percent chance that he could 
be rendered competent through treatment with anti-psychotic medication." Id. at 158. It is not clear 
whether that projection was particular to the defendant in Gomes because later in the opinion the 
Court found "not clearly erroneous" the District Court's reliance in part on "the BOP's [Bureau of 
Prisons'] 70 percent success rate in restoring defendants to competence through treatment (voluntary 
or not) with anti-psychotic medication." Id. at 161-62. 
* f i Coincidental^, the defendant in Gomes was reported to be suffering from the same delusions that 
afflict Lindauer: "delusional disorder of grandiose and persecutory type." Id. at 159. However, as 
noted, it appears that the only mental health professionals to present evidence in Gomes were a 
psychologist and a psychiatrist employed by the government; certainly, there was no mention in 
Gomes of any contrary testimony as to the amenability of such delusions to treatment of any kind, 
forced or otherwise. Because the case before this court must be decided on the record before this 
court, I draw no conclusions whatever from the apparent conclusion in Gomes that such delusions can 
be treated with whatever medication was proposed in that case. The only possible lesson I can draw 
from this portion of Gomes is that if one could project, based on clear and convincing evidence, a 70 
percent likelihood of success in treating Lindauer, that would be sufficient. 
The Gomes Court also analyzed the strength of the government's interest in bringing the defendant to 
trial as follows: 
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Gomes faces trial for a serious felony-possessing a firearm as a felon. Both the seriousness of the 
crime and Gomes's perceived dangerousness to society are evident from the substantial sentence 
Gomes faces if convicted. Because he has committed at least three prior felonies or serious drug 
offenses, Gomes faces a possible statutory minimum of fifteen years' imprisonment. 
Id. at 160. 
For all the Supreme Court's focus in Sell on standards for coercing antipsychotic medication, the Court 
does acknowledge the principle, arising from the Court's own precedents, "that an individual has a 
constitutionally protected liberty 'interest in avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic 
drugs'-an interest that only an 'essential' or 'overriding' state interest might overcome." Sell, 539 U.S. 
at 178-79, 123 S.Ct. 2174, (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 
L.Ed.2d 479 (1992)). Such an essential or overriding interest was found, for example, in Washington 
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028. 108 LEd.2d 178 (19901. where the Court permitted forcible 
administration of drugs "to inmates who are ••• gravely disabled or represent a significant danger to 
themselves or others." 539 U.S. at 226, 123 S.Ct. 2297. But when such interests are absent, as they 
are here, certain questions present themselves, and the Sell Court made it plain that this court must 
keep them in mind: 
Why is it medically appropriate forcibly to administer antipsychotic drugs to an individual who (1) is 
not dangerous and (2) is competent to make up his own mind about treatment? Can bringing such an 
individual to trial alone justify in whole (or at least in significant part) administration of a drug that 
may have adverse side effects, including side effects that may to some extent impair a defense at 
trial? We consequently believe that a court asked to approve forced administration of drugs for 
purposes of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, should ordinarily determine whether the 
Government seeks, or has first sought, permission for forced administration of drugs on these other 
Harper-type grounds; and, if not, why not. 
*9 Id. at 183, 123 S.Ct. 2174 (emphasis in original}). 
Although the Court's discussion of a defendant's interest in avoiding forced psychotropic medication 
seems at times curiously anodyne, I think it is not inappropriate to recall in plain terms what the 
government seeks to do here, which necessarily involves physically restraining defendant so that she 
can be injected with mind-altering drugs. There was a time when what might be viewed as an even 
lesser invasion of a defendant's person-pumping his stomach to retrieve evidence-was said to "shock 
[ ] the conscience" and invite comparison with "the rack and the screw". Rochln v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). The Supreme Court's rhetoric seems to have toned 
down mightily since then, but the jurisprudential principles remain the same. 
2. Evidence Bearing on Disputed Issue of Forced Medication 
All the mental health professionals at the Carswell facility endorsed in their reports the idea of 
prescribing antipsychotic medication for defendant. Indeed, even Drs. Shadduck and Greg, who hold 
Ph.D. degrees and accordingly are not, so far as I am aware, authorized to prescribe medication, 
nonetheless opined that "[antipsychotic medications are the best treatment for symptoms of 
psychosis" (Shadduck Reports 12/13/05, 12/28/05 at 5) ( see Vas Report 12/19/05 at 2; Letter of 
William M. Pederson, M.D. to the Court, Jan. 19, 2006, at 1) 
Dr. Vas submitted the above-referenced two-page report, in which he concluded that it is medically 
necessary to treat defendant with antipsychotic medications, that they are "substantially likely" to 
render her competent, and that the side effects listed in his letter are rare and can be dealt with 
through "treatment strategies," and that in any event defendant does not to his knowledge suffer 
from any medical condition which would place her at substantial risk of developing any severe side 
effects. 
Dr. Vas also testified at the hearing, and did so with the same bland assurance and utter lack of 
substantiation. He stated in conclusory form his professional belief that "antipsychotics are medically 
necessary and appropriate and that, although there is a risk of various side effects, the risk of the 
side effects are rather rare and fairly easily managed" (5/4/06 Tr. 24), and specifically as to 
defendant, answered in the affirmative to the question, " [ i ]n your opinion, is involuntary 
administration administration of antipsychotic medication medically appropriate to treat Ms. Lindauer 
for her mental condition?" ( Id. at 28) He recommended what are referred to as second generation or 
atypical antipsychotic medications that "are much more easily tolerated by patients, and we have 
some evidence that they have a less deleterious effect on cognition and help people think more 
rationally." ( I d . at 23) 
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In the same broad fashion, he testified to experience with "people that ••• might complain of a side 
effect, and we try to alleviate side effects as much as we can and try to meet the treatment goals at 
the same time." ( Id . at 25) 
*10 Similarly, and without elaboration, he testified that it was "extremely likely" that defendant 
would respond positively to antipsychotic medication, and added that "[t]here have been a few 
studies done that have been published in the literature which would indicate a restoration to 
competency that is above 80 percent, anywhere from 80 to 95 percent and that has included patients 
from various diagnostic categories and their response to particularly antipsychotic treatment." ( Id. at 
29) 
The government appears to have placed principal reliance on the testimony of its retained 
psychiatrist, Dr. Kleinman. He submitted an extensive initial report, cited above, that focused entirely 
on the diagnosis of defendant's condition. However, he submitted a later report that discussed 
treatment, and testified as well on the issue of forced antipsychotic medication. 
His second report described why he prefers his diagnosis to that of Dr. Goldstein, but stated also that 
even if defendant is diagnosed as suffering from delusional disorder, "second generation, i.e., 
'atypical', antipsychotic medication would reasonably likely-safely-help her/' (Kleinman 4/7/06 Report 
at 10) Although the report supports that conclusion by quoting four studies that are optimistic as to 
the potential effectiveness of second generation antipsychotic medication in treating delusional 
disorder, all are anecdotal, which is to say none report on controlled studies. The most optimistic, 
dated in 1995, reports an overview of the literature that suggests "80.8% of patients show total or 
partial recovery" ( id. at 15), but that conclusion is hemmed in with qualifications, as follows: 
The authors are well aware that the outcome of this delusional disorder treatment overview is 
tentative. The existing literature has been investigated thoroughly, but its quality is extremely 
diverse, nomenclature is highly variable, and extended-case series are rare. The simplest details are 
often missing, such as dosage schedules, side effects, duration of drug use, etc., as well as reasons 
for choosing or changing drugs. Duration of follow-up is extraordinarily variable. 
Another confounding factor in looking at outcome results with different treatments is that pimozide 
has generally become the first-choice treatment in recent years. Therefore, other neuroleptics tend to 
be employed in somewhat older studies. This may make their direct comparison even less reliable 
than otherwise. 
(Id.) 
At the hearing, Dr. Kleinman came bearing a later report, published in February 2006, that reviewed 
the literature dating back to 1994 dealing with treatment of delusional disorder. (5/4/06 Tr. 79; GX 2) 
According to Dr. Kleinman, the new report concludes that the literature indicates "an effectiveness 
overall of various types of antipsychotic medication to be approaching 90 percent, in the high 80 
percent." ( Id. at 80) (emphasis added) The word "overall" here is significant, because Dr. Kleinman 
testified further as follows: 
* 1 I Q. And with respect to persecutory and grandiose types of delusion [the two types with which 
defendant is afflicted], what are the results as reported in the article? 
A. Well, there is a total of 15 reported cases of persecutory delusions and there are a little bit more 
than 50 percent, eight [of] fifteen, are reported to be improved. None are reported to be recovered 
entirely, and there were no patients specifically with grandiose delusions. 
Id. at 81 
Moreover, Dr. Kleinman acknowledged a substantial ambiguity even in the "overall" figure, when he 
noted that the report showed elsewhere that a "positive response to medication treatment occurred in 
nearly 50 percent." ( Id. at 81) He speculated that the apparent contradiction between the 50 percent 
and 90 percent figures could have occurred because at one point recovered and improved patients 
had been lumped together to generate the 90 percent statistic, but the author did not explain what 
was meant by "positive response" in nearly 50 percent of the cases. Dr. Kleinman conceded that this 
explanation was "not an entirely satisfactory one." ( Id . ) He offered for guidance also an article 
describing a single success in treating delusional disorder with Risperidone (GX 3), a second 
generation or atypical antipsychotic medication (5/4/06 Tr. at 83-84). However, the last sentence of 
the conclusion in that article reads as follows: "A controlled clinical trial of Risperidone in the 
treatment of patients with delusional disorder is warranted." ( Id. at 85) 
Dr. Kleinman explained the absence of evidence from controlled clinical studies by pointing out that 
delusional disorders are generally rarer than schizophrenic disorders, and accordingly it is difficult to 
obtain data with respect to delusional disorders and resources are directed more at the schizophrenic 
disorders. ( Id. at 86) Later, he agreed that controlled studies are a "more desirable source of data 
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for making treatment decisions." ( Id. at 90) Despite the absence of controlled studies, and the 
"critical eye" with which case studies must be approached, he answered "Yes" to inquiries as to 
whether "involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication [is] medically appropriate to treat 
Ms. Lindauer's symptoms" and whether such treatment would "improve Ms. Lindauer's chances to be 
restored to mental competency to stand trial." ( Id. at 87) 
That was as strong an endorsement as he gave to involuntary medication. It bears mention here that 
initially, when he was not responding to leading questions, he testified simply that "there is only one 
type of treatment that holds any promise of diminishing ••• the psychotic disorder not otherwise 
specified and that is antipsychotic medicine." (5/4/06 Tr. 63) That testimony says nothing about the 
likelihood that such treatment would succeed, but only that it is the sole treatment that could succeed 
in treating what he characterized as "a condition very much worthy of treatment." ( Id. at 89) 
*12 Dr. Goldstein, defendant's retained psychiatrist, explained his preference for the diagnosis of 
delusional disorder, mixed type over psychotic disorder not otherwise specified (5/9/06 Tr. 6, 32-33), 
but readily noted that from the standpoint of treatment, the two defined "a distinction without a 
difference." ( Id. at 28) 
He reviewed the weaknesses of the paper Dr. Kleinman had brought to the hearing, GX 2, including 
not only that there were no controlled studies but also that, 
there aren't many articles where someone says I treated six patients with this illness and none of 
them got better. Those kind of papers are generally not published. So there's a kind of skewing of the 
literature towards only writing about things where you have a favorable outcome. 
(5/9/06 Tr. at 14; see generally id. at 13-16) Dr. Goldstein himself is working on an article about the 
Sell case and the issue of forced medication, in which he will take the position that some conditions 
are responsive to forced medication, but that delusional disorder is not among them. ( Id. at 16) 
Drs. Kleinman and Goldstein differed as well on the likelihood of undesirable secondary or side effects 
from forced administration of psychotropic drugs, starting with a paranoid patient's likely response if 
the drugs do not abate paranoia. Dr. Kleinman spoke principally of the likely effect of unsuccessful 
treatment on defendant's relationship with her lawyer, and said it was by no means certain that 
relationship would deteriorate because the relationship continued intact at the time of the hearing 
(5/4/06 Tr. at 68), although he conceded that an "extreme" reaction would be for her to "become 
very angry at him and reject him." Dr. Goldstein, on the other hand, testified to "a general consensus 
that compelling a paranoid delusional patient to undergo any coerced medication or other forms of 
treatment will have a high likelihood of intensifying their delusions, their agitation, their mistrust, 
their feelings of being persecuted and attempts to harm them and so forth." (5/9/06 Tr. at 17) In 
particular, he said, "it would have a highly adverse impact [on defendant's ability to function within 
the criminal justice system] because she'd be much more paranoid, so whatever distrust, and I'm 
sure there is some already, she has of the system and her lawyers and perhaps the judge, as well, 
would be intensified to the point where her cooperation and her level of ability to participate in the 
proceedings would be greatly compromised, I think." ( Id. at 17) He said that conclusion is "just a 
matter of common sense that sometimes is exercised by doctors with clinical experience who know 
that a paranoid patient who is forced to do things that they view as particularly harmful to themselves 
are only going to get worse." ( Id. at 43) 
As to physical side effects, Dr. Kleinman agreed that certain of such side effects were possible, but 
emphasized that monitoring and screening of patients could mitigate or prevent the onset of such 
symptoms (5/4/06 Tr. 71-73, 92), although he agreed that a physician charged with monitoring a 
large number of patients would have a harder time monitoring each patient effectively ( id. at 92). Dr. 
Goldstein relied on a pharmacology text (DX D) to project various percentages of physical side 
effects, principally including EPS, or extrapyramidal syndrome, which encompasses various degrees of 
muscular disorder and pseudo-Parkinsonism, with tremors, rigidity, and other involuntary muscular 
phenomena. (5/9/06 Tr. at 21) Such phenomena became more likely as the dosage increased, 
reaching 25 percent for Risperidone at a 16 mg level (DX D), which he said is considered a high 
incidence. (5/9/06 Tr. at 22; see also DX C) He testified that the recorded incidence of neurologic 
malignant syndrome, or NMS, in patients taking these medications is 2 percent, with 20 percent 
mortality in patients suffering NMS, a death rate of 4 per 1,000. (4/9/06 Tr. 24) 
*13 As to defendant's own experience with medication, she reported having been treated in the past 
for mood disorder with Depakote, which is not an antipsychotic but rather a mood stabilizer. (5/4/06 
Tr. 64) The government has argued that defendant was treated successfully in the past with 
olanzapine for hypomanic or manic symptoms, which are among the symptoms of what Dr. Kleinman 
has diagnosed as psychotic disorder not otherwise specified, and therefore that she has already had a 
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successful experience with an antipsychotic drug. (Letter of Edward C. O'Callaghan, Esq. to the Court, 
June 2, 2006, at 1) However, those symptoms are not the ones that render her incompetent to stand 
trial, and that medication has not been suggested by anyone as a treatment for the delusional 
symptoms that do render her incompetent. 
II. 
I think there is no dispute here that the government has presented clear and convincing evidence 
with respect to the third element under Se//-that means other than forced medication will not suffice 
to treat Lindauer, who rejects the very notion that she needs treatment and who has refused to take 
medication. Notwithstanding an attachment to defense counsel's March 27, 2006 submission wherein 
defendant offers to take medication on condition, inter alia, that she be released on her own 
recognizance, that the court appoint its own expert, in Maryland, who is to be "agreeable to me and 
to my attorney", and that the defendant will nominate her own candidate whose office location is 
convenient for commuting purposes subject to the court's approval. (Letter of Sanford Talkin, Esq. to 
the Court, March 27, 2006, Ex. D) That is not a workable set of conditions, and simply confirms 
defendant's unwillingness to submit to medication. Nor has any mental health professional suggested 
a course of therapy that can mitigate defendant's delusions, which is not surprising when one 
considers that defendant rejects the notion that she needs treatment. 
As to the fourth Sell element, that administration of antipsychotic drugs be found to be in the 
patient's best medical interest in light of her medical condition, the parties have not addressed 
Lindauer's particular medical history in detail, and in view of the other findings in this opinion I see no 
need to address the issue. 
However, as to the first and second Sell elements, I believe for the following reasons that the 
government has failed to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. 
With respect to the first element, the government argues that acting as an unregistered agent of a 
foreign power inimical to this country's interests is a serious crime, as indeed it is, and that in 
assessing the government's interest in prosecution the court should look no further than the 10-year 
maximum sentence that Lindauer faces if she is convicted, drawing from the reference in Gomes to 
the penalty that defendant faced. For the reasons set forth immediately below, I disagree. 
* I 4 As noted above, the Supreme Court has directed that I consider "the facts of the individual case 
in evaluating the Government's interest in prosecution." 519 U.S. at 180, 117 S.Ct. 644. The dentist 
in Sell could commit the crimes with which he was charged-submitting false medical claims and 
money laundering-without interacting personally with anyone. The defendant in Gomes, charged as a 
felon in possession of a weapon, could do that and more without interacting personally with anyone, 
except insofar as he might threaten or shoot someone. Lindauer, on the other hand, could not act 
successfully as an agent of the Iraqi government without in some way influencing normal people. I 
recognize that it is only with great diffidence that a court should examine a case before it has been 
tried, but the Supreme Court has said in essence that I must consider whatever reality is presented to 
me, fragmentary though it may be. That is what I take the Court to mean by "consider the facts of 
the individual case." Appropriately diffident though I am, there is no indication that Lindauer ever 
came close to influencing anyone, or could have. The indictment charges only what it describes as an 
unsuccessful attempt to influence an unnamed government official, and the record shows that even 
lay people recognize that she is seriously disturbed. See supra at . As is also noted above, 
Lindauer has been found to pose a threat neither to herself nor to others. ( Id.) The government's 
interest here in prosecuting this defendant is significantly weaker than it was in either Sell or Gomes; 
it would be a denial of reality-of "the facts of the individual case"-to find otherwise. 
As to the second Sell factor, the government's case as proved before me was neither clear nor 
convincing. First, although I do not dispute the sincerity of Dr. Vas's testimony, or denigrate his 
qualifications, his testimony was formulaic and conclusory. The principal witness for the government 
was Dr. Kleinman, and his unguided testimony was not that forced administration of antipsychotic 
drugs was highly likely to succeed, but rather that it offered the only possibility of success. Those are 
two very different standards. Even under the leading examination of the prosecutor, his most 
emphatic endorsement of forced medication was that such treatment would "improve Ms. Lindauer's 
chances to be restored to mental competency to stand trial." ( Id. at 87) The most forceful 
recommendation for antipsychotic medication contained in his April 7, 2006, report was that second 
generation or atypical medication "would reasonably likely-safely-help her." (Kleinman 4/7/06 Report 
at 10) Even that statement, which, as noted, was supported solely by studies reflecting anecdotal 
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evidence, seems to fall short of the high likelihood required by Sell. Further, even if one were to read 
that statement, standing alone, as consistent with the requirements of Sell, one must recognize also 
that it does not stand alone. It is contradicted by Dr. Goldstein's view, and mitigated substantially by 
Lmdauer's lengthy delusional history. Dr. Drob pointed out that delusions of long standing Mare very 
difficult to treat, in large measure because the individual has built his/her entire identity around the 
belief in their validity." (Drob Report 2/28/05 at 15) 
*15 In sum, the gaps in the medical literature and experience pointed out by Dr. Goldstein as 
described above, including the unreliability of anecdotal evidence and the absence of controlled 
studies; Dr. Goldstein's own view that medication is unlikely to help, which is supported by the length 
of this defendant's delusional history; and the reasonable possibility that forced medication would 
simply strengthen Lmdauer's paranoid tendencies and distance her still further from her lawyer ( see 
supra at ), all demonstrate that there is simply not enough here to warrant a finding by 
clear and convincing evidence that Lindauer is substantially likely to be rendered competent by forced 
medication and substantially unlikely to suffer effects that will impinge upon a fair trial. 
For the above reasons, the government's motion is denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
FN1. Regrettably, these exhibits were not marked separately for identification, and 
accordingly will be referred to herein by the name of the reporting expert and the date of 
the report. In addition, various exhibits that were marked were received in evidence 
during the witnesses' testimony and will be referred to by their exhibit designations. 
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